No.40 War Course, No.1 School of Physical Training and Drill, 1942 (Back)

No.40 War Course, No.1 School of Physical Training and Drill, 1942 (Back)

We are searching data for your request:

Forums and discussions:
Manuals and reference books:
Data from registers:
Wait the end of the search in all databases.
Upon completion, a link will appear to access the found materials.

No.40 War Course, No.1 School of Physical Training and Drill, 1942 (Back)

This picture shows the back of a photo of No.40 War Course, No.1 School of Physical Training & Drill, RAF St. Athan, and has been signed by some of the men on the course.

Many thanks to Jennifer Deane for sending us these pictures. Her father was Corporal Kenneth Briggs, whose name is upside down at the base of the picture.

Army Air Forces Training Command

The US Army Air Forces in WWII had major subordinate Commands below the Air Staff level. These Commands were organized along functional missions. One such Command was the Flying Training Command (FTC). It began as Air Corps Flying Training Command on 23 January 1942, was redesignated Army Air Forces Flying Training Command (AAFTC) on 15 March 1942, and merged with Army Air Forces Technical Training Command to become Army Air Forces Training Command on 31 July 1943. Continuing service after the war, it was redesignated Air Training Command on 1 July 1946. During the consolidation of Air Force Major Commands in the retrenchment of the 1990s, Air Training Command assumed control of Air University and became Air Education and Training Command on 1 July 1993—today's Air Education and Training Command (AETC), which celebrated its 75th anniversary 23 January 2017. see the Lineage and honors statement for AETC.

Army Air Forces Flying Training Command's mission was conducting the flying program for new Army pilot candidates and air cadets. The program was divided in to stages including primary, advanced and specific classification such as pursuit, twin engine and multi-engine. These phases were prelude to Operational or Replacement training or crew training.

Notable Graduates

The United States Military Academy ranks fourth among the nation's colleges and universities in number of Rhodes Scholars with 90. Since 1973, 40 cadets have earned Hertz Foundation fellowships in Applied Physical Science disciplines, and 36 cadets since 1983 have been awarded a Marshall Scholarship to attend a British university.

Anthony Noto, CFO of Twitter

Kristin Baker,First woman Brigade Commander, U.S. Corps of Cadets.

Kelly Perdew, Winner of Donald Trump's "The Apprentice 2"

CLASS of 1986
Joe DePinto, CEO of 7-Eleven

CLASS of 1982
Alex Gorsky, CEO of Johnson & Johnson

Andrea Lee Hollen,Rhodes Scholar. First woman graduate of USMA.

Richard Morales, Jr.,Rhodes Scholar and physician. Morales was the first Hispanic cadet to serve as First Captain (cadet brigade commander).

Major General (Retired) Ronald Johnson, NBA Senior Vice President, Referee Operations

Robert Alan McDonald, CEO of Proctor & Gamble

Michael W. Krzyzewski,Krzyzewski currently serves as the head men’s basketball coach for Duke University.

William Foley II, Chairman of Fidelity National Financial, Inc.

Barry R. McCaffrey, McCaffrey’s many positions during his 32 years of military service include serving as deputy U.S. Representative to NATO from 1988-89, and later as Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Southern Command from 1994-96. After his retirement, he served as director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy during the Clinton administration from 1997-2001.

James V. Kimsey, Kimsey was the founding chairman of America On Line, and in 1996 was named their chairman emeritus. He also founded the Kimsey Foundation in 1996.

Pete Dawkins, Rhodes Scholar, Heisman Trophy Winner, Chairman and CEO Primerica.

John Block, Secretary of Agriculture, Reagan Administration, 1981-86.

H. Norman Schwarzkopf, As Commander-in-Chief, United States Central Command from 1988-91, Schwarzkopf's command ultimately responded to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait with the largest U.S. deployment since the Vietnam War, including portions of the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps as well as units from dozens of nations around the world. The success of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm marked what former President George Bush hailed as "the beginning of a new era of internationalism." After retiring, Schwarzkopf received the Presidential Medal of Freedom.

John R. Galvin, Among his many position, Galvin served as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and the Commander-in-Chief, United States European Command from 1987-1992.

Randolph Araskog, President and chairman of IT&T.

Thoralf M. Sundt, Doctor of Neurosurgery at the Mayo Clinic.


Edward White II, Astronaut 1962-67 first American to walk in space, 1965 died in Apollo spacecraft fire, 1967.

Michael Collins, Astronaut 1964-70 command module pilot, first manned lunar landing director of the National Air & Space Museum.

Roscoe Robinson, Jr., Commanding general, 82nd Airborne Division 1976-78 commanding general, U.S. Army Japan 1980-82 U.S. Representative to NATO Military Committee, 1982-85 first African American four-star general in the Army, 1982.

Edwin E. "Buzz" Aldrin, Astronaut 1963-72 participated in the first manned lunar landing.

Frank Borman, Astronaut 1962-70 commander of the first circumlunar flight president of Eastern Airlines.

Fidel V. Ramos, One of the Academy’s international cadets, Ramos served as a Philippine Army officer after graduation. He eventually became the country’s military’s Chief of Staff and later Secretary of National Defense. He later served as President of the Republic of the Philippines from 1992-1998.

John G. Hayes, Former president, Coca-Cola Bottling Co.

Ralph Puckett, Puckett formed and commanded the 8th Army Ranger Company during the Korean War. Following the war, Puckett served as commander of the Mountain Ranger Division of the Ranger Department, and as the Ranger advisor in the U.S. Army Mission to Colombia where he planned and established the Colombian Army Ranger School.

Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Chief of Staff to the president 1973-74 Supreme Allied Commander in Europe 1974-79 president, United Technologies Corporation 1980-81 Secretary of State 1981-82.

Brent Scowcroft, Military assistant to the President, 1972 National Security Advisor, Bush Administration.

Wesley W. Posvar, Rhodes Scholar chancellor, University of Pittsburgh.

Reuben Pomerantz, Former president, Holiday Inns of America.

Alexander R. Nininger, Killed before his 24th birthday, Alexander "Sandy" Nininger died a hero. His heroism, character and commitment to the West Point ideals of Duty, Honor and Country made him worthy of emulation by future Army Officers. Nininger single-handedly charged into the enemy positions with a rifle, grenades and fixed bayonet. For his heroism "above and beyond the call of duty," President Roosevelt posthumously awarded him the Medal of Honor. In his honor for outstanding leadership and the virtues he embodied, the Corps of Cadets named the First Division of Cadet Barracks in his memory.

William T. Seawell, Commandant of Cadets, U.S. Air Force Academy 1961-63 former chairman of the board and chief executive officer, Pan Am World Airways.

Creighton W. Abrams, Jr., Abrams commanded the 37th Tank Battalion in World War II. He served in the Korean War as a Corps Chief of Staff and commanded at all levels from regiment through corps. General Abrams commanded the U.S. Army Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, from 1968 to 1972. He successfully ensured the safe withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam at the end of the conflict. Appointed Chief of Staff of the Army in 1972, he guided the rebuilding of the Army. The Abrams main battle tank is named in his honor.

William O. Darby, Darby organized and commanded the 1st U.S. Army Ranger Battalion in 1942. From 2,000 volunteers, Darby selected and trained 500 Rangers that successfully operated in North Africa and Tunisia. Darby trained and organized two more Ranger Battalions in 1943. The 1st, 3rd, and 4th Ranger Battalions were known as "Darby's Rangers," and were famous for their endeavors in the Sicilian and Italian campaigns. He was killed while leading a task force from the 10th Mountain Division in Northern Italy and posthumously promoted to brigadier general.

Frank D. Merrill, Commanded the 5307th Composite Unit, also known as Merrill's Marauders, in 1944. Following World War II, Merrill served as Chief of Staff of the Western Defense Command, and later served as Chief of Staff and as Commander of the 6th Army. In 1947, he became deputy Chief of the American Military Advisory Mission to the Philippines.

Maxwell D. Taylor, Commanded the 101st Airborne Division on D-Day, and during the Battle of the Bulge and the drive through Germany. Taylor served as Superintendent, USMA, 1945-49. He returned to Germany as U.S. Commander, Berlin, 1949-51, then took command of the Eighth Army, Korea, 1953-54. Taylor was Army Chief of Staff, 1955-59 and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1962-64 after retirement in 1964, with the rank of General, Taylor served as U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam, 1964.

Mark W. Clark, Clark succeeded Ridgway as U.S. and Supreme Allied Commander, Far East, from 1952-53. He successfully negotiated the armistice with the Communist forces in North Korea in July 1953, and later served as president of The Citadel, a military college in Charleston, S.C., from 1954-65.

Matthew B. Ridgway, Ridgway served in many positions during World War II, including commanding general of the 82nd Airborne Division and commanding general of the XVIII Airborne Corps. Later, he served as U.S. and Supreme Allied Commander, Far East, from 1951-52, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, from 1952-53, and Army Chief of Staff from 1953-55.

Omar N. Bradley, Commanding general, 1st Army, 12th Army Group European Theater in World War II Army Chief of Staff 1948-49 first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1949-53 chairman of the board of Bulova Watch Company 1958.

Dwight D. Eisenhower,, Supreme Commander Allied Forces Europe 1943-45 Army Chief of Staff 1945-48 president of Columbia University 1948 President of the United States 1953-61.

George S. Patton, Jr., Member of the 1912 U.S. Olympic Team commanding general of the 7th Army 1942-44, commander of the 3rd Army European Theater 1944-45.

Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, Pioneer of Army Aviation General of the Air Force 1949.

Adna R. Chaffee, Jr.,Chaffee is known as the “father of the Armor Branch.” Despite a lifelong love of horses and riding, he spearheaded the movement of the American Army into "armored warfare."

Douglas MacArthur,Superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy 1919-22 Army Chief of Staff 1930-35 Supreme Commander of the Pacific 1941-45 Supreme Commander, UN Forces Korea 1950-51.

Antonio Barrios,Barrios, the Academy’s first international cadet to graduate, went on to serve as Guatemala’s minister of public works.

John J. Pershing,Commander-in-chief of the Allied Expeditionary Force in World War I General of the Armies 1919.

George Washington Goethals,Architect and builder of the Panama Canal.

Henry O. Flipper,Civil and mining engineer in Southwest U.S. and Mexico first African-American graduate of the Military Academy.

George A. Custer,After establishing a reputation of daring and brilliance in battle, Custer served as an aide to Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, Class of 1846, during the Peninsular Campaign and was commissioned a brigadier general at the age of 23. After conducting several successful operations in 1864, he was placed at the head of the 3rd Division, Calvary Corps, and was brevetted major general of volunteers. In 1876, he and his regiment of 655 men were defeated at the Battle of Little Big Horn.

Oliver O. Howard,Founder and president of Howard University.

James E. B. Stuart,As a cavalry officer and later as commanding general of cavalry in the Confederate Army, Stuart distinguished himself and his cavalry brigade for acts of valor and gallantry. He fought in many fierce battles, including the Battle of Seven Pines he led multiple raids on Gen. Ewell's depots he protected the Confederate retreat from Gettysburg. He was killed during a battle against forces commanded by Sheridan.

Ambrose P. Hill,Hill is best known for his performance as an aggressive Confederate division commander who could move his troops at astonishing speeds. His finest hour was the forced march from Harper's Ferry to Antietam, which saved Lee's Army during the Civil War. In May of 1863, Lee described Hill as “the best soldier of his grade with me.” Fort A. P. Hill, Va., was named in his honor.

Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson,Lieutenant general and a corps commander of the Confederate Army killed at Chancellorsville.

George B. McClellen,Graduating second in his class, McClellan served as Commanding General of the Army from 1861-62. He was nominated for President in 1864, and served as governor of his home state of N.J., from 1878-1881. Fort McClellan, Ala., was named in his honor.

George E. Pickett,At Gettysburg, Pa., in 1863, Pickett led more than 4,500 Confederate troops over half a mile of broken ground against withering artillery and musket fire. With parade drill precision they descended one slope, ascended the next, and assaulted the formidable Union line only to be forced back in defeat. Less than one fourth of the troops returned from the charge. The event, which was later called "Pickett's Charge," proved to be a turning point in the war. He continued to serve the Confederacy with great devotion throughout 1864 and 1865. Fort Pickett, Va., was named in his honor.

Ulysses S. Grant,General in Chief, Armies of the United States President of the United States, 1869-77.

George Henry Thomas,The "Rock of Chickamauga."

William Tecumseh Sherman,President of Louisiana State University "March to the Sea" Civil War campaign commander of the Armies of the United States.

John Sedgwick,Sedgwick was the Commander of the Union VI Corps during the Civil War and was killed at the Battle of Spotsylvania.

George G. Meade,Commander of the Army of the Potomac victorious in the Battle of Gettysburg.

Benjamin S. Ewell,President of the College of William & Mary 1854-88.

Robert E. Lee,Superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy 1852-55 General in Chief, Confederate Armies president of Washington & Lee University 1865-70.

Jefferson Davis,Member of Congress from Mississippi 1845-461 senator from Mississippi 1847-51, 1857-61 Secretary of War from 1853-57 President of the Confederate States of America.

Leonidas Polk,Episcopal bishop of Louisana served as lieutenant general of the Confederate States of America honorary degree of Sacred Theology from Columbia University founded the University of the South at Sewanee in 1857.

Dennis Hart Mahan,Distinguished educator and writer world renowned scholar taught the science of war to numerous Army officers.

George Washington Whistler,Eminent civil engineer chosen by the Czar of Russia to build a railroad from Moscow to St. Petersburg.

Horace Webster,Founder of Hobart College, 1822 founder and president of City College of New York 1848-69.

Benjamin L.E. Bonneville,Explored and mapped the Great Salt Lake and the Green, Snake, Salmon and Yellowstone Rivers, venturing into the unknown American West. His explorations were memorialized.

Sylvanus Thayer,Preeminent educator, "Father of the Military Academy" originated technical education in America and established the educational philosophy and discipline still followed at the Military Academy.

No.40 War Course, No.1 School of Physical Training and Drill, 1942 (Back) - History

The United States Marine Corps is a military service forming part of the Naval Establishment. The Continental Congress on November 10, 1775, authorized Marines as part of the Continental military forces, but they were disbanded after the Revolution. An Act of Congress, dated July 11, 1798, established the Marine Corps. 1

Reference is made in the Act to the employment of Marines in the Navy in the following words: "The President of the United States may detach and appoint such of the officers of this Marine Corps to act on board the frigates and any of the armed vessels . . . in the service of the United States." The Marine Corps was charged in the Act with other duties as follows: "The Marine Corps . . . shall, at any time, be liable to do duty in the forts and garrisons in the United States, on the seacoast, or any other duty on shore, as the President, at his discretion, shall direct."

Nowhere in the Act is the Marine Corps described as part of the Navy, or of the Army. The working of the Act led to much argument for many years as to the legal status of the Marine Corps with respect to the other armed services of the Federal Government. An Act of COngress, dated June 30, 1834, 2 clarified the matter somewhat, but the only references to the Navy or the Navy Department in that Act are found in Section 2, "that said Corps shall at all times be subject to and under the laws and regulations . . . established for the better government of the Navy except when detached for service with the Army," and in Section 4, "that no officer of the Marine Corps shall exercise command over any Navy Yard or vessel of the United States."

Additional legislation and interpretations of laws affecting the Marine Corps followed in later years. An example is a Comptroller's decision and

Attorney General's opinion given on page 359 of "Laws Relating to the Navy--Annotated--in Force March 4, 1921" stating that "The Marine Corps is not one of the Bureaus of the Navy Department. It is a part of the Naval Establishment, but it is not a part of the Navy Department as established at the seat of government it is under the supervision of an Executive Department but that relation to the Department is not the same as being part of it." 3

By World War II it had been generally accepted that the Marine Corps is not an integral part of the Navy, but is a part of the Naval Establishment, and that only the Secretary of the Navy as the Deputy of the President has authority to give direct orders to the Commandant of the Corps.

The Act of 1798, establishing the Corps, gave the President wide powers for its employment on a great variety of duties. President Jackson in 1836 ordered the Marines to duty with the Army in the war with the Seminole Indians. Marines have fought side by side with the Army in all wars since then. In addition to service with other troops in declared wars and to its routine ceremonial, guard, and security duties on ships, at U.S. Embassies and Legations, and at naval shore stations, Marines have been used extensively in various parts of the world, to protect lives and property, and to restore order.

There were some 180 instances from 1800 to 1934 of landing forces composed of Marines for performing duties of the kind mentioned. Such forces ranged in size from simple landings by the Marine guards of ships to large expeditionary forces specially trained on shore and equipped with artillery, air units and other combat and support facilities. The effect was to require the Corps to be prepared at all times for any form of employment to meet emergency situations. Such employment was largely responsible for the high morale and esprit de corps characteristic of Marine Corps personnel.

During the period from the Spanish-American War to World War I, many officers, particularly the younger ones, pressed for an overhaul of Marine Corps thinking on organization and on the education of its officers in Marine Corps schools, in such matters as the development of Marine Corps doctrine, and its dissemination to Marine Corps personnel, the formulation of orders, the preparation of better manuals and like matters. The importance of doctrine was stressed particularly in order to provide a foundation for mutual understanding between the various echelons of command during hostile operations. Re-appraisal of the Marine Corps' mission

was also urged by many officers who believed the most important role of the Marines in war to be service as ground troops in amphibious operations undertaken jointly with the Navy. 4

Marine Corps interest in modern amphibious operations dates back to the success in June 1898 of the Navy-Marine Corps team in seizing against enemy opposition a site for a naval base in Guantanamo Bay needed to support the U.S. FLeet blockading the Spanish squadron in the harbor of Santiago. 5

The failure of the Gallipoli amphibious operation undertaken by the British in 1915 during World War I still further stimulated interest in this type of warfare. Organization, training, and command responsibility, based largely on these two events, became the center of Marine Corps thinking on the subject. But,l not until 1921 were comprehensive studies undertaken by Marine Corps schools to develop a doctrine and the techniques for amphibious operations. 6 A number of years were, however, still to pass before a specially organized, trained, and equipped Fleet Marine Force came into being.

Fleet Marine Force. In the winter of 1902, landing exercises were held on the Puerto Rican Island of Culebra by the Atlantic Fleet with Marines from the ships participating. In 1923 that island and nearby Vieques were acquired for carrying out such exercises, as they had beaches suitable for the debarkation and embarkation of troops. Landing exercises were conducted on Culebra in 1924 and again in 1935, repeated each year thereafter through 1940. Eventually gunfire from ships and aviation support for the landing forces were included. The troops consisted principally of Marines specially organized and under training for such duty. In 1925 and

in 1932 similar exercises were held in the Hawaiian Islands, later also at San Clemente, an island off the coast of California.

Paralleling these exercises, Headquarters Staff and Marine Corps schools were studying the many problems involved in amphibious warfare. O RANGE War Plans envisioned that a war with Japan would be a practically continuous naval campaign in the Pacific, involving frequent amphibious operations to seize and to hold Japanese-occupied islands for conversion to advance bases or to neutralize them as enemy strongholds. It was expected that these island bastions would be stubbornly held and would require specially trained and completely integrated sea, land, and air forces for their conquest. In the plans the role of ground troops, especially for the early undertakings, was assigned largely to the Marine Corps.

In accordance with a recommendation of the Commandant of the Marine Corps, approved by the Chief of Naval Operations, a Fleet Marine Force was established in December 1933 by order of the Secretary of the Navy. 7 An official definition of the term "Fleet Marine Force" based on the experience of World War II is given in General Order 245, dated 27 November 1946, as follows: "A Fleet Marine Force is defined as a balanced force of land, air, and service elements of the U.S. Marine Corps, which is integral with the U.S. Pacific and/or Atlantic Fleet. It has the status of a full Type command, and is organized, trained, and equipped for the seizure or defence of advance naval bases and for the conduct of limited amphibious or land operations essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign."

A provisional Landing Operations Manual was prepared by Marine Corps Schools in 1934 to provide doctrine, instructions, and regulations for the training and employment of the Fleet Marine Force. The precepts of the manual were tested extensively in Fleet exercises and revised as necessary during the following years. In 1938 the manual was adopted as landing operations doctrine by the Navy, and also by the Army in 1941.

A few of the many logistics problems that confronted the Marine Corps in making an efficient fighting machine of the Fleet Marine Force were the addition of extensive training facilities on shore, and the development in cooperation with the technical Bureaus of landing craft more suitable than ships' boats for moving men and materials from ship to shore and of special weapons and equipment needed in amphibious operations.

Thus, the Fleet Marine Force became a major administrative preoccupation of Marine Corps Headquarters during the decade preceding the outbreak of World War II, and so continued throughout the war. No peacetime training and logistic program paid greater dividends than the investment

Administrative Organization

The status of the Marine Corps in the Naval Establishment and its principal functions have been briefly outlined in the foregoing pages. It is a separate service within the Naval Establishment, and as such is responsible for its own internal administration. In actual practice, however, the Marine Corps lacks some of the elements necessary to make it truly autonomous. It relies completely, for example, on the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery and the Chaplain's Corps for the services performed by those naval activities, and during World War II depended to a considerable degree on the War and Navy Departments for its weapons, ammunition, food, and many other logistic items, such as aircraft and landing craft. Its activities were therefore an important element in the administration of the Navy Department during the period with which this history deals.

Headquarters United States Marine Corps in Washington, located during much of World War II under the same roof with the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Fleet, some of the Bureaus, and other upper level elements of the Navy Department, provided the mechanism for the administration of the Corps. Headquarters consisted of the Commandant, who commands the Corps, and of an organization to carry out the manifold responsibilities involved in the administration of the Corps.

The Commandant is appointed by the President. Under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, he procures, discharges, trains, disciplines, and distributes Marine Corps officers and enlisted personnel he operates and maintains Marine Corps posts and stations and he has general supervision of all estimates, expenditures, and supplies needed for the maintenance of the Marine Corps. Current Navy Regulations define his responsibilities in some detail.

The Commandant's responsibilities derive from acts of Congress, and from executive direction by the President, or Secretary of the Navy acting for him. They spell out the Commandant's authority for administering the Corps. His authority in that field has not been seriously questioned since an early Secretary of the Navy ruled against Navy ship captains who attempted to reassign or discharge Marines serving aboard their vessels. 8

Major General Thomas Holcomb (later General), USMC
Commandant of the Marine Corps, Dec. 1936-Jan. 1944.

Although only the Secretary of the Navy, as the Deputy of the President, was empowered to give orders to the Commandant, the relationship between him and the Chief of Naval Operations was of the closest during the period of World War II. Hardly a day passed without informal meetings between General Holcomb and Admiral Stark, and their staff, and later, between their successors, for the discussion of matters involving the Marine Corps. Proposed policies were often taken up in a preliminary way with the Secretary of the Navy, then worked out jointly by the staffs, and finally formalized in directives issued by the Secretary.

There is nothing in the law limiting the Commandant to an administrative role or preventing him from taking command in the field, but

no Commandant has done so since Colonel Archibald Henderson led a regiment against the Indians in Georgia and Florida in 1836.* Other 19th century commandants could have imitated their predecessor had they chosen, but they evidently preferred to confine their activities to administering the Marine Corps from its Headquarters in Washington. Increased administrative burdens, which came with the growth of the Marine Corps after the turn of the century, effectively tied later Commandants to their desks.

To assist Commandants in administering the Marine Corps, a Headquarters staff had been gradually built up in Washington. In 1939, on the eve of the outbreak of war in Europe, it was composed of two basic elements. These were the planning and policy staff, to assist in policy formulation, and the administrative staff, to translate policy decisions into action. Coordinating all staff activities was the major responsibility of the Assistant Commandant, who acted as Headquarters Chief of Staff.

The planning and policy staff was first organized in 1920 as a result of World War I experience. Originally designated the Division of Operations and Training, it underwent several reorganizations, finally emerging by 1939 as the Division of Plans and Policies with a five-section composition similar to that of the War Department General Staff. The five sections were: M-1, Personnel M-2, Intelligence M-3, Training and Operations M-4, Supply and M-5, War Plans. 10 Chart No. 1, approved by the Commandant on 1 February 1940, shows this organization.

The adoption of the Army staff organization was the natural consequence of Army influences on Marine Corps staff officers attended the Army War College and the Command and General Staff School where they were exposed to Army Staff concepts. These same concepts were taught at Marine Corps Schools, and they were put in practice by Marines in the field before they were adopted at Headquarters. It was not surprising that the planning staff at Headquarters, in effect the general staff for the Marine Corps, resembled the War Department General Staff. 11

The administrative staff consisted of three departments and four independent divisions. The departments, all dating from the early years of the Corps, were: the Quartermaster's, responsible for all supply, for preparation of budget estimates, and the disbursement of all funds except pay of

troops the Paymaster's, charged with the payment of troops and the Adjutant and Inspector's, which combined inspection duties with personnel administration. Of the four divisions, all dating from after World War I, two, Personnel and Recruiting, shared with the Adjutant and Inspector the function of personnel administration. The other two, Aviation and Reserve, had cognizance of the specialized activities indicated by their titles. 12 Presumably due to an oversight, the official chart, Figure 30, dated 1 February 1940, does not show the Division of Recruiting as a separate division.

On 8 September 1939, President Roosevelt in connection with the declaration of a national emergency authorized slight increases in the armed forces. The months which followed were ones of gradual mobilization, increasing in tempo as the tide of war turned against the western allies. Although the Marine Corps participated in the partial mobilization of this short-of-war period, increasing about 300 percent from 8 September 1939 to 7 December 1941, the resulting administrative burdens were not sufficient to necessitate any major changes in staff organization. However, three developments are worth noting. The first was the abolition of the M-5 section and the assumption of its duties by M-3 in the fall of 1941. The second was the creation of the Division of Public Relations. Finally and most important was the development of the Division of Reserve into the primary officer procurement agency, owing to the fact that most of the officers recruited for the expanding Marine Corps were given reserve commissions. The result was further to decentralize responsibility for personnel administration. 13

Headquarters Staff Developments. On 7 December 1941, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor brought the days of peacetime development of the Marine Corps staff to a close. The declarations of war against Germany, Italy, and Japan were the signal to begin mobilization of the nation's resources. The conduct of its share of the mobilization of the nation's resources. The conduct of its share of the mobilization put the staff organization of Headquarters Marine Corps to a crucial test.

The organization of the Division of Plans and Policies into four sections proved to be a sound one, well suited to guiding the administrative activities of the wartime Marine Corps. However, the rapid expansion of the Division in the early part of the war led to the setting up of two new sections with duties which encroached upon functions of the existing four sections.

The Gunnery Section, established 26 January 1942, was the first of these. It combined the functions of the old Artillery Section of M-3 and

the operational responsibilities of the Target Practice Section which had been a part of the Adjutant and Inspector's Department. Formerly, the supervision of small arms training and the keeping of records pertaining thereto had been duties of the Target Practice Section. All other weapons training was supervised by the Artillery Section. Under the new organization, the Gunnery Section prescribed the courses of fire, instruction, and record practices for all ground and boat weapons in use by the Marine Corps took charge of the training and distribution of fire control personnel supervised formal schools in fire control and coast and field artillery maintained liaison with the Army and Navy and recommended the procurement of ranges, their location, and operation. The Target Practice Section in the Adjutant and Inspector's Department continued to maintain all records pertaining to weapons training. It also assisted M-4 in planning ammunition allowances and participated with M-3 in planning and supervising the design, development, and employment of tanks, ordnance, and artillery. 14

The other activity set up as a separate section of the Division of Plans and Policies was the Communications Section. Its function included the supervision of communications training within the Marine Corps, the development of signal equipment, the examination and promotion of communications personnel and assistance to M-3 in organizing communications units. 15

The development of these new sections in the Division of Plans and Policies, with their wide variety of duties, tended to break down the boundary lines between the functional components of the staff. Responsibility for training, for personnel, and for materiel, were no longer each the responsibility of a separate section. Jurisdiction over all of them was spread over several sections, resulting in losses in coordination and supervision. 16

To remedy these defects, the Division of Plans and Policies was reorganized in March 1944. The Gunnery and Communications Sections were abolished and their functions distributed among other sections of the Division. The personnel and materiel functions were assigned to M-1 and M-4 respectively, while the training duties, along with those which had formerly been the responsibility of M-3, were concentrated in a new section designated M-5, Training. 17

Lieutenant General Alexander A. Vandegrift (later General) USMC
Commandant of the Marine Corps, Jan. 1944-Dec. 1947.
administrative functions. At the request of the Commandant, the Secretary of the Navy asked Congress for the necessary legislation, and on 1 May, the Personnel Department was organized. The Adjutant and Inspector's Department, and the Divisions of Personnel, Reserve, and Recruiting were absorbed by this new organization. 18

The abolition of the Adjutant and Inspector's Department left the housekeeping and inspection duties formerly discharged by that department to be reassigned. On 1 July 1943, the Administrative Division was organized to handle the housekeeping functions. It was to administer civilians employed in Headquarters, issue bulletins and memoranda, and take responsibility for security of Headquarters. It was not until July 1945 that the Inspection duties were disposed of by the establishment of the Inspection Division under command of the Inspector General. 19 Figure 31, approved by the Commandant, General Vandegrift on 10 May 1945, shows the overall organization of Headquarters with which the Marine Corps emerged from World War II, except that an Inspector General was added in July 1945, as just mentioned. Other charts showing in detail the organization of the respective subdivisions are available in the historical files at Headquarters.

By contrast with the personnel administration agencies, the activities concerned with supply and finance proved to be soundly organized. They met the test of mobilization very well. The Quartermaster Department expanded during the war to three times its original size. In the course of this expansion, only one major administrative change took place. The Supply Department grew so large that each of its component sections were elevated to division status. The Paymaster Department changed even less. Its staff at Headquarters increased five-fold during the war, but its administrative structure remained substantially unchanged. 20

Administrative Operations--Personnel

In 1939, the Commandant had been unable to build up the Marine Corps top the strength needed under existing war plans. The isolationist sentiment and determination not to be involved in another European war, so prevalent in the United States during the two decades following World War I, prevented the creation of adequate armed forces. Most Americans saw no need for large military and naval establishments, and Congress faithfully reflected their views. As a result, there were only 19,432 Marines on active duty on 1 July 1939. Backing up the regular establishment was a Marine Corps Reserve of 16,025. 21

Under war plans current in the middle thirties, the Marine Corps was committed to furnish expeditionary forces totalling about 30,000 officers and men within 45 days of the beginning of hostilities. As this figure was clearly far in excess of the total available strength of the Marine Corps, the Division of Operations and Training drew up a plan in 1937 which would achieve a 28,781 strength by 30 June 1942.

The partial rearmament of the short-of-war period enabled the Marine Corps to build up at a rate much faster than that called for by the 1937 plan. By 7 December 1941, Marine personnel totalled about 63,000 officers and men, representing an increase of about 300 percent in 27 months.

President Roosevelt, at the time of his declaration of limited national emergency on 8 September 1939, made a modest beginning towards rearmament. He authorized an increase of Marine Corps strength to 25,000 for the 1940 fiscal year, but this meager authorization was not immediately followed up. 22 In Europe, the winter of 1939-1940 was the political climate in the United States favorable to a further increase. In May of that year, the Commandant appealed to Congress for 7,500 additional Marines. Prodded by Nazi successes in France, Congress offered him funds for an increase of 9,000, raising the authorized strength of the Marine Corps to 34,000 enlisted men. Further increases occurred during the summer under the provision of the law permitting the Marine Corps 20 percent of Navy strength. By September, the Marine personnel ceiling had reached 38,000. As a final strength increase during the short-of-war period, 79,757 were authorized for the fiscal year 1942. 23

Supplementing these additions to the regular Marine Corps, was the mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve, which added an additional 15,927 to the active duty rolls. On 15 October 1940, general mobilization orders were issued to all members of Reserve battalions. Ten days later, the Fleet Marine Reserve, composed of former enlisted Marines with more than 16 years service was called back to the colors. The volunteer reserve, which included reservists who did not belong to organized units, was ordered up in two groups, the first on 14 December 1940, and the second on 12 May 1941. 24

In spite of the three-fold expansion achieved since September 1939, the Marine Corps had still not achieved its desired state of readiness, for commitments expanded more rapidly than additional Marines could be authorized, procured, and trained. The Fleet Marine Force, which in September 1939 had included two brigades, and two aircraft groups, had, by December 1941, grown to a force composed of two divisions, two aircraft wings, and 13 defense battalions. In addition, the Navy building program called for many more Marines afloat and at Navy shore installations. On the eve of U.S. entry into World War II, the top-level estimate of the resources of men and material needed to defeat the prospective enemies, Germany, Italy, and Japan, was the Victory Program. It called for a force of 161,816 Marines--almost 100,000 more than were available on 7 December 1941. 25

The entry of the United States into the War, following the attack on Pearl Harbor, did not lead to a speedy achievement of full mobilization for the Marine Corps. Mobilization was stepped up to take in men as rapidly as they could be absorbed, but the demands for Marines for amphibious forces, for ship detachments, and for shore station guards quickly exceeded the estimates of the Victory Program. Not until July 1944 did personnel growth level off at about 475,600, a figure which was to remain stable until a final spurt during the last two months of the War. This added another 10,000 to make the peak Marine Corps strength 485,113 in August 1945. 26

The first two and one-half years of war were therefore ones of constant striving to build up to full mobilization strength. Hardly had one strength figure been set than it was superseded by a higher one, necessitating constant revisions in personnel planning. The period of expansion fell into two phases. The first of these, covering the initial eight months of the war, was characterized by uncoordinated increases for all the services. Each service estimated its own manpower requirements and submitted

them to the President for approval. During these eight months, Marine Corps strength authorizations jumped from 75,000 to 223,000 enlisted men.

This increase was achieved in three stages. On 16 December, the President authorized 104,000 for fiscal 1942. 27 By the beginning of February, the build-up to 104,000 had almost been achieved. In view of continuously expanding Marine commitments for the FMF and naval installations afloat and ashore, the Commandant, General Thomas Holcomb, requested the Secretary of the Navy to approved 130,000 enlisted strength for the fiscal year 1942, and 200,000 for the following fiscal year. On the advice of Admiral King, who felt that it was too early to determine 1943 needs, the Secretary cut the Marine request to 180,000 for calendar 1943. The President accepted the recommendation on 11 February. 28 On 11 May, the Commandant's request for 186,000 by 31 December 1942 and 220,000 by 30 June 1943 was approved. Scarcely more than two months passed when the President was asked to approve a further increase to 223,000 by 31 December 1942. This he did on 16 July 1942. 29

With the approval of a strength of 223,000, the President discontinued the practice of acting on manpower requests sent to him directly by the Secretary of the Navy. Realizing the need for comprehensive manpower planning, the President, in August 1942, directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to undertake a study of the armed forces manpower requirements for the calendar year 1943. For the remainder of the War, the President only acted on manpower requests in the form of JCS recommendations.

The President's decision to refer military manpower questions to the JCS meant for the Marine Corps that representatives of the Army would have a voice in Marine manpower decisions, as became apparent very shortly. Formerly, the Secretary of the Navy, with the advice of the CNO, had acted upon manpower requests from the Commandant. He could accept, reject, or modify them. Having reached a decision, the Secretary then made recommendations to the President for final action.

The first Marine manpower decision under the new procedure was made on 4 September 1942. On that date, the President approved a recommendation of the JCS that the Marine Corps strength on 30 June 1943 be set at 306,661 officers and men. 30

The decision of 4 September was in effect less than a month when it was superseded. In considering the troop bases for all services for 1943, the chiefs, in a generous mood because of the plenitude of manpower,

readily accepted the requests of all the services. Presidential approval of these JCS recommendations raised the Marine Corps approved strength for 1943 to 360,215. 31

Manpower became a critical item, however, in preparing the troop bases for 1944. The shipbuilding program, expansion of the shore establishment, need for larger amphibious forces to carry out strategic missions, and demands for combat replacements called for an expansion of naval forces to 3,824,000, of which 559,000 would be Marines. The Army also requested an increase to 8,208,000. In view of the fact that estimates by civilian agencies of the government set the manpower available for the armed forces at a figure approximately 1,138,000 lower than the Army-Navy total, the Navy proposed that the Army figures be cut. The Army agreed, and the Maddox Committee, appointed for the purpose, reconsidered strategic goals and proposed a reduction in the Army troop base to 7,657,000.

Having disposed of the Army manpower excesses, the Maddox Committee turned its attention to the Navy, seeking to discover unnecessary activities and duplications of effort. One of the duplications, said the committee, was the Marine Corps, which was being built into a ground force comparable to the Army. The nation did not need nor could it afford two such forces.

The Maddox report, raising as it did the question of the roles of the services, led to the appointment of a committee to review service missions. No agreement could be reached on the roles of the services, so the members concentrated instead on eliminating specific duplications. Once again, the Marine Corps came in for special attention from the Army. After representatives on the committee proposed to hold the Marine Corps down to the 1943 strength. Navy members took the opposite view, maintaining that a Marine Corps which was only 14 percent of Navy strength was not a wasteful duplication of Army Ground Forces and would hasten victory. The committee on missions of the services was completely at odds on this and on other questions. As a result, no report was ever made.

With the strong support of the Navy, the Marine Corps had defeated the Army attempt to hold it to the level of the 1943 troop base. However, the original Marine Corps request for 559,000 proved to be unrealistic in the light of a limited supply of manpower. The JCS, therefore, approved a strength of 478,000 for calendar 1944. This action, taken on 9 November 1943, marked the end of JCS manpower planning during World War II. 32

One final strength increase was authorized for the Marine Corps directly by the President on 29 May 1945. But it was granted merely to maintain the fighting strength of the Marine Corps at the previously agreed level. Owing to miscalculations in the numbers of men unavailable, hospitalized, in transit, and permanently disabled, awaiting transfer to the Veteran's Administration, an additional 25,000 was granted, making the final authorized strength of the Marine Corps 503,000. 33 Actual strength, however, never exceeded 485,113.

Personnel Procurement. During the six years between 1939 and 1945, procurement procedures for both officers and enlisted men underwent drastic changes, but only in the case of officers was the change dictated by a failure of the peacetime system to meet wartime conditions. The greatly increased demand for additional officers led to adoption of the officer candidate program to tap the rich reservoir of current college graduates. On the other hand, the system of voluntary enlistments for other than officers which had been employed successfully in peacetime, proved more than adequate also in wartime to fill the need for enlisted personnel. However, the eventual order of the President placing the Corps under Selective Service forced the abandonment of the voluntary system. The Selective Service system consistently failed to meet quotas, and only the continuance of voluntary recruiting of 17-year-olds (not subject to Selective Service) prevented serious shortages of enlisted men.

Enlisted Procurement. During the peacetime years before 1939, Marine recruiting was on a voluntary and highly selective basis. Because of the reputation of the Corps as a fighting force and the very small quotas to be filled, many more men applied than could be taken. Out of 36,356 applicants during 1939, for instance, on 5,861 could actually be enlisted. The Recruiting Service, organized into four geographical divisions, each containing districts and substations was geared to this type of selective recruiting. 34

The shift to a mass production basis began on the day President Roosevelt issued his declaration of a limited national emergency. On 8 September, dispatches went to all recruiting divisions suspending quotas until further notice in order to reach as quickly as possible the newly authorized enlisted strength of 25,000. 35 By February 1940, the goal had been reached. In five months 7,000 new Marines had joined the Corps. By comparison, the total recruiting effort for the previous year had resulted in taking only 5,861 enlistments.

Strength increases, which followed each other in rapid succession during the next two years, kept Marine recruiters working at a stepped-up tempo. However, the attainment of strength increases from February 1940 to December 1941 was spread out evenly by the re-imposition of monthly quotas.

To meet the demands of the partial mobilization of the short-of-war period, the recruiting service increased its personnel and opened new districts and substations. Recruiters, both new and old, perfected their organizations and polished their skills during the moths before Pearl Harbor. When the larger challenge of total mobilization came after the declaration of war against the Axis Powers, the Marine recruiting service was ready to meet it.

Marine recruiting officers opened their doors on 8 December 1941 to find long lines of young men eager to join the Marines. in the days that followed, there was no slacking off in the numbers seeking to enlist. Faced with an abundant supply of manpower, the Commandant accepted the recommendation of his staff to achieve the newly authorized enlisted strength of 104,000 as quickly as possible. As in September 1939, he once again removed all quota restrictions, and increased recruiting personnel by 50 percent. By the end of February, the goal had been achieved. A total of 44,947 new recruits had joined the Marine Corps during the period 1 December 1941 to 28 February 1942. This was an increase of more than 600 percent over the 6,510 recruited during the preceding three-month period. 36

The rapid build-up to 104,000 put great strains on the recruit depots, necessitating a shortening of the training cycle with a resulting reduction in the quality of recruit depot graduates. Realizing the importance of an even flow of recruits into the recruit depots, the Commandant decided to achieve further strength increases at a lower and more uniform rate which would bring recruits into the Marine Corps no faster than they could be absorbed by the training activities. When the President approved the Marine Corps request of February 1942, General Holcomb set recruiting quotas designed so as to achieve the new goal of 160,000 enlisted strength not sooner than 30 June 1943--the target date set by the President. By taking the full time allowed, the Commandant planned to hold down the monthly input of new recruits to a figure ranging from 7,50 for March 1942, tapering off to 2,000 in December, and then climbing back to 3,500 by June 1943. Subsequent strength authorizations made during the spring and summer of 1942 forced an upward revision of the monthly recruiting quotas to a figure ranging in size between 8,000 for May and 14,711 for August 1942.

The achievement of these recruiting quotas was facilitated by lowering the physical standards for admission. On 16 April 1942, blanket authority was given to recruiting officers to grant waivers for slight deviations from enlistment standards with respect to age, height, weight, character discharge from the Army, and police records. In this last case, a waiver could be granted if the individual had a good record for a considerable period since his last arrest or conviction. A further modification was made on 24 August 1942 when the maximum age for recruits was raised from 33 to 36.

The voluntary recruiting system, so successful in filling Marine manpower needs during the first year of the War, had to be abandoned in favor of the draft as hostilities entered their second year. On 5 December 1942, President Roosevelt issued an executive order stopping voluntary enlistments for all men between the ages of 17 and 36. He did so because the voluntary system had created serious overall manpower problems, resulting in the enlistment in the Armed Services of men essential to industry, and making impossible an equitable distribution between the services of the higher quality men. 37

The Marine Corps had hoped to continue the voluntary system, but at least six months before the executive order of 5 December was issued, Headquarters realized that the Marine Corps would be put under selective service sooner or later. Work was begun to create a system which would permit draftees who desired to serve in the Marine Corps to do so. For this purpose, a Selective Service Liaison Section was established at Headquarters. Its members were assigned to Selective Service headquarters and to Selective Service agencies in all the states. 38

On 1 February 1943, the Marine Corps began personnel procurement under a procedures of Selective Service. Every month, the Marine Corps submitted a manpower request to the Secretary of the Navy, who in turn presented a consolidated figure representing the needs of the Navy and Coast Guard, as well as of the Marines, to the Director of Selective Service. At Selective Service Headquarters, a total call was made up. Quotas were then issued to the states, where they were divided among the local boards. 39

The men called up reported to Armed Forces Induction Stations, manned by personnel of all services. For the guidance of induction station staffs in distributing personnel between the military and naval services, Selective Service Headquarters announced the ratio each month between

the Army and Navy quotas. Each Induction Station allotted inductees on the basis of this ratio. To assure equitable distribution of manpower by quality, categories were set up according to age, education, and occupational skill. The quotas for the Army and Navy were to be made up of proportionate numbers from all these categories. The Navy quota at each Induction Station was then broken down into Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard components, again by use of a ratio. Selectees could pick their branch of service provided vacancies existed in the quota of the service of their choice. 40

At this point, the Marine Corps liaison officers entered the picture. Through their influence with state and local selective service officials, they were able to postpone the induction of draftees who wanted to serve with the Marine Corps until a vacancy in the quota occurred. Through this process, the Marine Corps was able to procure individuals of high caliber who were anxious to serve in its ranks.

The induction and processing of Marine inductees were the duties of the Recruiting Service and were performed as they had been for volunteers. At first, all inductees were enrolled as Selective Service, but after 25 February 1943 the Recruiting Service was authorized to discharge inductees to permit then to enlist in the regular or Reserve Marine Corps. As some stigma came to be attached to selective service inductees, unjustified of course, this pseudo-voluntary procedure became very popular. Of a total of 224,323 inductees, fewer than 70,000 chose to remain in inductee status.

On 11 February 1943, the Marine Corps received its first recruits through the Selective Service. Results during this first month were disappointing, as only 9,349 men of a quota of 13,400 were actually delivered to the Marine Corps. It was hoped that performance would improve in subsequent months, but this was not the case. Not until June, 1944, did Selective Service meet the monthly quota established for the Marine Corps. In August, the number of inductees delivered once again fell below the quota, and, with the exception of July 1944, Selective Service never again met the quota it had agreed upon for the Marine Corps. 41

The Marine Corps was able to avert a serious manpower shortage only because voluntary enlistment by 17-year-olds was still permitted, a practice which was begun in February 1943, the month of the first Marine draft call. The Commandant directed the heads of Recruiting Divisions to build up a pool of men in this age group by enlisting them in the Reserve and placing them on inactive duty subject to call. During the remaining months of the War, the pool was drawn upon repeatedly. Of the

275,985 men who entered the Marine Corps between 1 February 1943 and 31 July 1945, 58,927 were 17-year-old volunteers. 42

Officer Procurement. In the decade or thereabouts before 1939, regular Marine Corps officers came from three sources. Each year, 25 graduates of the Naval Academy were selected on their own application for commissioning in the Marine Corps. A somewhat larger number were recruited from civil life. Members of this group were, however, not without military training. for they were all graduates of Army or Navy ROTC, or of its Marine counterpart, the Platoon Leaders' Class. In addition, a small number of outstanding noncommissioned officers were appointed to commissioned rank. 43

The Marine Corps Reserve recruited its officers primarily from selected colleges and universities under the Platoon Leaders' program. College students, enlisted as privates first class in the Marine Corps Reserve, attended two six-week summer training camps. Upon graduating from college, they were commissioned as second lieutenants in the Marine Corps Reserve.

When the expansion of the Marine Corps started under the executive order of 8 September 1939, only a very modest increase in officer personnel was required. To command the newly authorized 25,000-man Marine Corps, 1,568 officers were needed, an increase of only 214 over the 1,354 officers then on active duty. Rather than embark upon an expanded officer recruiting program, the Commandant decided to call upon young company grade officers of the Marine Corps Reserve, most of whom were graduates of the Platoon Leaders' Class.

For the first year of the gradual expansion, the Marine Corps filled its officer requirements without resorting to additional procurement from outside sources. But after the authorization of 34,000 enlisted strength for fiscal 1941, and with future increases in sight, the Commandant and his fiscal 1941, and with future increases in sight, the Commandant and his staff realized that new sources of officer personnel would have to be sought.

In September 1940, the Commandant approved a plan to swell the commissioned ranks by recruiting 800 recent college graduates between the ages of 20 and 25. Originally enrolled as privates first class, these men were to complete an officer candidate class (OCC) at Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, and then to be commissioned as second lieutenants in the Reserve. 44 Under the original plan, there were to be two classes, each of 400 candidates. The first class was scheduled to begin on 1 November 1940, less than two months after the original announcement of this officer candidate program. To secure candidates for it, the Commandant wrote to

200 college presidents asking them to recommend outstanding recent graduates who were interested in Marine commissions. By 1 October, only 80 replies had been received. In an effort to meet the quota, the closing of recruiting for the first class was delayed until 1 December, and the inspector-instructors of Reserve battalions were ordered to visit the college campuses. In spite of these additional efforts, only 266 candidates reported.

The quota for the second candidates' class was filled. After the first of the year, recruiting efforts of previous months began to pay off, and applications poured into Headquarters. The filling of the second OCC roster completed procurement of the 800 candidates called for under the original plan, but further increases in enlisted strength authorizations for 1941 led to a continuation of the candidates' program. To assure adequate numbers of applicants for these classes, special recruiting officers visited the colleges to enlist 1,000 seniors--400 principals and 600 alternates. So successful was this effort that there was a surplus of applicants beyond those needed to fill the additional classes. 45

The entry of the United States into the war following the attack on Pearl Harbor relegated existing officer procurement quotas to the discard. But the sources for new officers remained substantially the same as they had been during the short-of-war period. Officer candidates recruited form the colleges to begin their military careers upon graduation still constituted by far the largest group. Limited numbers of graduates of the Naval Academy and the Army and Navy ROTC continued to accept commissions in the Marine Corps, and outstanding noncommissioned officers were still accepted for commissioned rank. To these sources, two others were added. They were the selection of officer candidates form the ranks, and direct commissioning of former officers and specially qualified civilians for administrative and technical duties.

The revised candidates program, announced on 13 January 1942, called for the enlistment in the Marine Corps Reserve of 7,00 students from 307b colleges and universities. Beginning in May, they were to be fed into the candidates' class at Marine Corps Schools at the rate of 225 per month. Graduating seniors would make up the first classes, other men remaining in college to complete their courses.

Responsibility for procurement of the new candidate quotas was given to commanding officers of Marine Barracks and to officers in charge of recruiting stations. To assist them, 40 second lieutenants were sent out to act as liaison officers between the recruiting officers and the colleges. They made their first visits to the campuses in February to explain the program to college administrations and to students. On a second trip, made

the following month, the liaison officers, accompanied by medical and clerical personnel, selected the best qualified applicants and enlisted them in the Marine Corps Reserve. 46

Results of the early 1942 recruiting drive for officer candidates were disappointing. Actual numbers enrolled fell far short of the allotted quotas for all college classes. Only 814 of the necessary 3,000 seniors were signed up, and out of a quota of 2,000 juniors only 957 were enlisted. The sophomore class made the best showing with 1,039 out of the allotted 2,000 enlisting. However, of the 2,000 freshmen required, on 493 could be obtained. 47

One step had already been taken the previous month which now provided a supplementary source for officer candidates. The Commandant had directed that enlisted Marines between the ages of 20 and 28, who were college graduates or could pass a college equivalency test, be made eligible for OCC after they had completed four months service. A month later, the educational requirements were relaxed to permit enlisted applicants with an LL.B. degree or two years of college work to qualify as candidates. The educational requirements were again lowered in August to admit noncommissioned officers who were high school graduates. Privates and privates first class still were required to have completed two years of college. Then in November, the Commandant directed the commanding officers of the two recruit depots to select one-half of one percent of all recruits between the ages of 20 and 35 for assignment to candidates class. The educational requirement for these men was only that they have completed high school.

Results could not be realized from the expanded candidates program overnight. Faced with an immediate demand for officers, the Marine Corps resorted to a vastly increased granting of direct commissions. Included among the recipients were meritorious noncommissioned officers and graduates of Army and Navy ROTC's, selected for general duty, former officers of all services recalled to fill administrative posts, and civilian specialists commissioned for technical duties. So extensive was the practice that out of a total of 5,618 officers entering in 1942, only 2,723 came by the candidate route. Field promotions accounted for 1,236, specialists for 1,408, Army and Navy ROTC's for 222, and the Naval Academy for 29. 48

Reports from the field based on experience gained during the first year of war indicated that directly commissioned officers generally lacked the professional knowledge of Marine Corps Schools graduates. As the output

of OCC increased, direct commissioning for general duty was gradually restricted: on 1 December 1942 to overseas theaters and aviation organizations in the States six months later to the South and Southwest Pacific theaters. At the same time, the demand for specialists and administrative officers was diminishing, so procurement in these categories was sharply reduced after 1942.

For the remainder of the war, college-educated young men constituted the major source for Marine Corps officers, but beginning on 1 July 1943, the nature of the college training changed for Marine Corps candidates. They were sent to school under the Navy V-12 college training program, organized to keep selected students in college after the lowering of the draft age to 18. Under V-12, individual judged to be officer material were sent through an abbreviated college course as enlisted men. They wore uniforms and were under military discipline while on the campus. Marines attended college under V-12 in two separate categories. First, all those previously enlisted in the candidates' program, plus a limited number selected from the ranks, were ordered to active duty and formed into Marine college units. Second, additional candidates beyond the number provided by the Marine college units were selected from qualified volunteers from Navy college units. The V-123 students pursued a special curriculum which, except for a few selected for technical specialist study, did not lead to an academic degree. 49

Officer procurement programs reflected reliance on the V-12 program as a source for officer candidates. For the fiscal year beginning 1 July 1943, 440 of 515 new officers were to come by the officer candidate route, and of these 440, 350 would be V-12's. The procurement program announced on 1 January 1944 for that calendar year provided that out of 4,895 officers to be procured, 3,360 were to come from officer candidate sources, and of these 3,000 would be products of the college program. 50

Marine Corps Women's Reserve. The Women's Reserve was organized on 13 February 1943, almost a year after the formation of the women's services in the Army and Navy. 51 General Holcomb had opposed the idea of a similar organization in the Marine Corps at the time the WACS and WAVES were organized, but, as he came to realize that women could release a lot of men for combat, he reversed his position and by 7 November 1942 he had approved the formation of a women's reserve. It was decided to avoid creating a special title, like WACS, WAVES, or SPARS,

but to refer to the women reservists simply as Marines. This was a fortunate decision, for it gave them a feeling of belonging and indicated the willingness of the Corps to accept them by sharing its name.

Responsibility for organizing and administering the Women's Reserve was placed originally in the Division of Reserve. Procurement, training, detail, promotion, uniforming, and the promulgation of regulations concerning women were all responsibilities of the Director of that division. To handle the actual work, the Women's Reserve Section, staffed by women, was set up in the Officer Procurement Division. In March 1944, as a result of a Navy Department manpower survey, the various administrative functions were distributed to the appropriate departments and divisions at Headquarters.

No separate division or department with authority over women reserves was ever established. As a result, the Director of the Women's Reserve was a director in name only. She could not issue orders, nor could she sign official correspondence. However, she was able to influence the conduct of Women's Reserve affairs by advising the heads of the various activities at Headquarters. And she was invaluable in representing the Women's Reserve before the public. Very few mothers would have permitted their daughters to enlist unless they believed that a responsible women was in charge.

Procurement of Women Reserves got under way with the appointment of the DIrector and seven other key officers directly from civilian life. The Navy offered to give the Marine Corps some additional officers, and from the many who volunteered, 19 were selected and assigned to recruiting duty. The new recruiting officers lost no time in setting to work to procure the officers and 18,000 enlisted women authorized for the Women's Reserve. Until 15 November 1943, all officer candidates came directly from civilian life, and by that date, 543 had signed up. After that, the opportunity to qualify for a commission was thrown open to women in the ranks. Procurement from civilian life was not entirely closed, but all but 41 of the 404 women officers commissioned after November had served in the ranks. The recruiting of enlisted women was so successful that by 1 June 1944 the entire 18,000 had been enlisted. Input was then cut back to maintain the Women's Reserve at authorized strength.

The women, both officers and enlisted, who joined the Marine Corps, were an outstanding group. About 96 percent of them scored 90 or more on the General Classification Test. Their educational attainments were equally distinguished. Slightly more than 20 percent of them had attended college for one year or more, and an additional 65 percent had graduated from high school.

Training for enlisted women was conducted until July 1943 at the

WAVES training school, Hunter College, New York. By that date, the Women's Reserve Training Center at Camp Lejeune was ready to begin operations. Recruit Training, of five weeks duration, was designed, as in the case of men, to indoctrinate the individual in the fundamentals of Marine Corps life. However, administration, rather than combat skill was emphasized. A highlight of the training program was the demonstration of the weapons and combat techniques by men Marines. By seeing what the men released for combat faced, the women's pride in the Corps was increased and they could see their own part in it more clearly.

Specialist training in formal schools was provided for about four percent of the enlisted women. In Marine and Navy schools the women studied for duty in the clerical, paymaster, quartermaster, motor transport, communications, and aviation fields.

Officer candidate training, like that for enlisted women, was conducted for the first few months in Navy facilities. At the Midshipman's School, Mt. Holyoke College, potential officers studied for seven and half weeks, the first four under the Navy faculty, and the last three under male Marines. During the fourth class, the Officer Candidate Class moved to the Women's Reserve Training Center, Camp Lejeune. For the first seven classes, instruction was designed to covert the candidates rapidly from civilian to military life as Marine officers. Emphasis was placed on drill, learning to take orders, military discipline, and precision and snap.

When the officer ranks were opened to enlisted personnel, training emphasis shifted to the woman officer rather than the enlisted woman. While the shift in emphasis could be achieved to some extent in the regular training of candidates, it was decided that an additional two to four weeks at school as commissioned officers would provide a brief period for the students to adjust to officer life. Accordingly, a reserve officers' class was organized in December 1943. Originally two weeks long, the course was doubled in length in January 1944.

Specialist and training opportunities were afforded officers in regular Marine and Navy schools. About 35 percent of the women who were commissioned were trained in a specialty. Included among the fields offered were supply administration, mess management, motor transport, communications, special services, post exchange administration, and rehabilitation and educational services.

The contribution of the Women's Reserve to the Marine Corps war effort can best be measured in terms of the numbers of men it released for combat duty. The Women's Reserve was able to replace nearly the equivalent of a combat division. "Free a man to fight" was truly a fitting slogan for the Marine Corps Women's Reserve.

Classification. Personnel classification in the Marine Corps before the

World War II period was carried out by rank titles and specialist branch warrants. New ranks and titles were created as the need for them arose. 52 To supplement this system, an Occupational Qualification Card, listing civilian skills for each enlisted man, was introduced in 1939.

Marine Corps expansion during the sort-of-war period accompanied as it was by a great increase in the use of mechanical and electronic equipment, emphasized the need for meaningful classification of occupational skills. With the entrance of the United States into the war, proper classification became even more urgent. At the upper level, rank and warrant specialist designations were not precise enough to define skills. The occupational card for enlisted men also failed. Lack of a central agency to control the whole program, inaccurate evaluation of individual qualifications, and failure to keep the qualification cards up-to-date, all contributed to render the system unsatisfactory.

In the summer of 1942, work began at Headquarters on a new classification system. Staff officers at work on the project recognized that three fundamental problems were involved. These were: how to classify each man how to classify each job and how to correlate men with jobs. As the Army had a system that was giving satisfaction in these respects, the Marine Corps adopted it with certain modifications to suit its own needs.

The new system went into effect in October, 1942. Under it, every recruit entering the Marine Corps was to take the Army General Classification and Mechanical Aptitude Tests. He was also to be interviewed by a personnel specialist regarding his civilian background and experience. The results of tests and interview for each man were recorded on a qualification card. The information contained on the card could then be used as the basis for assigning military specialties, catalogued by number and title in an Army manual adapted to Marine needs. As individuals gained additional qualifications through schooling or experience, the military specialty numbers were adjusted accordingly.

In December 1942, classification of new Marines got under way at the recruit depots. To classify personnel already in the Marine Corps, mobile teams set out in May 1943 to visit all posts and stations in the United States. By the end of August, they had completed their work. The classification of personnel overseas was then begun. During the fall, classifiers were sent out to FMF units in theaters of operations, and tables of organization were revised to provide billets for them down to battalion and air squadron level. 53

After two years experience with the Army system of classifying military

jobs, it was apparent that differences between the Marine Corps and the Army were large enough to justify preparation of a Marine Corps classification manual. In June 1944, a preliminary copy of this manual was distributed, listing in one volume all specification numbers, job titles, and job descriptions. After an exhaustive field trial the manual was published in August 1945.

Both at Headquarters and in the field personnel classification was judged indispensable to efficient personnel management. It furnished a permanent record of the abilities and limitations of the individual Marine that could be used by the small unit commander as well as by higher echelons, and it permitted accurate planing for requisitioning, training, assignment, and promotion of personnel.


Training Facilities. Before describing the training given to newly acquired officers and enlisted men of the Marine Corps during World War II, it is desirable to set down the steps taken to provide the more important additional facilities found necessary for that purpose.

For more than a century after its establishment the principal facilities for training Marines were connected with the barracks at the various navy yards. The expansion of the Corps during World War I led to the establishment of training centers and schools for both officers and enlisted marines at Quantico, Virginia, and San Diego, California. After World War I, these two stations were expanded to provide much of the training for the embryo Fleet Marine Force, together with its integrated aviation activities, and for the establishment of various schools of application. Schools were located also in some of the navy yards and at the Quartermasters' Supply Depot in Philadelphia. The recruit depots for the east and west coasts were located at Parris Island and San Diego, where enlisted marines received their first training. All of these facilities had to be expanded when the authorized strength of the Corps was increased at the outbreak of war in Europe, but there was insufficient room at Quantico and San Diego to provide the facilities needed for training the enlarged Fleet Marine Force.

The Commandant requested first that an additional base be acquired and developed on the east coast. The House Naval Affairs Committee approved this request on 15 February 1941. An extensive survey was made of the Atlantic seaboard for a suitable site and resulted in the acquisition or large tracts of land for that purpose at New River, North Carolina, eventually known as Camp Lejeune.

Camp Lejeune. Aviation training facilities were promptly established at

Cherry Point about forty miles from New River. The distance was not too great for easy ground-air liaison and combined training, but far enough away to avoid operational interference between aviation and ground force training. Eventually some 120,000 acres were acquired at New River and 24,000 acres for the air station at Cherry Point. New River had many advantages as a training center accessibility to deep water, ranges for artillery and anti-aircraft gunnery practice,landing beaches with a variety of surf conditions, recreational areas, room for expansion, and the availability of railway transportation and electric power.

Constructing and equipping the new station was the responsibility of the Quartermaster's Department of Marine Corps Headquarters, which did the planning and supervised the construction work jointly with the Bureau of Yards and Docks. The first contracts, based on competitive bids, were awarded on 22 April 1941 and came to $14,575,000, but this was only the beginning of the cost of the program. An officer from the Quartermaster's Department was placed in command during the planning and construction phases of the project. 54

A Tent Camp of more than 1,000 tents was set up before any buildings were ready for occupancy, in order to get training under way as quickly as possible. The Tent Camp was inaugurated by Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox on 16 July 1941. The 1st Division of the FMF and the 1st Infantry Division, United States Army moved into the area for maneuvers shortly thereafter. Landing exercises, using Coast Guard boats, were conducted in the late summer. 55 On one occasion 25,000 troops were put ashore in three and one-half hours. Many of the officers and enlisted marines who took part in the Guadalcanal campaign a year later had received their first realistic training in amphibious operations during that first summer at New River. After the Army division departed following these maneuvers, a number of marine regiments moved into Tent City for intensive training.

Establishing command and administrative relationships at New River such that the mission of the station of training the Fleet Marine Force would always be kept in the foreground became an early preoccupation of Marine Corps Headquarters. As soon as training became possible by the establishment of the Tent Camp, a line officer took over command from

the Quartermaster. It was some time, however, before the administrative relationships between the officer in command of the post and the officer in immediate command of the Fleet Marine Force units was clarified. In a letter of 28 August 1941, the Commandant assigned the senior line officer regularly attached to the post as Post Commander. He was ordered to command all units attached to the Marine Barracks, New River, with the exception of the Fleet Marine Force units. The latter were not to be placed under the Post Commander except by specific orders from Marine Corps Headquarters. This arrangement resulted in divided authority and responsibility as the commander of the Fleet Marine Force had to depend on the facilities of the post for carrying out his training programs.

In an attempt to correct this situation, the Commandant in a letter of 28 July 1942, charged the senior Fleet Marine Force Commander at New River with the command of all Fleet Marine Force units, ground and air, and further charged him with the coordination of all training activities at New River. The Commandant made the Commanding Officer, Marine Barracks, New River (later named Camp Lejeune) responsible to the senior Fleet Marine Force Commander in all matters connected with the development and maintenance of facilities for the support of Fleet Marine Force units. The station went through a number of reorganizations, each underlining, with increasing emphasis, the fact that the mission of the activity was the training of the Fleet Marine Force. The concept of its mission was summarized in a statement in one of the reorganization reports as follows: "it is believed that the Commanding General, Marine Barracks, Camp Lejeune is the organization in preparation for combat of Fleet Marine Force units."

In connection with a reorganization late in 1942, the New River activities were redesignated Training Center, Camp Lejeune, effective as of 20 December 1942. In June of 1944, the designation Training Center, Fleet Marine Force, Camp Lejeune, was adopted. The Commanding General of Camp Lejeune who had also commanded the Training Center was assigned additional duty as Commanding General, Training Command. He was made directly responsible to the Commanding General, Camp Lejeune for the training of Fleet Marine Force units, all of which remained under command of the Camp Lejeune Commander, thus carrying out finally the principle of unity of command. 56

Camp Lejeune became the training center for the Women's Reserve in the summer of 1943. The first unit consisting of ten officers arrived late in April 1943. In May, an enlisted contingent of 145 came from Hunter

College, New York, where they had been undergoing indoctrination training. This activity grew rapidly until there were some 3,000 Women Reserves under training at one time at Camp Lejeune.

Camp Pendleton. Marine Corps Headquarters was engaged in planning additional training facilities for the west coast in the vicinity of San Diego at the same time that the plans for the east coast were taking shape. This was done in two stages. First came the development in 1940 of a piece of land of about 360 acres leased to the Marine Corps by the City of San Diego. This was named Camp Elliott. Some 29,000 additional acres were acquired early in 1941 for the expansion of this site. The camp was activated in April 1942. Further expansion in that immediate area not being practicable, the Navy Department, in March 1942, purchased approximately 132,000 acres of the Santa Margarita ranch, one of the original Spanish grants that had remained practically intact since the annexation of California after the Mexican War. The new base, named Camp Joseph H. Pendleton, became ready to receive troops in September 1942. It had an extensive beach frontage at Oceanside for landing exercises.

In most respects the training at Camp Pendleton followed the same lines as at Camp Lejeune. Headquarters decided, however, that complete duplication of all activities was unnecessary, in fact, undesirable. Tank training, for example, was eventually concentrated at Camp Pendleton partly because of the greater variety and suitability of the terrain for such training, as compared to Camp Lejeune. Certain of the courses given in the engineering school at Lejeune were transferred to Pendleton. Highly realistic infantry and infiltration training with emphasis on combat conditioning were also made a specialty at Camp Pendleton.

Replacement battalions received their final training at Lejeune and Pendleton. The latter served also as a reservoir for the distribution of Fleet Marine Force units to the Pacific area. Under the Lend-Lease Act, Headquarters arranged also for the training of Royal Netherlands Marine Corps units at Lejeune, Pendleton, and Quantico.

Pendleton was intended originally as a temporary training center to meet the needs of amphibious warfare in the Pacific. However, a survey made by Marine Corps Headquarters toward the end of the war made clear that it possessed advantages over any other base for training entire Fleet Marine Force divisions because of its great area, the nature and variety of its terrain for tank training, its extensive artillery ranges, and its unsurpassed boat basin. The Commandant, accordingly, recommended that Camp Pendleton be retained as a Marine Corps base. This recommendation was approved by the Secretary of the Navy under date of 14 October 1944.

Enlisted Personnel Training. The foundation for all enlisted training in the Marine Corps on the eve of World War II was an eight-week period

of rigorous and uniform training for all recruits. 57 Every man entering the Marine Corps went first to one of the two recruit depots at Parris Island, South Carolina, or San Diego, California, where he was introduced to the fundamentals of military life. He learned discipline, military courtesy, close order drill, and interior guard duty. He was given a start on thorough physical conditioning to prepare him for the rigors of combat. He became intimately familiar with his rifle, mastering its mechanical functioning and firing it for record on the range. And he received elementary instruction in infantry combat subjects, including the digging of foxholes, bayonet, grenades, chemical warfare, map reading, and basic squad combat principles.

Upon completion of the recruit cycle, most Marines were assigned to organizations where they continued to train both as individuals and as members of combat teams. For those who were selected for instruction in the operation and maintenance of complex weapons and equipment, specialist schools were conducted. In keeping with the small size of the Corps before the war, specialist school training was on a very small scale. Only about 250 enlisted men graduated during fiscal 1939.

With such a limited demand, the Marine Corps could not afford to maintain an elaborate educational system. It operated only nine schools for enlisted men, representing the communications, ordnance, and supply fields, relying on the Army, Navy, and civil institutions to train Marine Corps students in other subjects.

The declaration of limited national emergency on 8 September 1939, which ushered in the build-up of the Marine Corps, naturally led to increased demands upon the training organization. To handle the stepped-up input of new recruits created by unlimited recruiting during the fall of 1939, the Commandant put into effect an emergency recruit program of four weeks duration. Four weeks proved to be too short a period for proper training. In January 1940, recruit training was extended to six weeks, and in May to seven weeks. Except for these changes in length, recruit training remained essentially the same in subject matter and in instructional method.

The gradual mobilization also increased the demand for trained specialists. Not only was the Marine Corps growing in numbers, but the introduction of new and more complex weapons and equipment required trained operators and maintenance mechanics. The Army and Navy, faced with their own expansion problems, could not offer additional training opportunities. The Marine Corps was forced to provide its own training facilities, so in February 1941, the Training Center, an organization of specialist schools, was activated at Quantico.

The pressures put on the training system by the partial mobilization of the sort-of-war period were dwarfed by the swift rush of events following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. First to feel the pressures of wartime mobilization were the recruit depots. To attain the build-up to 104,000 by 1 March, the recruit cycle was cut from seven to six, and then to five weeks. In addition, the 2d Marine Division and Marine Barracks, Quantico, were pressed into service as supplementary recruit depots. 58

By 1 March, expansion of recruit depot facilities, combined with a leveling off in enlistments, permitted a resumption of the seven-week program. Two years later, an additional week was allotted, to lengthen the recruit program to eight weeks, where it remained until the end of the War. In content, the recruit curriculum remained relatively unchanged throughout the War. The procedures in effect in 1939 proved to be sound and were only modified to give greater emphasis to swimming and to field subjects.

The demand for trained technical specialists underwent a similar increase. The training center concept, developed before Pearl Harbor, proved sound. It was expanded in April 1942 by the formation of an additional training center on the West Coast at Camp Elliott. Overcrowding at Elliott led to the removal of the specialist schools to a newly organized Training Center at Camp Pendleton, beginning 1 February 1943. 59 Meanwhile, the original East Coast training center had moved from Quantico to Camp Lejeune during September-November 1942 to permit the expansion of the Marine Corps Schools at the former base. The creation and mission of Camps Lejeune and Pendleton have been described in previous pages. The expansion of specialist training in the Marine Corps was so great, in fact, that the training centers could not accommodate all the schools. The overflow spilled on to various Marine bases and stations throughout the country. In addition to these Marine schools, Marine students continued to be sent to Army and Navy and civilian schools.

The subjects offered covered a wide range, including ordnance, engineering, communications, motor vehicles both wheeled and tracked, quartermaster, personnel, administration, intelligence, Japanese language, tank tactics, and other subjects. Instruction was given in a graduated system of schools, beginning with the elementary level and progressing through more advanced stages. Many of the systems incorporated schools not only of the Marine Corps but of the Army and Navy and civilian institutions as well. Most basic instruction was given in Marine schools, the Army

and Navy supplementing these in a few instances where the load was particularly heavy.

In contrast with the progress made in the production of specialists, no provisions for the training of combat replacements were made until 22 May 1942. Directives issued on that date called for the establishment of replacement training centers on both coasts. Camp Elliott in California and Camp Lejeune in North Carolina were the sites for these training centers. 60

The replacement training cycle was eight weeks long for the first two and one-half years of the War. During that period, the lessons of combat were applied to make the training schedule more rigorous and realistic. Combat reaction courses, in which trainees crept and crawled across obstacle-strewn terrain covered by machine-gun fire aimed over their heads, and greater emphasis on night and day tactical problems contributed to the new realism. 61

In spite of these innovations, reports from the field indicated that the training of replacements was still inadequate. During the early months of 1944, officers in the training centers and at headquarters re-examined the training system. On the basis of their studies, the replacement training program was lengthened from 8 to 12 weeks, where it remained until the end of the War. 62

Officer Training. The peacetime officer training program in effect in the Marine Corps before 1939 was geared to produce a small, highly skilled, professional officer Corps. Upon reporting for duty, newly commissioned second lieutenants were assigned to the Basic School located in the Marine Barracks, Philadelphia Navy Yard. After nine months instruction in drill, small arms marksmanship, naval administration, and tactics, the young officers went out to take up duty assignments. Some years later, they resumed formal education at the Junior Course, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia, as senior first lieutenants or captains. In the Junior Course, they received thorough instruction in the tactics of amphibious and land warfare. Following another period of troop or staff duty, officers, now having attained field grade, returned to Marine Corps Schools for the senior course, where they studied the art of command, and naval and military strategy. For a very few officers, there were opportunities to continue formal education beyond Senior Course at the Army Command and General Staff School and the Army and Navy War Colleges.

Officers selected for specialist duties followed a somewhat different

course of formal education after the completion of Basic School. They substituted a course in their specialty for the Junior Course. Artillery officers, both field and base defense, attended the Base Defense Weapons Course in Marine Corps Schools, or the Army Field or Coast Artillery Schools. Specialists in other subjects, including engineering, communications, ordnance, chemical warfare, languages, and law attended Army, Navy, or civilian schools in their specialists.

The peacetime training system failed to meet the needs of an expanding Marine Corps from the very beginning of mobilization. In September 1939, when company grade reserve officers were called to active duty to command the newly authorized 25,000-man Marine Corps, a special Reserve Officers' Course had to be set up in Marine Corps Schools to complete their military education for troop duty.

The first Reserve Officers' class convened at Quantico on 2 October 1939 for six weeks of instruction. Divided into infantry, field artillery, and base defense artillery sections, the course offered subject matter similar to that in the Basic School, but greatly condensed. Despite some difficulties, due mostly to lack of equipment and of time for adequate preparation of course by the instructors, the first ROC was successful in preparing reserve officers reasonably well for troop duty. As there was a continuing need for officers, it was decided to assemble additional classes. In the 2nd ROC, two important changes were made. First, the schedule was increased to 13 weeks to allow for additional instruction. Second, all students took the same course which was devoted to infantry work. Those officers designated for field or base defense artillery were assigned to the Base Defense Weapons course after completing the ROC.

Another new program was created in the fall of 1940 to train officer candidates. Essentially a recruit depot for potential officers, the 12-week Officer Candidate Class (OCC) offered a curriculum made up of close order drill, small arms marksmanship, parades and ceremonies, map reading, interior guard duty, first aid, care of equipment and clothing, basic combat principles and other basic subjects. An equally important function of the OCC was the selection of those who possessed the qualities necessary for the successful performance of the duties of commissioned rank. Skilled officer instructors kept the candidates under constant scrutiny, and only those who measured up to the high standards of the Marine Corps were commissioned.

Newly commissioned graduates of OCC were not ready to assume command of troops in the field. They needed further military education, which they received in the Reserve Officers Course. The first three ROC classes had been filled with reserve officers ordered to active duty, but the fourth class, which convened in March 1941, was made up of the entire

graduating body of the first OCC. This same practice was observed for all subsequent OCC classes. The two courses combined provided the new officers, most of whom were drawn from civilian life, with the training necessary to discharge the duties of combat command. Until late in the war, January 1945, the OCC-ROC combination was to be the basis of Marine Corps officer training.

After completing ROC, all officers except those selected for specialist training were ordered to a command or staff assignment. As the numbers of Marines increased, the demand for trained specialists expanded. However, the Army and Navy, faced with similar growing pains, were unable to accommodate the additional Marine students, so it was necessary for the Marine Corps to organize courses of its own in the Training Center, Quantico.

The pressure of total mobilization following the declaration of war led to two immediate results. One of these was the liquidation of the peacetime officer training program. The Junior and Senior Courses at Marine Corps Schools had already been discontinued with the completion of the 1940-1941 classes because of the demand for field grade officers in the FMF. So serious was the shortage that in the Second Division, only one officer in each infantry battalion was above the rank of second lieutenant. 63 The Platoon Leaders Class was discontinued in December 1941 because of the acceleration of college classes. Platoon Leaders who had completed the required training were called to active duty and commissioned. The remainder were assigned to the OCC. The Basic School was combined with the ROC on 31 July 1942. 64

The other step taken as a result of the mobilization following Pearl Harbor was to accelerate officer training in the wartime schools. To meet the demand for junior officers, the OCC, ROC, and Base Defense Weapons Schools were shortened to 10 weeks, and classes were scheduled on the block system, under which two or more classes underwent instruction at the same time. 65

Even with the accelerated program, Marine Corps Schools could not meet the requirements for officers. To supplement the Quantico Schools, the Second Division organized an officer candidate school on the West Coast at Camp Elliott. This school, which was to provide a minimum of training for noncommissioned officers who had been selected for direct commission, proved to be inadequate to teach all the necessary technical

and tactical principles to junior officers. Commanders in the field reported that products of the Second Division school were lacking in professional knowledge and were far inferior to ROC graduates. 66 As a result, in October 1942, the policy of direct commission of NCO's stationed in the United States for general duty was discontinued as was the Second Division Officer Candidate School. 67

The termination of the Second Division Officer Candidate course was not an isolated occurrence but foreshadowed a re-examination of officer training procedures in the Marine Corps. It was generally recognized both at Marine Corps Schools and Headquarters Marine Corps that the total of 20 weeks--10 in OCC and 10 in ROC--allotted to officer training was not sufficient preparation for combat command. Additional firing problems, night exercises, infiltration exercises, and opportunities for all students to command a troop-leading exercise without coaching were most important.

The solution arrived at in October 1942 was to require all officer candidates entering the Marine Corps from civil life to take the full seven-week cycle of recruit training at the Parris Island or San Diego Recruit Depots. Much of the material given in OCC could now be dropped as it would be covered in recruit depot. OCC was accordingly cut to eight weeks, much of it devoted to subjects formerly taught in ROC. This last course was retained at 10 weeks and now featured the more advanced subjects recommended for inclusion in the officer training program. Thus the training program for officers from civilian life was extended by five weeks, from 20 to 25. 68

The need for additional training for officer candidates selected from the ranks was recognized also. Candidates detachments were formed in the Training Centers at Camp Lejeune and Camp Elliott during April 1943 to offer an eight-week pre-OCC course. Here the prospective candidates were given a careful screening, were introduced to the military subjects they would encounter at OCC, and were given a refresher course in mathematics, particularly useful for those who hoped to select artillery after receiving their commissions. The training course for candidates from the ranks thus covered a period of 24 weeks. 69

In the spring of 1944, the officer candidates direct from civilian life

were required to take the pre-OCC course also. Both groups of officer candidates now took two successive eight-week courses to qualify for commissions. They had also to complete an additional 10 weeks of basic officer training before they were assigned to troop duty. 70

his three-part, 26-week officer training program continued in effect until January 1945, when the program was simplified by combining the OCC and ROC into one 16-week Platoon Commanders Course. The resulting 24-week program remained in force until the end of the war.

The procurement of officers for limited specialist duty under the Reserve Class V program brought into the Marine Corps a number of individuals with no military background. Aviation ground officer specialists were the first to report for active duty. A few of these officers were enrolled in the regular ROC course. Because of their age and lack of basic military training, they made very poor records so a special 10-week indoctrination course was organized in May 1942 using the barracks and class rooms of the ROC. The curriculum consisted of selected lectures and exercises of ROC plus new courses emphasizing staff work and aviation subjects.

On 5 September, a group of recruiting specialists were ordered to Quantico for a one-week indoctrination consisting of lectures on the Marine Corps, military customs and courtesies. They spent 20 minutes each day in close order drill, and the remainder of this time in observing the ROC and OCC classes in operation. This course was just a stopgap until the beginning of a regular four-week course for all reserve specialists reporting to the officers' pool at QUantico. On 15 October another course was started in the Training Center at Camp Lejeune. At Lejeune, more emphasis was placed on drill, weapons, physical conditioning and living under field conditions than in the Quantico course. A similar course was conducted on the West Coast in the Training Center, Camp Elliott. By the end of 1943, the bulk of indoctrination training had been completed the indoctrination course at Lejeune was closed on 15 February 1944. 71

The discontinuing of the Senior and Junior Courses at Marine Corps Schools, though unavoidable, proved unfortunate since it eliminated the only formal instruction in staff work and higher command offered by the Marine Corps. The rapid organization of new units and the necessity to fill the staff and command billets soon pointed up the shortage of officers experienced in the duties of these positions. As early as May 1942, both at Headquarters Marine Corps and Marine Corps Schools, the desirability

Administrative Operations--Supply

Supplies in General. Supplying the logistic needs of the Marine Corps was no less important than recruiting and training its personnel. Logistics planning was the responsibility of the Division of Plans and Policies and more particularly of the G-4 Section of that division. That division had the determination of the "what, when, and where" of supplies and equipment, normally based on preliminary studies made by the Quartermaster Department. Procurement and storage were the responsibility of the latter which handled also the transportation of troops and supplies and made all disbursements except payment of Marine Corps personnel, the latter coming under the cognizance of the Paymaster Department.

The Quartermaster Department merits a high mark for the economy and efficiency with which it carried out its logistics functions without building up extensive engineering, technical, and procurement organizations of its own. Instead, it made use of the existing engineering and technical facilities of the War and Navy Departments. For the development and manufacture of items of equipment, unique to the Marine Corps, including uniforms, it depended largely on the Quartermaster Supply Depot, Philadelphia. At that depot before World War II were stored all items needed to equip Marine Corps expeditionary forces. Given the size of an expedition and its destination whether for the tropics or for a cold climate the depot was able to assemble on 24 hours notice everything needed for expeditionary forces up to brigade size, ready for loading on shipboard. 73

It might be supposed that the Marine Corps, as a part of the Naval Establishment, would depend almost entirely on the Navy Department for supplies and equipment not unique to the Marines. This had not however been the case before World War II and was less so during the war, because in its organization and in its operations as a ground force the

Marine Corps resembles the Army more than it does the Navy therefore, its logistic needs also paralleled those of the Army more nearly than those of the Navy.

About 65 percent of all material used by the Marine Corps during World War II came from the Army. Included were 85 percent of all ordnance items, 75 percent of all food, 5 percent of all engineer equipment, and a substantial amount of signal gear. The Navy Department furnished only about 5 percent, primarily all aircraft and aviation equipment, some naval type guns and about 15 percent of food. The Marine Corps manufactured about 5 percent of the equipment it needed, mostly clothing and personal equipment at the Depot of Supplies, Philadelphia. About 25 percent, including all motor transport, 95 percent of engineer items, and 10 percent of food, the Marine Corps purchased from civilian manufacturers and suppliers. 74 All floating equipment used by the Marines in amphibious operations such as landing craft, amphibian tractors, small boats, etc., were provided by the Bureau of Ships, but on specifications and characteristics based broadly on studies and plans made by Marine Corps Headquarters. In its policy over the years of using the War and Navy Departments for filling in large part of its logistic needs the Marine Corps may be said to have anticipated some of the aims of unification and single service procurement.

The expansion of the Marine Corps following the declaration of a limited national emergency on 8 September 1939 made it necessary to step up the procurement of supplies. Procurement of weapons and ammunition, for instance, increased 20 percent during the first half of 1941 over the previous six month period. During the second half of the year there was a far greater increase amounting to 300 percent over the preceding half year. 75

In spite of increased appropriations, there were still not sufficient funds to provide the needed supplies for the growing Marine Corps during the short-of-war period. A survey undertaken by the General Board of the Navy in July 1940 revealed shortages in Marine Corps equipment amounting to $14,045,000 worth of clothing and individual supplies and equipment, and $20,413,020 of tanks,guns, and fire control equipment. Estimates on delivery dates varied from three to six months for the clothing and equipment to one to two years for the ordnance material. 76

However, the situation with respect to funds changed when the threat of United States involvement in the war came closer. In the summer of

1940 Congress appropriated large sums for increases in the Navy and in the other armed forces. There was no lack of money thereafter during the war to carry out the military expansion programs, but shortages in materials to manufacture munitions and build ships and to create the additional facilities needed to produce them soon became the critical problem in procurement.

The history of the emergency agencies that were set up to control the economy of the nation under war conditions and the procedures adopted to effect a balanced distribution of manpower and material resources between the various production programs and civilian needs with due regard to urgency is told in the chapter on "Material Procurement," and need not be repeated in this place.

Effective relationships of Headquarters with the war emergency agencies and with the other services were of great importance to the success of Marine Corps supply programs. This was particularly important in dealing with the Army which was the major Marine Corps supplier. Good relations with Army supply agencies and a thorough understanding of Army supply procedures were essential if the Marine Corps were to receive prompt and efficient service in filling its requests.

The largest single category supplied by the Army was ordnance. Early in the war, the Marine Corps took steps to establish close working relationships with the Army Ordnance Department. On 23 October 1942, a civilian employee of that department was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Marine Corps Reserve to head a liaison section with his former employers. He very quickly proved his worth. As nearly all ordnance material was in short supply, the proper preparation of requirements, a process demanding a thorough knowledge of the complex Army supply structure and accurate interpretations of its many publications, was very important. With the expansion of the Army Ordnance Department, additional Marine liaison offices were opened--with the Chief of Ordnance, Detroit, in January 1943 at Rock Island Arsenal a year later and at Frankford Arsenal in August 1944. 77

For the procurement of food, the Marine Corps participated in the Army Quartermaster market center system. This was a centralized procurement organization which could use speedy commercial methods of purchasing large quantities of foodstuffs from markets all over the country. The Marine Corps joined the system in July 1942. Two officers were assigned to the Market Center to represent Marine Corps interests in food procurement. 78

Essential to effective participation in wartime procurement programs, both at the War Production Board level and with the Army and Navy, were accurate estimates of requirements. The system employed by the Marine Corps was for the Quartermaster Department to make estimates on the basis of Tables of Basic Allowances prepared by M-4. These tables specified the equipment authorized for each unit and also provided a replenishment factor to provide for the replacement of supplies and equipment as they wore out or were expended in combat. The calculation of replenishment rates was based largely on assumptions and the personal experience of the officers who calculated them. After Marines entered combat, reports form the field were combed through in M-4 for information on actual expenditures. On the basis of such evidence, readjustments were made in the Tables of Basic Allowances. Originally a function of the War Plans and Statistical Section, requirements estimating was decentralized to the technical supply divisions in June 1943. 79

Landing Craft. The development and procurement of special landing craft needed in amphibious operations is a typical example of the method followed in solving a particularly difficult logistics problem. 80 Getting men, equipment, and supplies ashore quickly with minimum sea and landing risks during the assault phase of an operation had been found from pre-war exercises to be difficult and of crucial importance. Standard ship's boats were used in the early peacetime exercises to put landing parties ashore on beaches, but no one was satisfied with the suitability of such boats for the purpose, neither the Marines and the Fleet as the users of the boats, nor the Bureau of Construction and Repair as their designer and producer. Due to the cost and difficulty of developing something better, progress in providing more suitable craft was slow.

The Marine Corps Equipment Board, previously mentioned, was formed in 1933 to devote full time to the study of this and other equipment problems. In 1935 the Bureau of Construction and Repair invited bids from naval architects and commercial boat builders for boat designs to meet the requirements of landing operations. The Bureau found it necessary to limit the maximum weight and length of the designs proposed in order to keep the boats within the weight handling facilities and davit strength and spacing on the ships that were to carry the craft. This probably handicapped the bidders with the result that the designs submitted were not outstandingly superior to conventional boats, although they

included some improved features. Eventually, the Bureau had to provide handling facilities of greater capacity and greater davit strength and spacing so as to take care of larger and heavier boats.

Shortly after this competition the Bureau of C&R purchased from Andrew J. Higgins, a new Orleans boat builder, a number of 30-foot boats of a special type known as the Eureka boat. Higgins had developed the type for the use of oil drillers and fur trappers in the Louisiana bayous. The special features of the boat were considerable power for its size, a heavy skeg to protect the propeller from damage, and a shape of hull from amidship forward to facilitate retraction from the beach. The hull form was such that the boat grounded over only a small area forward. The slip-stream from the propeller in backing washed away the sand from under the boat at the point of contact, thus releasing it from the beach. None of these features was original with Higgins but he had brought them together in an excellent design for the purpose for which the boats were built.

The first boats purchased were still limited as to size. In 1941 Higgins built a 36-foot boat for his own account fitted with a bow ramp for disembarking personnel. The weight ran up to 16,000 pounds. Under tests the boat showed itself superior to former models of landing craft. This boat as to hull form became the prototype for a variety of landing craft in this size range.

The engineering and technical work connected with the design and production of landing craft was handled by the Bureau of C&R, later the Bureau of Ships. That Bureau also paid for the craft. In order to give every consideration to the user's experience and point of view the "Department Continuing Board for the Development of Landing Boats" was set up by the Secretary of the Navy. Its membership included representatives of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Marine Corps, the Bureau of Ships, and the Bureau of Ordnance.

In addition to boats, the Marines were interested in a vehicle that could be placed overboard from a ship some distance from the shore and could then, under its own power, make its way over coral reefs, such as found in the Pacific, through the surf, up on the beach, and inland through swamps and over other roadless terrain without unloading men and supplies at the water's edge. The use of a caterpillar type of tractor had suggested itself for this purpose. Such a tractor was built by Mr. J. Walter Christie and tested in the fleet maneuvers at Culebra in 1924, but was too unseaworthy to be serviceable. Its capacity was also very limited. Interest in such a vehicle then languished for a number of years.

In the middle 30's Mr. Donald Roebling developed an amphibian vehicle of the caterpillar type for rescuing people from the Florida swamps,

but when he was approached by the Marine Corps to develop something similar for landing operations he at first showed no interest, but with the increasing tension in Europe he agreed in 1938 to adapt the "Alligator," as the vehicle was known, to military uses. The project was turned over to a special section of the Landing Craft Board which later became the "Continuing Board for the Development of Landing Vehicles, Tracked (LVT)". The actual writing of the specifications for the vehicle and its procurement were the responsibility of the Bureau of COnstruction and Repair.

The contract for the first of these vehicles was placed with the Food Machinery Corporation, Dunedin, Florida. Inspection and follow-up of the contact was placed under the Inspector of Naval Material covering that district with Marine Corps officers participating in the inspection work. Eventually other contractors were brought into the production program.

The first two LVT's were delivered in November 1940 and were tested by the Marine Corps at Guantanamo Bay. The tests proved sufficiently successful to justify going into production. A continuous program of improvements was then started under the guidance of the Board mentioned above. The Bureau of Construction and Repair, and later the Bureau of Ships, handled the technical aspects of specifications, development, and procurement. Officers from the Marine Corps were assigned to liaison duty in the section handling the work in the Bureau of Ships.

Greater seaworthiness and better military characteristics were the two principal lines of improvement followed in the wartime development of tracked vehicles. To improve military characteristics it was necessary to increase the useful loads that the vehicle could carry from ship to shore. One of the types that evolved from the original LVT was the Armored Amphibian (LVTA). During the period from 1941 through 1945 some 18,620 tracked vehicles of various types were produced. They contributed greatly to the success of the war in the Pacific. Their greatest strategic value lay in the fact that they could land troops and supplies on almost any kind of beach and through coral formations, thus making it impossible for the enemy to foresee probable landing points and to concentrate his defenses at such points.

Storage. For the storage of supplies in the continental United States until they were issued to troops, the Marine Corps maintained three supply depots. The Depot of Supplies at Philadelphia was by far the largest of these, handling about 75 percent of all supplies. The other two, at ships detachments. Before World War II storage facilities were not in great demand because there were never sufficient funds to accumulate war reserve stocks. As an example of the stringency of budget restrictions,

spare parts could not even be stocked for engineer equipment. If a replacement part were needed, the whole piece of equipment remained idle until the using unit was authorized to procure a replacement for it under the Table of Basic Allowances. The only alternative was to cannibalize equipment in storage. 81

The expansion of the Marine Corps following the declaration of a limited national emergency on 8 September 1939 made it necessary also to procure more supplies. Procurement of weapons and ammunition, for instance, increased 20 percent during the first half of 1941 over the previous six-month period. During the second half of the year there was a far greater increase amounting to 300 percent over the preceding half year. 82

Facilities for storage had top be greatly expanded during the war. The three depots in existence in December 1941 proved inadequate to store the vast quantity of supplies procured for the wartime Marine COrps. Existing depots were expanded and new ones activated, resulting in an integrated depot system designed to speed the flow of supplies from the time of their delivery to the Marine Corps until they were finally issued to troops in training in the states or shipped to units overseas. The two Depots of Supplies at Philadelphia and San Francisco became the foundation of the depot system that developed during the war. All supplies procured for the Marine Corps, except for local purchases of perishable foods, were shipped to one of these depots.

Before the war, Philadelphia had been the more important of the two, but with the deployment of the FMF in the Pacific, the depot at San Francisco became the dominant one. All supplies destined for the Pacific theaters of operations, except those in the hands of units moving overseas, were shipped from San Francisco, and the great majority of items were delivered there by manufacturers or by the Army and Navy. Philadelphia became primarily the initial storage and distribution point for clothing and personal equipment.

The Depot of Supplies, San Francisco, was a very small installation in December 1941. Only about 200 military and civilian personnel were employed, and storage space was a mere 548,313 square feet. By the end of the war, storage space had more than quadrupled. The additional space included a subordinate depot at Barstow, California. Begun in the spring of 1942 as an inland supply installation for the Navy, Barstow was transferred to the Marine Corps in December 1942 to help meet the supply demands of Marines fighting in the Pacific. Barstow accounted for a little more than half of the storage space in the San Francisco depot system.

Overseas shipments from San Francisco from December 1941 through August 1945 amounted to 907,530 short tons. 83

In addition to the two major depots at San Francisco and Philadelphia, there were two FMF base depots, one on each coast. Their mission was to supply FMF units in their respective areas. The Base Depot, FMF,l Norfolk, Virginia, was originally activated on 11 June 1941 at Charleston, South Carolina, and moved to Norfolk in October of that year. The depot was very active during 1941 and early 1942, equipping the Marine brigade bound for Iceland and the First Marine Division when it shipped out for the South Pacific. After the departure of the First Division, the majority of supply activities were shifted to the West Coast. The FMF Base Depot, San Diego, drawing on the Depot of Supplies, San Francisco, for its stocks of material, assumed the major role in fitting out units departing for Pacific theaters of operations. Units formed on the East Coast usually picked up most of their equipment when they reached the West Coast. 84

To assure efficient use of the material after it had been procured, an accurate and up-to-date record of supplies on hand had to be set up. At the beginning of the war, the only record of Marine Corps supply levels was a property account, showing the property charged to accountable officers throughout the Marine Corps. Each of these officers submitted a report of his issues and receipts to the Quartermaster Department, but as the reports were submitted only at infrequent intervals, they were of little value as a record of supplies on hand at a given moment.

Beginning in September 1943, a special task force of the Quartermaster Department made a complete inventory of all depots in the United States and set up a stock record card accounting system covering every item of Marine Corps supply. At first, all entries on the stock record cards were hand posted. But the volume of ordnance items, some 75,529 by 22 November 1944, led to the adoption of a machine record system for this category of supply. Located at the Depot of Supplies, San Francisco, it was modeled on the system in use by the Army Ordnance Department. 85


perform. Expanding the Corps and equipping it with the weapons and support facilities demanded by modern amphibious undertakings was an administrative achievement of the first magnitude but was overshadowed by the readiness of the Fleet Marine force to undertake the Guadalcanal Operation at a critical time early in the war when other ground forces were still undergoing training. A few statistics will be helpful to an understanding of the nature of the administrative task.

Personnel was expanded from 18,000 in September 1939 to an authorized strength of 503,000, although the actual strength never exceeded 485,833, reached in August 1945.

The Fleet Marine Force eventually comprising some 185,000 trained men in the ground units, organized into six divisions, 19 defence battalions, and other supporting units, was the heart of the Marine Corps' fighting forces.

The Aviation Branch of the Fleet Marine Force grew to some 80,000 men, grouped into various units consisting of more than 175 land and carrier-based squadrons. Aviation personnel was rotated frequently, but more than half were overseas on 30 June 1945.

Logistics was a controlling factor in mounting amphibious operations. Success depended upon a procurement, storage, and distribution of tremendous quantities of supplies and equipment. Due to the sound procurement policies followed by the Quartermaster Department over the years, no operation was ever delayed because of lack of supplies. The procurement fo some of the items ran to very large figures for example, 2,548,121,000 rounds of ammunition of all types, 1,156,959 weapons of all types, 62,240 vehicles, and many other items that had to be procured in unprecedented amounts. 86

Combat Fitness Test

The Marine Corps Combat Fitness Test, or CFT, measures functional fitness and simulates the demands of battle in full combat utility uniforms. The three parts of the CFT are Movement to Contact, Ammunition Lift, and Maneuver Under Fire. The Movement to Contact drill is an 880-yard sprint that mimics the stresses of running under pressure in battle. In the Ammunition Lift, Marines must lift a 30-pound ammunition can overhead until elbows lock out. The goal is to lift the can as many times as possible in a set amount of time. The Maneuver Under Fire is a 300-yard course that combines a variety of battle-related challenges, including crawls, ammunition resupply, grenade throwing, agility running, and the dragging and carrying of another Marine.

The Combat Fitness Test ensures Marines are at all times ready for the physical rigors of combat operations. Individual readiness is measured by performing a series of combat-related tasks, including:


To uphold the trust our Nation places in those who fill our ranks, Marine Fitness is not something one simply meets—it is an expectation that must be continually maintained. Every Marine must at all times possess the highest level of physical fitness regardless of age, rank, or Military Occupational Specialty (MOS).

Part 1 RAF Pilot Training - Geoff Wright UK

This story is based on my diaries and flying logbook. Remember that I was 18 years old and was called up 7 days after finishing my Higher School Certificate Exams. You may find some of the text quaint but most of it is as it was written down at the time.
Some of us had a lot to learn about life, such as our first pint of beer.
I had already had some experience of flying as my father bought an AVRO 504k (1919 vintage) in the 30’s which he used for giving joy-rides at various places along the east coast. He also built a Flying Flea and owned Wrights Bus Service which served North east Lincolnshire. The red and cream buses were used by many RAF servicemen from the bomber stations in the area.
This is my story:
2.7.43 Interviewed at No. 1 Aircrew Selection Board, Doncaster. Recommended for commission and training as PNB(3) ‘A’ Service Number 3040524.
Rank AC.2 Medical grade 1
The interviews lasted for two days but I can remember very little about them. I know we were given thorough medical and intelligence tests. We also had colour blindness and eye examinations, and I was amazed to find that my sight was below the standard required. Fortunately it was agreed that I could fly with corrective lenses in my goggles. I was instructed to see my dentist before I was called up and was horrified to discover that I required 12 fillings. These were all replaced later at ITW as the RAF dentist said they were not suitable for high flying and would give me intense pain.
9.8.43. Posted to No. 1 Air Crew Recruiting Centre,
Lords Cricket Ground.
Service life started here. I was surprised that the ACRC was located in London when one bomb could have wiped out hundreds of potential aircrew. We were immediately issued with our kit and uniform, and then had to march to our billets carrying our civilian suitcase, two kitbags, back pack, side pack and gasmask case. We soon realised how unfit we were. The accomodation was in luxury flats in St. Johns Wood. They had been stripped of all their luxuries, but at least we had decent bathrooms and toilets and sheets on our beds. White sheets were one of the perks of aircrew and we had them until we were withdrawn from flying training in September, 1945. On the second day we all had a compulsory haircut. No comb and scissors affair, electric clippers straight over the top whether or not you gave the hairdresser a sixpenny tip. One airman was processed every 90 seconds.
The food was good, but the discipline irksome and at times farcical. I remember one day coming out of the mess and putting my forage cap on as I stepped through the door. The RAF Sergeant waiting outside promptly ordered me to report for an hours punishment drill that evening for appearing in public bare-headed. You soon acquired a healthy respect for the powers of NCO’s.
Church parade was compulsorily every Sunday, but it did at least ensure that the local churches had good congregations. After a few days we were allowed out into the city and I remember enjoying several free concerts by distinguished musicians. There were a few air raid warnings but I don’t remember any activity in our area.
We were subjected to large doses of square bashing and my previous experience in the OTC and ATC came in useful. Everyone had to try and swim a length of the baths and those who couldn’t received a crash course. Numerous tests were used to confirm our fitness to fly, including a night vision assessment. In this you were seated in a dark room on a chair with a restraining collar round your neck. You had to name the objects or shapes which appeared momentarily on a small screen in front of you.
28.8.43. Posted to No. 11 Initial Training Wing,
Prince of Wales Hotel, Scarborough.
The food was excellent as the original chefs still worked in the kitchen, but it was was a pretty tough place. Wakey wakey at ten to six, breakfast at twenty past, and on parade at seven o’oclock. Before you could go on parade you had strip your bed and pile up your kit in a neat pile at the foot. Blankets, sheets, greatcoat, gas mask container etc. had to be absolutely square, achieved by inserting sheets of cardboard in the front. Lectures were given in the Spa buildings at the foot of the cliff, and square bashing at the top so we had to march at the double several times a day up and down the cliffs. We had physical training on the beach, route marches, cross-country runs up and down the Mount. In between we were taught the principles of flight, navigation, aircraft recognition, morse code, the elements of service law etc. We were given no leave while we there but at least we were free to enjoy the delights of Scarborough at weekends and in the evening, if you had any energy left.
1.12.43. Posted to No. 4 Elementary Flying Training School, Brough, Yorkshire.
The old flying club belonging to the Blackburn Aircraft Company was used as our mess and for lectures. On the airfield were several Nissen huts used as flight huts for the flying instructors and trainees. All trainees had about 15 hours instruction on Tiger Moths. I had problems as I was only 5’6" tall and had short legs. I had to use cushions so that I could reach the pedals and see out of the cockpit. We flew off the grass, usually towards the river bank which was about twenty feet high so there was no room for mistakes. I managed to go solo in 7 hrs. 50 mins. but had to make three circuits before I landed safely. On the first two attempted landings I was too close to the river bank and had to go round again. When I eventually landed I discovered that my instructor had hid himself in the flight hut as he didn’t think I was going to get down safely. In the innocence of youth, I was quite unperturbed. I had simply flown as I had been instructed. Perhaps that is why I was one of the two out of five who were selected for pilot training. The others were sent for training as navigators and bomb aimers.
We slept in Nissen huts in the corner of the field by the gasworks and railway bridge. Over the bridge lived my Aunt Alice and Uncle Charlie and five cousins, so you can guess where I went at night.
10.3.44 Posted to Aircrew Despatch Centre, Heaton Park,
Remustered as U/T Pilot (2) as a result of my performance at Brough. Only two out of every five recruits were selected for pilot training, and probably half of these were allocated to fighter training, so I considered myself fortunate to have passed the recruiting board, passed the ITW training and finally been selected for fighter training. There was still a long way to go as only two out of five of those selected for pilot training eventually got their wings. Unfortunately, my posting to flying training was delayed as the special goggles I needed had not arrived. Perhaps this saved my life as I never reached operations.
25.3.44. Posted to No 12 Initial Training Wing, St. Andrews,
We were sent here until the RAF could decided what to do with us. Presumably they were not needing as many aircrew replacements as expected. My memories consist of salty porridge and route marches through the snow up the hills. These were agony to me as I am only 5"6" and my legs are short.
5.4.44. Posted to R.A.F. Bomber Station, Leconfield, Yorks.
Sid Wybrow and I were assigned to the Signals Section. This was the beginning of a long friendship as we were posted together for the next two years. We built valve radios for use in the billets and on one occasion Sid built a radio transmitter which caused havoc in the control tower. One of our jobs was to log in the Lancasters as they returned from bombing raids - could be a sad task.
I got leave occasionally and used the Humber Ferry from Hull to get to Lincolnshire. Unfortunately there were always military police on duty at the ferry so it was impossible to get across on unofficial leave. The alternative was a long journey up the river to Goole and back down the other side.
9.7.44. Posted to Aircrew Despatch Centre, Heaton Park, Manchester. 4 weeks embarkation leave but no embarkation.
10.8.44. Posted to 101 Lancaster Squadron, Ludford Magna, Lincolnshire. This RAF station was only eight miles from Louth, so I acquired an old cycle and frequently went home. We occasionally helped to load incendiary bombs and did menial tasks around the site. I remember one night being stationed at the beginning of the runway with a red Very pistol and a telephone. I can’t remember what my duties were, but suddenly the fog came down and to my amazement lines of fire roared up on either side of the runway. I was seeing one of the first demonstrations of FIDO, a fog dispersal system. 101 Squadron was a special duties squadron and the story was that they carried German speaking radio operators who attempted to fool the German night-fighters with spurious messages.
6.2.45 Tue. Embarkation Centre, Heaton Park, Manchester
Things are moving at last. This afternoon we had a Yellow Fever jab, and it certainly had a kick. For a few minutes I thought I was going to faint, but fresh air revived me and I had no after effects. In the evening the boys and I went out to the Griffon for a lively evening.
7.2.45 Wed.
Miserable day. Usual Manchester rain. Most of the day was spent exchanging u/s clothing and in the evening we went to the Squirrel for tea. The old waitress was in a bad mood as some of the boys didn’t sit at her table, so the bill was heavier than usual. As we had two teas each that wasn’t surprising. Afterwards the boys went to the Union, but I wasn’t in that mood at all as I hadn’t recovered from the previous night. So I went to the flicks to see "Between Two Worlds" instead. Not a bad show.
8.2.45 Thu.
The prospects are getting brighter every day. Today we have been issued with flying kit and tropical clothing and all our laundry has been brought up to date. Looks as if we shall be on the move pretty soon. However I’m not particularly excited yet.
9.2.45 Fri.
This morning we’ve had a lecture on Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. The old Air Commodore was rather boring, but he did give us a little gen. I’m going to Southern Rhodesia and we may fly from the Middle East to Bulawayo. Also there is a good chance that I may return to England when I get my wings. In the evening we went to the Union to celebrate our draught overseas.
10.2.45 Sat.
Day off today. Supposed to be our last free day. We were marched out of the gates at 10 o’clock and the boys and I caught an electric train to Victoria. I wasn’t hungry. but the others were so we had breakfast and then went to do a little shopping. I managed to buy a "Brownie" camera for 10/-. It isn’t very versatile but it will serve it’s purpose. We had lunch at the YMCA, Spam and veg. with a horribly sad date pudding. But as it only cost a shilling one can’t grumble.
The afternoon was spent at Birch Park roller-skating rink and we had a good time in spite of the crowds of children. I wrecked two pairs of skates and tired myself out thoroughly, but the girls made me lovesick for Winnie. I was too exhausted to skate in the evening, so Geordie, Geoff and I went to the Odeon to see "Double Indemnity".
11.2.45 Sun.
Bad news today. Draft postponed for a week. We paraded at 10 o’clock and were dismissed for the day. The Halle Orchestra was playing at the King’s Hall so decided to spend the afternoon there. I reached Belle Vue at 2.40 pm and just as I was about to buy a ticket a civilian came up to me and gave me a 3/6d ticket he didn’t want. He wouldn’t allow me to pay for it and I had a pleasant afternoon six rows from the orchestra. Unfortunately it was at the back near the kitchen department, but that didn’t prevent me falling asleep three times.
14.2.45 Wed.
On the Sten gun range this morning. As usual we spent three hours firing 20 rounds of ammunition. In the afternoon we each threw a grenade. It’s much easier than one would imagine and no mishaps occurred. I wasn’t feeling too well in the evening so stayed in and did a little washing the Rinso way.
15.2.45 Thu.
We left the Regiment this afternoon and were marched out of the gates at two o’clock for our last evening out of camp in England. It wasn’t particularly exciting, an hour’s roller skating at Birch Park, tea at the Squirrel and a party with Dan and the rest of the boys at the Union.
16.2.45 Fri.
Confined to camp. Very lazy day spent in exchanging laundry and boots. Early to bed after a good supper in the NAAFI.
17.2.45 Sat.17.2.45
The great day has at last arrived. Draft no. 9903 embarked at 11pm on the S.S. Samaria at Liverpool. The size of our sleeping quarters was a shock when we realised we had to eat there as well and we wondered how the hell we should manage. The lucky ones got a hammock, I didn’t and spent three weeks sleeping on a table on a pile of life-jackets. When we left port we immediately ran into a raging storm, The waves were higher than the deck and most of us were promptly seasick. I was never actually sick but felt rotten and then caught what felt like dysentery. Food was awful. Sausages like rubber, spam or stew with potatoes and vegetables. The plates frequently ended up in a pile at the end of the table as the storm was so violent. We went far out into the Atlantic and didn’t see land until we passed through the Straits of Gibraltar. I then remember stopping at Algiers, but not being allowed on shore, and passing Malta we had a submarine alert. The weather was hot in the Mediterranean and we had to shower in salt water. This is not to be recommended - you feel dirtier afterwards than when you started. The troopship was so crowded that exercise was almost impossible and during the latter part of the journey, when the weather improved, we spent most of the time lying on the deck.
3.3.45 Sat.
We disembarked at Port Said

© Copyright of content contributed to this Archive rests with the author. Find out how you can use this.

Physical Activity Facts

Regular physical activity can help children and adolescents improve cardiorespiratory fitness, build strong bones and muscles, control weight, reduce symptoms of anxiety and depression, and reduce the risk of developing health conditions such as: 1

  • Heart disease.
  • Cancer.
  • Type 2 diabetes.
  • High blood pressure.
  • Osteoporosis.
  • Obesity.
  • Lead to energy imbalance (e.g., expend less energy through physical activity than consumed through diet) and can increase the risk of becoming overweight or obese. 14
  • Increase the risk of factors for cardiovascular disease, including hyperlipidemia (e.g., high cholesterol and triglyceride levels), high blood pressure, obesity, and insulin resistance and glucose intolerance. 1,5,6
  • Increase the risk for developing type 2 diabetes. 1,7
  • Increase the risk for developing breast, colon, endometrial, and lung cancers. 1
  • Lead to low bone density, which in turn, leads to osteoporosis. 1
  • Less than one-quarter (24%) of children 6 to 17 years of age participate in 60 minutes of physical activity every day. 8
  • In 2017, only 26.1% of high school students participate in at least 60 minutes per day of physical activity on all 7 days of the previous week. 9
  • In 2017, 51.1% of high school students participated in muscle strengthening exercises (e.g., push-ups, sit-ups, weight lifting) on 3 or more days during the previous week. 9
  • In 2017, 51.7% of high school students attended physical education classes in an average week, and only 29.9% of high school students attended physical education classes daily. 9
    • Aerobic: Most of the 60 minutes or more per day should be either moderate- or vigorous-intensity aerobic physical activity and should include vigorous-intensity physical activity on at least 3 days a week.
    • Muscle-strengthening: As part of their 60 minutes or more of daily physical activity, children and adolescents should include muscle-strengthening physical activity on at least 3 days a week.
    • Bone-strengthening: As part of their 60 minutes or more of daily physical activity, children and adolescents should include bone-strengthening physical activity on at least 3 days a week.

    These guidelines state that children and adolescents be provided opportunities and encouragement to participate in physical activities that are appropriate for their age, that are enjoyable, and that offer variety. 3

    The national recommendation for schools is to have a comprehensive approach for addressing physical education and physical activity in schools. 10&ndash12 This approach is called Comprehensive School Physical Activity Programs. 13

    Move Forward With Purpose

    At North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University, we deliver a high-quality, intellectually stimulating education focused on helping every student gain access to the hands-on opportunities, core knowledge and global perspective that will help them make lasting change in their lives and the lives of people in their workplaces, communities and world.

    We inspire people to stretch their potential, achieve beyond expectations and lead the way to success. Every day and in every way.

    This isn’t just school spirit. It’s genuinely how we do things at N.C. A&T.


    Sustaining Lives, Enriching Communities

    With a rich history of innovation, cutting-edge technology and outstanding educational programs, we engage in practical research that enriches the lives, land and economies of our state and nation and helps to meet the food challenges of a hungry planet.

    Visit our site to learn why we are one of America's leading agricultural and environmental sciences colleges - and what that means for you.

    Building a Foundation for Life

    We create and disseminate knowledge of the human experience, expression and creativity. We advance human welfare and hone problem-solving, critical thinking and communication skills students need to make a difference in the world around them.

    A world of discovery for your lifetime ahead awaits you at the College of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences.

    With a student-centered emphasis on leadership, ethical reasoning, critical thinking, achievement and excellence, we educate and mentor high-performing leaders who advance business for the good of people, communities and economies around the world.

    Visit us and learn why so many graduates who have gone on to great success chose to get their start in business here in Aggieland.

    Equity, Opportunity and Advocacy for All

    We prepare exemplary educators, counselors and leaders who transform the communities they serve by solving systemic issues that impact students, schools and organizations across North Carolina and around the nation.

    It all begins here in the heart of A&T. Visit us to learn more.

    Leveraging a rich tradition of academic and research excellence, we cultivate and inspire our engineers and computer scientists to design and build technical innovations that solve the complex challenges of today to create better tomorrows.

    Improving Lives, Enhancing Communities

    We deliver innovative educational programs that capitalize on the strengths of faculty in the social, behavioral and health sciences to prepare our students to solve complex population health and human concerns, improving the quality of life for individuals and communities.

    With leading-edge research and teaching programs, facilities and faculty, we prepare successful and innovative professionals on the forefront of an increasingly technically and scientifically driven economy and world.

    Individual Attention, Advanced Knowledge

    With a focus on individual success, The Graduate School combines excellence in education with leading-edge research opportunities to give students the freedom to explore, innovate and advance their knowledge for professional education and advanced degrees.

    Limited Only By Your Imagination

    A collaborative, cross-disciplinary research and teaching enterprise, we draw leading faculty and graduate students from around the world. We enable meaningful technology breakthroughs, foster economic development, and deliver significant impact regionally and globally.

    How Combat Experience Matters

    The debate over how much combat experience matters for the PLA frequently conflates two related but distinct issues. The first concerns the operational significance of combat experience for China's military. In other words, how much does inexperience affect the PLA's potential battlefield performance? The second concerns the strategic significance of experience. How much does the PLA's relative inexperience affect the potential outcome of a war involving China?

    Even without battlefield experience, training matters. Considerable evidence shows that better educated soldiers are easier to train, more adept at operating and maintaining sophisticated weapons and platforms, and more capable of executing complex tasks. Both the quantity and quality of military training correlate with superior military performance as well. Military units that undergo realistic, demanding training which simulates combat conditions tend to fare better (PDF ) in battle than those that have not had similar training. For example, after the U.S. Navy founded the Navy Fighter Weapons School in 1969 to provide more rigorous and realistic training, its pilots experienced a dramatic improvement in its loss exchange ratio against the North Vietnamese, from about 4:1 between 1965 and 1967 to 13:1 after 1970. And as the examples of Kasserine and Ia Drang illustrate, how much a military invests in maintaining the infrastructure to transmit lessons between wars can greatly influence prospects for combat performance in the next conflict.

    Social, cultural, and political factors can help win or lose wars, as well. In some cases, ideology and culture can encourage a furious fighting style that can help compensate for material disadvantages, as Japan demonstrated with its &ldquobanzai&rdquo culture in World War II and many highly motivated insurgencies showed in overthrowing their colonial overlords. Militaries that can operate with minimal interference by political authorities tend to demonstrate greater adaptability on the battlefield than forces whose decisions are made for political, rather than operationally sound, reasons. Units riven by social, ethnic, or sectarian divisions have generally proven less resilient and less lethal than more cohesive units.

    The PLA's disastrous performance in the Sino-Vietnam War owed a great deal to such factors. The Cultural Revolution directed by Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong in the late 1960s decimated the officer class and destroyed much of the professional knowledge that had been accumulated over decades, especially after the fall of Lin Biao, one of the PLA's most talented generals, and his followers. The deleterious consequences (PDF ) are evident in the PLA's reversion to discredited, but low-skill, tactics like the human-wave assault, as well as in the inability of infantrymen to navigate or read maps, and the inaccuracy of artillerymen due to unfamiliarity with procedures for measuring distances and calculating firing distances.

    Competent management is also required to supply, transport, and support troops in war, and to ensure retention, training, and preparation in peacetime. Technologically advanced militaries depend on systems that link weapons and troops to sensors, satellites, and command centers. But it takes technical and management skills and knowledge to assimilate state-of-the-art technologies into a cohesive, lethal whole. All of these factors can affect how efficiently a society can translate resources into military power.

    So, what role does combat experience play in all this? Research has confirmed its importance in improving some measures of survivability and performance. One study, for example, found that maneuver battalions under experienced commanders in the Vietnam War suffered one-third fewer (PDF ) battle deaths compared to those with inexperienced commanders.

    Combat experience does not automatically translate into military advantage. Militaries require institutions, processes, and procedures that can learn the right lessons from battlefield experience.

    But combat experience does not automatically translate into military advantage. Militaries require institutions, processes, and procedures that can learn the right lessons from battlefield experience and improve their performance. Military academies and research institutes can help systematize insights into superior doctrine or develop more lethal weapons and technologies. Scholars have noted that a major source of the German military's adaptability and lethality in World War II owed (PDF ) in part to its deliberate, thorough analysis of its after-action reviews and willingness to implement changes accordingly.

    All these factors (except perhaps motivation) are extremely resource-intensive, and for this reason many of the qualities associated with superior military performance tend to improve as resources become more plentiful. At least some studies suggest that cultural and institutional barriers to military effectiveness could dissipate as states become more economically developed. This suggests China has the potential to make gains in many areas of military effectiveness, even if it does not fight a war.

    In sum, experience alone doesn't ensure superior battlefield performance&mdasha painful lesson the seasoned, but seriously deficient Iraqi military learned in the Gulf War. Experience is but one of many factors that contribute to combat effectiveness. Militaries that have mastered the other variables, as the United States did in the lead-up to the Gulf War, can more than compensate for a lack of experience. Moreover, mastery of the other factors can position a military to profit from its experience more quickly and thoroughly, a key attribute of high-performing militaries.

    In China's case, the PLA has made impressive gains in raising (PDF ) education levels, the quality of recruits, the realism of training, and an overall readiness for a broader range of missions. After a disastrous performance in the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake, for example, the PLA carried out an overhaul of its approach to such operations. As a result of these changes, military forces have operated more effectively in subsequent major relief operations. The PLA has also eagerly sought opportunities to deepen its experience through non-combat operations. Since 2008, for example, the PLA Navy has deployed a counter-piracy (PDF ) task force near the Horn of Africa. The PLA has expanded its participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations around the world as well, and deployed its first full infantry battalion in 2015 to South Sudan. The PLA has also stepped up its involvement in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in 2011, the Navy competently carried out a major noncombatant evacuation operation in Libya.

    The PLA has likely improved its combat readiness from a very low level, but how much remains unclear. The persistence of corruption, concerns about the realism and rigor of its training, challenges in integration, and mismanagement provide grounds for skepticism. Moreover, given the PLA's history of cover-ups and prevarication, Chinese leaders have sound reasons to doubt the military's assurances of successful reform.

    Combat reveals truths about competence more clearly than any peacetime analysis. Short of going to war, Chinese leaders will likely have little choice but to rely on observations of peacetime performance to assess the PLA's overall readiness, and these simply do not test the military's capabilities to the extent war would.

    No.40 War Course, No.1 School of Physical Training and Drill, 1942 (Back) - History

    In the mid-nineteenth century, the scalpel joined the sword as a tool of modern warfare. Major Jonathan Letterman, after whom the hospital at the Presidio was renamed in 1911, was the medical director of the Army of the Potomac. A founding father of military medicine, Letterman organized forward first-aid stations, mobile field hospitals, and ambulance services for the evacuation of wounded soldiers during the Civil War.

    Later, military hospitals like Letterman became pioneers in orthopedics, rehabilitation therapy, and research in areas such as artificial blood. Just as important, over the course of the twentieth century the military developed comprehensive health care systems for members and their families, which provided coverage through retirement.

    The U.S. Army General Hospital at the Presidio of San Francisco was established to cope with the health problems of the 22,000 troops at Camp Merritt, a cantonment of tents hastily set up in the sand dunes of the Richmond District south of the Presidio. W.H. Wilcox of San Francisco designed a 300-bed, pavilion-type hospital consisting of 10 wards, with administrative and support buildings arranged around a rectangular central green and linked by covered corridors. The facility was built between 1899 and 1902. Today, twelve surviving buildings of this complex have been reborn as the Thoreau Center for Sustainability.

    As the United States expanded across the Pacific and into Asia, the hospital served troops in the western states and those returning from Hawaii, the Philippines, China, Siberia, the Panama Canal Zone, and Alaska. In 1901, Letterman was the first army general hospital to employ women of the Army Nurse Corps. Civilian San Franciscans were admitted to the hospital in the aftermath of the earthquake and fire of 1906, and medical officers from the Presidio took charge of sanitation in the post-quake refugee camps built in city parks and on the Presidio.

    By 1918, Letterman Hospital was the Army's largest general hospital, and had opened a School of Nursing. Despite its distance from the battlefields, Letterman cared for many of the wounded returning from Europe during World War I. Staff physicians developed orthopedic devices including the Letterman Leg, and also pioneered the field of physical therapy.

    To deal with the sudden influx of returning wounded, East Hospital, an orderly array of 21 frame buildings which more than doubled the patient facilities, was built east of the (since built over) O'Reilly Avenue parade ground. By 1921, Letterman hospital had 56 permanent buildings and 29 temporary ones staffed by 41 medical officers, 58 nurses, and 484 enlisted men.

    In 1960, the Army began planning for a more modern hospital. The East Hospital complex was demolished and in 1969 a 10-story, 550-bed, reinforced concrete facility opened on the site. The new Letterman Army Medical Center trained a quarter of the Army's medical specialists. It served the wounded and POWs returning from Vietnam in the 1970s.

    In 1971, the Army opened the adjoining Letterman Army Institute of Research. It consisted of four concrete buildings that housed research in artificial blood, laser physics, and the treatment of trauma. During these years, the Army began demolishing parts of the 1899 quadrangle to build housing for nurses and enlisted men the remaining historic buildings housed support services. By the late 1980s, Letterman served mainly military retirees and their dependents. Both the hospital and the research institute were deactivated in 1995.

    Letterman's history and contributions to medical and military history are shining and significant. Neither architecturally significant nor up to contemporary seismic standards, the 1960s Letterman complex will soon be removed to make way for the Letterman Digital Arts Center. This change guarantees the vitality of this site for years to come.

    • Stephen A. Haller, Letterman Hospital: A Summary of Its Significance and Integrity, 1994.
    • Erwin N. Thompson, Defender of the Gate: The Presidio of San Francisco, A History from 1846 to 1995, vol. I, 1997.

    Letterman General Hospital

    A Hospital Was Needed, 1898 - 1905

    When, in May 1898, the War Department ordered the formation of the 8th Army Corps at San Francisco for service in the Philippine Islands, volunteer troops from many states assembled at San Francisco. In a short time 22,000 men occupied Camp Merritt south of the Presidio, between it and Golden Gate Park. The area proved unsuitable as a cantonment. Cold winds, fog, drifting sand, and poor drainage wrought havoc with the health of the command. The morning sick reports increased in length as typhoid fever, spinal meningitis, and pneumonia swept through the camp. While the more serious cases found care in city hospitals, the tent hospital of forty-eight beds offered little comfort or relief from the cold for the majority of patients. Finally, the chief surgeon of the Department of California, Col. Johnson V.D. Middleton, urged the removal of the sick to the new brick barracks at the Presidio. He also wrote to the Surgeon General of the Army recommending construction of a 500-bed general hospital at San Francisco as soon as possible.[1]

    The Division Field Hospital moved to the Presidio in July 1898, occupying two of the new brick barracks. An increase in the patient load resulted in the addition of eight hospital tents and three conical wall tents. And before long, four wood frame barracks became part of the facility. Although far from satisfactory as a hospital – overcrowding, inadequate water and plumbing in the wards, and poor ventilation – the barracks provided better facilities than the former tent camp. In addition to the six medical officers, ninety enlisted men of the Hospital Corps, thirty-three contract nurses, and ten Sisters of Mercy volunteers administered to the ill.[2]

    By the end of 1898 nearly all the volunteer troops had departed for the western Pacific, but those contracting diseases overseas began to return to the United States. In a few more months the bulk of these troops would begin the return journey. At the same time, the Army realized the need for regular troops in the Philippines where insurrectionists complicated army administration. The need of a general hospital at San Francisco continued to be deemed urgent. On December 1, 1898, the War Department published General Orders 182 establishing the U.S. Army General Hospital – on paper – under the direct control of the Surgeon General, U.S. Army.

    A Board of Officers, composed of Brig. Gen. Henry C. Merriam, commanding Colonel Middleton, chief surgeon and Maj. Charles B. Thompson, chief quartermaster, all on the Department of California staff, met to select a site for the urgently needed hospital. The Board considered Angel Island, southern Fort Mason, and the Presidio drill field that the Army had built up immediately to the northeast of the main post. Believing that the hospital would be only temporary in nature, the Board selected the Presidio site as the most economical even though it noted some objections to it.

    The Army employed Architect W.H. Wilcox of San Francisco to prepare plans for a 300-bed, pavilion type hospital such as had been used by the British in the Crimean War, 1853-1856, and by the Union in the American Civil War. The plans called for wards, administration building, operating theater, kitchens and mess halls, laundry, boiler house for steam heating, and an electric plant surrounding a rectangle of covered verandas. Before construction started the Army eliminated the operating theater (part of a ward would serve as such) and Brig. Gen. William B. Shafter, prior to his departure for Cuba, struck out the boiler house, electric plant, and laundry to reduce expenses. Surgeon Middleton wrote, after this emasculation, "he [Shafter] forwarded the plans to the War Department and they seemed to be satisfactory, at all events the hospital was ordered to be built." Early in 1899 John T. Long won the construction contract with a bid of $113,340.[3]

    Although the general hospital remained incomplete, Maj. Alfred C. Girard took command in July 1899.[4]

    As the volunteers returned from the Philippines in ever increasing numbers ill from tropical diseases, the hospital proved its worth in a hurry. Major Girard had mixed emotions about his new command. He wrote, "The location of the hospital has its advantages and disadvantages. The advantages are proximity to the city, to the post of the Presidio, and to the camps which were to shelter the troops assembling for duty in the Philippines and the volunteers returning therefrom. The disadvantages are exposure to the high winds and fogs . . . the low ground . . . the proximity to the liquor shops adjoining the Presidio." An anonymous account noted that Major Girard struggled with incompetent help, epidemics, shiploads of
    wounded, and swarms of mosquitoes and flies (the cavalry stables stood 400 yards to the west). The civilian contract surgeons changed over so often they were more of a hindrance than a help. A later critic wrote, "The location of this site has often been regarded as the one great mistake in the hospital's formation." [5]

    Throughout 1899, military patients continued to occupy both the barracks and the new hospital. During the year, 5,400 patients entered the facilities and 5,200 were discharged.

    taffing consisted of nineteen medical officers, 158 Hospital Corps enlisted men, and thirty-six nurses. The most serious drawback at this time was the lack of a power plant. Coal and kerosene stoves heated the buildings and kerosene lamps provided lighting. The ten forty-man wards in the general hospital were divided into: seven for general medical service, two for surgical, and one for venereal disease. Soldiers in the Presidio camps suffered from typhoid fever, measles, mumps, pneumonia, rheumatism, bronchitis, and venereal disease.
    Veterans from the Philippines brought home chronic diarrhea, dysentery, and malaria fever. The Surgical Service operated for hernia, appendicitis, gunshot wounds, hemorrhoids, and circumcision.[6]

    In early 1900 almost 15,000 Regulars passed through San Francisco en route to China where the Boxer Rebellion threatened the foreign legations. In just two years about 80,000 enlisted men and 2,500 officers, coming and going, spent time at the Presidio and the general hospital treated all those in need.

    The largest number of patients in one day in 1899 amounted to 1,040 on August 2. Plant improvements in 1900 included the power house, an ice machine, and a laundry. Wooden sidewalks and tin roofing on the verandas improved the grounds. Hospital equipment gradually improved. Still, the patient load caused the continued use of the Presidio's barracks.[7]

    The following year, 1901, saw a marked improvement in the hospital's functioning, especially in a more proficient staff. The number of patients decreased as the volunteer troops returned to civilian life. Yet, the Presidio barracks and tents continued to house patients. An intercom telephone system connected all the wards and the administration building. X-Ray equipment, still primitive, came into use. The total number of cases treated during the year amounted to 3,180, of whom ninety-two died. Fire on June 10 caused a setback by destroying the patients' and the hospital corps' dining rooms, kitchens, storerooms, and two wards. Damage amounted to $56,000. A tent hospital with forty-five tents sprang up to take care of the emergency.

    President McKinley Visiting the Army General Hospital, Presidio of San Francisco

    A month before the fire and a few months before his assassination, President William McKinley visited the general hospital and addressed the veteran-patients from the China Expedition. His visit was but the first of many by civil and military dignitaries.

    Colonel Girard transferred in June 1902 and Maj. William P. Kendall succeeded him as commander. Before Girard left he had the pleasure of being the first occupant of the new commanding officer's quarters (Building 1000) completed, along with a duplex officers' quarters (Building 1001), in March.[8] Before he departed, Girard also supervised the suppression of a serious measles epidemic that had begun at the Presidio in December 1901:

    December, 8 cases
    January, 70 cases
    February, 79 cases
    March, 116 cases
    April, 82 cases
    May, 24 cases
    June 1902, suppressed

    During the epidemic the measles patients were first isolated in two of the Presidio's barracks. In March, as the epidemic slowly began to decline, the patients moved into the hospital. By the time it was over, measles had claimed eighteen deaths.[9]

    Letterman was the first army general hospital to employ women of the Army Nurse Corps, it being established in 1901. By 1902 forty-one of these nurses, along with eleven medical officers and contract surgeons and 180 enlisted men of the Hospital Corps, comprised the hospital's staff. The nurses did not receive commissions until much later for the time being they received $40 per month for their valued duty.

    The total number of patients in 1902, 4,828, dropped precipitously the following year when only 2,252 were admitted, allowing the hospital to turn one of the two brick barracks back to the Presidio. At the same time the physical plant expanded with the addition of a storehouse, a second barracks for the enlisted men, and additions to the wards. The central veranda that bisected the courtyard was enclosed with glass, and painters spruced up the entire hospital. By 1903 the hospital maintained four messes: nurses, Hospital Corps enlisted men, officer and civilian employees, and enlisted patients and civilian employees.[10]

    Army General Hospital circa 1901

    For reasons remaining unclear, War Department General Orders 25, January 30, 1904, placed the general hospital under the general supervision of the commanding general, Department of California, upon the recommendation of the Surgeon General, U.S. Army. In March 1904, Lt. Col. George H. Torney became commanding officer of the general hospital. A most capable administrator, Torney presided over an important period in the hospital's evolution. Finally, an operating pavilion, that had been canceled in 1898, came to be. Located in the center of the quadrangle and considered a model of its kind, it cost $22,000. Other new construction that year included a guardhouse at the north end of the compound and an iron flagstaff at the front of the administration building. Rebuilt roads and new sidewalks graced the grounds. A post exchange featuring billiard and pool tables became available for staff and patients alike.

    Measles again brought a slight increase in the number of patients. More important, however, changes in the general hospital's missions became apparent, "The large majority of all the medical cases treated during the year, contrary to former years, were admitted from the United States. This is explainable by the fact that prior to this year the Presidio Post Hospital [Building 2] had served as a post hospital for all commands casually at the Presidio as well as for two regiments of infantry stationed at the [East and West] Infantry cantonments, which custom was discontinued in the early part of this year by the General Hospital being made to take up patients from these sources."[11]

    The mean daily average of the sick load in 1904 dropped to 257, indicating that the general hospital no longer needed to make use of the Presidio's barracks. Even those suffering from the measles were kept in the hospital, in Ward A.[12]

    Colonel Torney recorded further changes in the hospital's missions in 1905. He wrote that the hospital's aim "has been to develop a high standard of specialized professional services fitted to meet the demands of the Army. When the hospital was established its purposes were stated to be to receive the sick from troops en route to and from the Philippines and to care for patients transferred to the States from the Manila hospitals, and this was the hospital's only real reason for its existence up to the present year." But
    now, in addition to receiving all patients from the Presidio's garrisons, the general hospital's mission had increased significantly by the handling of special cases from all over the United States – obscure diseases serious surgical cases and eye, ear, nose, and throat (ENT) cases throughout Western military installations, and all dental work in the Department of California.[13]

    The hospital staff this year consisted of eleven medical officers, 156 enlisted men, and thirty-nine army nurses. Dora E. Thompson replaced Helene M. Gottschalk, who had served for the past four years, as head nurse in August. Although the nurses' quarters continued to be inadequate, a third floor had been added to the administration building, 1016, to serve as bachelor officers' quarters for the medical officers, cost $6,776. At the beginning of 1905 the hospital held 330 patients, at the end of the year, 303. Thirty-eight deaths had occurred in those twelve months.[14]

    Several attempts to create a coherent organization among the separate services had been attempted in these early years then about 1905 Colonel Torney published the comprehensive "Rules and Regulations for U.S. Army General Hospital." Thirty pages of fine print set forth the organization, duties, administration, fire protection, and procedures for all personnel. These regulations overlooked little.

    Rules specified how a nurse should be evaluated for promotion. The names of patients being photographed had to be accurately recorded. Enlisted attendants had responsibility for sanitation in the wards, including the floors, windows, bed pans, spit cups, toilets, and lavatories. No one could chew tobacco in a ward. Rheumatic patients being considered for transfer to the Army and Navy General Hospital at Hot Springs, Arkansas, for treatment in the waters had to be thoroughly inspected for gonorrhea. Also, patients or Hospital Corps men awaiting trial by summary court martial were confined to the hospital guardhouse when necessary.

    Still other regulations concerned security. A guard near the front door of the administration building refused admission to unauthorized persons, directed legitimate visitors to the officer of the day to obtain a pass, checked patients going on leave for their passes, and insured that such patients departed and returned through only this door. Guards locked the hospital's gates at retreat and unlocked them at reveille. At night, other guards, checked all doors and windows to insure they were locked.[15]

    Thus did the U.S. Army General Hospital evolve in five short years. It sprang up on the lower Presidio to treat successively thousands of soldiers departing for an returning from the Philippines, China, and Hawaii. Despite inadequate or missing facilities in the beginning, its staff gradually improved the hospital's services and its professionalism. In a short time it became responsible for the large garrisons at the Presidio and Fort Mason as well. In its fifth year, it acquired the responsibility of treating special cases from army installations all over the United States.

    The Hospital is Named, 1906-1917

    The year 1906 began with the ordinary routine at the general hospital. Then, just before dawn, April 18, a tremendous earthquake struck San Francisco. Immediately thereafter a terrible fire swept through the city. Units from U.S. Army posts in the Bay Area immediately came to the aid of the stricken city and military supplies from around the nation began the journey to California. Col. George Torney at the general hospital immediately organized his resources to assist in efforts to care for the steady stream of sick and injured citizens coming from the downtown area, including the unconscious fire chief, Dennis Sullivan. Attendants crammed beds together to make room for more and they set up an additional
    operating pavilion. Volunteer civilian medical people came to the hospital to help. By April 20 an army doctor reported that the hospital had taken in 200 civilians. The staff cared for them in the wards, halls, porches, and grounds. One history recorded that Mrs. Frederick Funston, the wife of the commanding general of the Department of California, came to the hospital (she had lost her own home to the fire) and made the rounds with Colonel Torney demanding the utmost effort be made to care for the victims.[16]

    Colonel Torney took charge of sanitation throughout the city and in the hastily established refugee camps. He received full authority to draw up and enforce the necessary regulations and through his capable staff supervised all sanitary work. Throughout the emergency the hospital's medical officers inspected the camps and enforced strict measures concerning sanitation. Given much credit for his efforts in this disaster, Torney later was "jumped" over several senior doctors to become Surgeon General of the U.S. Army, 1909-1913.[17]

    While San Francisco began its recovery from the devastating earthquake, the general hospital suffered a minor disaster of its own when the laundry building burned to the ground early in May. The records do not disclose how this travail was overcome except to say that it severely hampered medical service for a time."[18]

    Following San Francisco's rebirth from the earthquake and fire, the general hospital returned to its traditional missions. An anonymous source described the period as "a base hospital for the Philippines and Hawaii, a post hospital for the Presidio, Fort Winfield Scott [established in 1912], and several smaller posts in the harbor of San Francisco, and a general hospital for the western part of the country." In 1907 Maj. William W. Harts, Corps of Engineers, prepared an elaborate master plan for the future expansion on the Presidio military reservation. Recalling the hospital's earliest days – on the edge of a swamp, facing a dusty plain, and on low ground – he proposed abandoning the existing plant and constructing a new general hospital near the reservation's southern boundary, land on which the Presidio Golf Course had been established. The hospital remained where it was.[19]

    In 1911, when Lt. Col. James D. Glennan commanded the hospital, the War Department issued general orders naming it in honor of the late army surgeon Maj. Jonathan Letterman. Born the son of a doctor in Pennsylvania in 1824, Letterman graduated from a Philadelphia medical school. He entered the Army as an assistant surgeon in 1849. His first assignment took him to Florida where he participated in the Third Seminole War campaigns from 1849 to 1853. Letterman next transferred to the Department of the Pacific for service in New Mexico, Arizona, and California. In the spring of 1860 he arrived at Fort Tejon, 150 miles northeast of Los Angeles. Almost immediately he accompanied the 1st Dragoons to the Mojave Desert where Camp Cady protected the route to Salt Lake City during the campaign against the Paiute Indians. He next moved to Camp Fitzgerald at Los Angeles in 1861.

    Like many other regular officers, Letterman went east to participate in the Civil War. Promoted to major surgeon in April 1862, he became the medical director of the Army of the Potomac. He promptly reorganized that Army's ineffective medical service by setting up forward first-aid stations, mobile field hospitals, general hospitals, an ambulance corps, and the medical supply system. Letterman made use of the doctrines of Baron Larrey, Napoleon's chief medical officer, and adapted them to conditions in the Civil War. He placed great emphasis on the rapid evacuation of the wounded thus saving a great many lives. Four-wheel ambulances replaced the former two-wheel carts. Enlisted men, trained by the Medical
    Department, took the place of hired civilians. He adopted the pavilion type hospital that the British had employed in the Crimean War. This type later formed the basis of the general hospital at the Presidio, which, in turn, served as a model for hospitals in the American Expeditionary Force in World War I.

    Letterman's organization and procedures so improved the medical service in battle that they were later enacted into law for the U.S. Army. Soon his scheme was adopted by major armies in other countries.

    Major Letterman resigned from the United States Army in December 1864. This departure was brought about by poor health and the dismissal of his friend and commander, the Surgeon General William A. Hammond.

    The doctor moved to San Francisco to practice medicine. In 1867 he became coroner for San Francisco.

    A year later he accepted the position of Surgeon General for the State of California's military organizations. The Regents of the University of California elected him to its board of medical examiners in 1871, the same year he became a member of the first class of the Military Order of the Loyal Legion. That December Letterman retired. He died March 15, 1872, age 48 years. Later his daughter had his remains moved to Arlington National Cemetery.[20]

    Various improvements and additions had been made to the general hospital during its first decade, yet a serious deficiency remained - the lack of quarters for the noncommissioned officers. The hospital's quartermaster officer, Capt. H.B. McIntyre, wrote in 1910 that he rented quarters for nine NCOs attached to the hospital in the nearby community. The Quartermaster General, however, had not approved any leases for the current fiscal year and these sergeants were paying rent out of their own pockets – an average of $23.50 a month – which they could ill afford. He went on to describe one sergeant's arrangements. He was "situated in the low-lying, unhealthy district of lower Lombard Street. The houses in this vicinity are almost exclusively occupied by colored people and low class foreigners, and, during high water, excreta and other refuge from the sewer back up into the drains."

    The Army's solution to this situation has not been found. An inspection a few months later revealed that four sets of quarters for noncommissioned officers remained a requirement.[21]

    Besides these quarters the 1911 inspection report listed other structures that the hospital required: storehouse for combustibles, new kitchen, new stables, and another quartermaster storehouse. Some additional structures were erected during this period, particularly quarters for medical officers and for nurses. Officers' row east of the hospital reached completion in 1908 with the addition of three duplexes.

    An interesting note was that the northernmost set of quarters housed not an officer but the hospital's sergeant major, a mark of respect for this important personage. The army nurses received new housing with the construction of two buildings, one three story and the other four story, concrete, and with clay tile roofs. Later numbered 1022 (built in 1915) and 1024 (built in 1916) they formed parts of Thompson Hall, now demolished.

    Col. Frederick Von Schrader's inspection listed some of the various vehicles employed by the hospital:

    Station wagon, for meeting trains and transportation of officers to and from the depot Wagonette, for taking children to and from school and for same purposes as station wagon

    Express wagon, for baggage and marketing

    Two delivery wagons, one used for delivering supplies to offices from the commissary, the other used as milk and ice wagon

    Two ambulances, field, for conveying patients to and from hospital and for emergency calls

    Ambulance, city, rubber tired, for same purposes as field ambulances in more serious cases

    Cart, dump, for removing dry garbage and for general police work

    Cart, sanitary, for removing garbage

    Two carts, hand, used by organizations for hauling commissaries and other supplies

    In addition to these vehicles, Letterman experimented with "motor ambulances" in 1912. Alas, "They were not a success."[22]

    Thus the years between the San Francisco earthquake and World War I passed at Letterman. During this time Letterman was the largest general hospital in the U.S. Army and remained so until the extraordinary needs of the Great War. The average annual admittance of patients hovered at 3,000. In fiscal year 1916 the hospital admitted 3,195 patients including general prisoners and civilians. That year seventy-four deaths occurred in addition to the tragic deaths in the Pershing family in a house fire. The operating pavilion carried out 771 operations. The hospital began a new service in 1916 – orthopedics.[23]

    World War I and the 'Thirties, 1917 - 1939 Letterman General Hospital Circa 1917

    Although Letterman lay far from the conflict in Europe in 1917, it became a most important army hospital during and following that great war. The U.S. Army mobilized and trained troops in California and throughout the West. One result was increased admissions at Letterman. For the two years of the American entry into the war, 1917-1918, Letterman received a total of 18,700 patients, three times its annual load for the past several years and the largest number of admissions ever. Once the fighting stopped, Letterman's mission increased ever greater as the stream of wounded and sick soldiers flowed from Europe. In the year 1919 the total admissions reached 12,400.[24]

    At the beginning of the war the U.S. Army had four general hospitals: Letterman the Walter Reed General Hospital, District of Columbia, founded in 1909 the General Hospital at Fort Bayard, New Mexico established in 1900 and the Army and Navy General Hospital, Hot Springs, Arkansas, established as a general hospital in 1887. The Army and Navy hospital cared for arthritis and rheumatism cases and Fort Bayard was used solely for the treatment of pulmonary tuberculosis. Only Letterman and Walter Reed were true general hospitals.

    The commanding officer of Letterman during the war years, Col. Guy L. Edie, had been the personal physician of President William H. Taft. Under his administration Letterman's bed capacity reached 2,200.

    In 1918 Letterman was one of the army hospitals selected to establish a unit of the Army School of Nursing.[25] One of the more important wartime developments at Letterman came about with its designation as an Orthopedic Center for amputation cases from the American Expeditionary Force.

    Forty-six amputee cases arrived at Letterman from Europe between April 1, 1918, and June 30, 1919.

    The Surgeon General also established a Division of Neurology and Psychiatry at Letterman. During the war the hospital also specialized in the treatment of venereal disease.[26]

    Sick and Wounded Admissions

    Personnel on Duty

    April 1917 732
    October 1917 1,679
    April 1918 1,665
    August 1918 1,879
    December 1918 1,943
    April 1919 2,153
    August 1919 2,751
    December 1919[27] 1,770


    April 1917 24 190 48 August 1917 32 302 67 April 1918 37 377 103 December 1918 61 658 182 April 1919 88 668 107 August 1919 80 608 104 December 1919 80 574 113

    Letterman had a casualty of its own in October 1919. That year Col. Robert M. Thornburgh replaced Colonel Edie as commanding officer. Thornburgh had seen service in the Philippine Islands, the Mexican Punitive Expedition, and in France. On October 10 he attended a dinner honoring Herbert Hoover at the Bohemian Club in San Francisco. When returning to his Letterman quarters, Thornburgh's automobile was hit by a municipal bus at 19th Avenue and Lincoln Way, killing the colonel.[28]

    Letterman's physical plant underwent great changes during the war when it almost doubled in size. On the former drill field to the east a complex consisting of eighteen patient wards, two barracks for Hospital Corps men, a kitchen and mess hall building, and a Red Cross building sprang up. Soon this area became known as East Hospital. At the main hospital many changes took place. New construction included a psychopathic ward for 100 patients, a stable for twenty-eight animals, a garage holding twelve ambulances, permanent barracks for seventy-five men, four temporary barracks each holding sixty-seven men, another nurses' dormitory having sixty rooms, an additional dining room for 300 men, and still
    another dining room and kitchen for 500 men. Additions were made to the disinfecting and sterilization plant and to the power and heating plant. Painters put a fresh coat on the entire exteriors of all the buildings and most of the interiors. Old roads became macadamized and new roads were built.

    The Army's Medical Department praised the new psychopathic ward, building 1050, as a vast improvement in the care of mental patients who previously had been housed in the overcrowded detention ward, 1051, along with general and garrison prisoners. The new building opened to patients on October 17, 1918. In contrast to the detention ward with its barred doors and windows and cells, the psychopathic ward had no bars and patients were placed in rooms and dormitories that were located around the outside, "hotel fashion." The many windows and air shafts allowed for adequate ventilation.

    Offices and hallways had hardwood floors, while other floors were colored concrete. A dormitory for sick patients on the second floor had a screened porch where patients enjoyed the air and a view of the bay. A complete hydrotherapeutic department occupied the basement. After the signing of the armistice, the hospital began to receive large numbers of cases returning from France and Siberia and this ward, originally designed for sixty patients, had as many as 130 men at one time.[29]

    Other buildings existing by 1919 included a green house, solariums in the central court, crematory (for trash), bakery, tennis court, a small building for (experimental?) animals, a stage for entertainment, and three long runways for orthopedic patients. Construction materials included both wood frame and concrete covered with stucco. (Letterman avoided brick construction that had proven unstable during the 1906 earthquake.) Across the road to the south the YMCA erected a building that offered aid and comfort to the hospital.

    The U.S. Army operated eighty-four hospitals in the United States by the end of World War I:

    48 general hospitals (four named, rest numbered)

    33 base hospitals

    3 miscellaneous hospitals

    The Army prepared a schedule for abandoning most of the hospitals and reducing the number of beds in the others. By October 30, 1920, the number of available beds had been reduced to 3,750 in only five general hospitals:

    Capacity Walter Reed General Hospital 2,000 500 1,500 Letterman General Hospital 2,200 1,500 700 Army and Navy General Hospital 266 16 250 General Hospital 19, Oteen, North Carolina 1,300 800 500 General Hospital 21, Denver, Colorado 1,603 803 800 [30]

    In 1921, when matters had settled somewhat, a report summed up Letterman General Hospital:

    56 permanent buildings
    29 temporary buildings
    41 medical officers
    58 nurses
    108 student nurses
    177 civilians
    484 enlisted men[31]

    In the years between the two great wars, Letterman General Hospital continued to improve both its plant and its missions. While the number of beds was reduced to 750 [sic] in 1921, admissions never fell back to the pre-war annual average of 3,000. Rather, increases were fairly common:

    1920 4,988 admissions
    1925 6,107
    1930 6,404
    1935 4,842
    1939 6,474

    Patients now came from the Western states (Ninth Corps Area), the Philippines, Hawaii, Alaska, China, and military installations in Panama. In 1924 an Intern Training Program began for budding doctors. About that same time the hospital originated an Outpatient Clinic. Beginning in 1933 Letterman treated the young men in the Civilian Conservation Corps in the Ninth Corps Area. In 1920 army nurses acquired the relative rank of officers (but not the commissions) and wore the appropriate insignia. Some noncommissioned officers continued to live in the city and received 75 cents a day to help defray expenses – insufficient. But a few married soldiers had quarters in one of the wards that had been converted to the purpose. In September 1923 Letterman sent a detachment of thirty-nine personnel to Japan for earthquake relief in the great quake that had devastated Tokyo and Yokohama. They returned to San Francisco in December. [32]

    In the year 1929 two descriptions of Letterman General Hospital emerged that, at first glance, seemed contradictory. In a history of the U.S. Army's Medical Department, the author stated that Letterman was "the hospital for reception and definitive treatment of the more serious cases of the army stationed on the Pacific Coast and nearer states and for the sick returned from trans-Pacific stations. It has 1,000 beds, abundant medical, dental, nursing, and enlisted personnel, is beautifully situated and well arranged."

    About the same time Brig. Gen. Wallace DeWitt, Letterman's commander, described the hospitals buildings saying that they had been constructed of wood frame, stucco, and concrete. He considered the concrete structures to be excellent buildings that should be retained. As for the others, "The frame and stucco buildings are old, and, with the exception of the Officers' Quarters and Noncommissioned Officers' Quarters [in converted wards?], do not meet modern requirements and constitute a potential fire hazard." These, he concluded, should be replaced. DeWitt was but the first to argue for modern facilities. Had he been asked, he probably would have agreed that Letterman's mission was ever more important and that the Presidio of San Francisco was indeed beautifully situated and well arranged. [33]

    DeWitt's words must have hit at least a small nerve in Washington. The construction quartermaster at San Francisco reported that in fiscal year 1930 he had built for Letterman a $50,000 concrete ward building, 1009, to replace the original wood frame ward "H," and two additions to the nurses' quarters (Thompson Hall) at a cost of $69,000. Three more concrete wards, including building 1008 that replaced old wood frame ward "G" and a new ward, 1012, came into being the following year and costing another $150,000, and other construction valued at $115,000 was underway.[34]

    The San Francisco Chronicle reported on April 24, 1938, that the depression-era Works Progress Administration had authorized almost $2 million for construction on the Presidio reservation. Of that amount $345,000 pertained to Letterman General Hospital. This money was in addition to $117,500 worth of work that had been completed at the hospital in 1937 and 1938. As war clouds gathered in Europe and Asia, Letterman began to stir anew as the United States considered expanding its armed forces while maintaining a neutral stance in the affairs of nations.[35]

    World War II in the Pacific brought a vast increase in Letterman General Hospital's responsibilities as hospital ships brought home tens of thousands sick and wounded men from far-flung battlefields that extended from the Aleutian Islands to the southwest Pacific. Before then, beginning in 1939, the United States increased its military strength sharply when war began in Europe. The first peacetime draft began in September 1940. At the Presidio of San Francisco the Army began a substantial program for temporary housing on November 1, 1940. Of the five areas on the reservation selected for the emergency construction, three in the lower Presidio would have a strong association with Letterman General Hospital:

    Area A, on the bay front between Marine Drive and Mason Street and east of Crissy Field. It contained ten 2 story, wood frame barracks, two 1 story dayrooms, administration building, post exchange, three combination company administration and storehouse (supply room) buildings, and two mess halls. (Later, in 1941, additional structures in this area consisted of five barracks, two administration-storerooms, a 250-man mess hall, and a recreation building.)

    Area B, on the bay front between Marine Drive and Mason Street and west of Crissy Field. It had a similar combination of structures except that a large warehouse replaced the administration building.

    Area C, between Mason Street and the Golden Gate Bridge Approach and south of Crissy Field. This area had similar mobilization-type structures but was much smaller than the other two. In 1945 Area C housed Letterman's detachment of WACs.

    Construction completed by March 1941, the contractor received his final payment (total contract, $298,300) and painters applied a gray color from the ground to the water table and to the trim and a cream color to the rest of the buildings.[36]

    Letterman decided in the fall of 1940 that in order to meet the needs of an expanding military force, it would no longer receive admissions from the Veterans Administration and it reduced the number of CCC enrollees accepted for treatment (twenty percent of the patients had been coming from the CCC). At that time the hospital counted fifty-nine permanent structures and twenty-seven temporary structures of all these there were thirty-three wards having a normal capacity of 904 beds and a maximum capacity of 1,191 beds. The 1940 patient load at the hospital amounted to about 9,000. Early in 1941, the Surgeon General announced that Letterman and Walter Reed general hospitals, as well as the Army and Navy
    Hospital at Hot Springs, Arkansas, would establish facilities for the care of cases of resection and amputation requiring the fitting of prostheses.[37]

    Japanese aircraft attacked military installations on Oahu Island in Hawaii on December 7, 1941. By the end of December Letterman's emergency bed capacity had increased to 1,589. On December 31 the first convoy of patients from Hawaii arrived in San Francisco Bay. Letterman's annual report for 1941 added a new mission to its purposes for being: Because of the Japanese attack, Letterman was now in the combat zone and it served the triple function of Port of Embarkation Hospital, General Hospital, and Evacuation

    The forty-eight acres now contained 100 buildings. Seven buildings that had housed enlisted men had been converted to wards, bringing the number to forty (1,471 beds). Construction completed in 1941 included three Special Service schools and their administration building, six barracks, storehouse, new bakery, and over at East Hospital a 1,000-man mess. During 1941 Letterman admitted 12,290 patients, of whom 103 had died.[38]

    In 1942 battle casualties and tropical disease cases arrived from the Pacific. A special emergency developed when the hospital admitted 600 patients suffering from acute hepatitis associated with jaundice following inoculation with yellow fever vaccine. Six of these patients died. By the end of 1942 Letterman had occupied at least Area A east of Crissy Field, mostly as quarters for its growing enlisted men staff.

    The hospital now had forty-three wards (1,627 beds), nine officers' quarters (no change), and accommodations for 150 nurses. It operated no fewer than seven messes: officers, general, ward, nurses, ambulatory patients, East Hospital, and Crissy Annex. The seven professional divisions consisted of: Medical, Surgical, Outpatient, Radiological, Dental, Laboratory, and Nursing. There had been substantial peaks of patient admissions before, but a new high was reached this year – 20,881 admissions of whom 107 died.[39]

    In 1941 the hospital began an in-house newspaper called Fog Horn , Letterman General Hospital, an upbeat paper intended for information, morale, and, possibly, future historians. An issue might run articles on military government, the Army Hour radio program, nurses' column, the soldier of the week, Purple Heart awards, sports, or the medical detachment. From time to time it contained longer, historical articles, such as the September 13, 1943, issue that had a history on the Army Nurse Corps. It concluded by saying that Capt. Margaret Knierin, with twenty-nine years service, was Letterman's Chief Nurse. Captain Knierin retired that December.

    Shortly after Pearl Harbor the headquarters of the Ninth Corps Area had moved from the Presidio of San Francisco to Fort Douglas, Utah, where it reorganized as the Ninth Service Command. From the Fog Horn one learned that Letterman General Hospital had come under the administration of the Ninth Service Command rather than the Surgeon General. Not until the end of the war did the Surgeon General regain control.

    The newspaper also informed its readers of medical news, such as the arrival of the newly-invented electro-encephalograph, or brain wave, machine in July 1943. The Christmas edition that year said that Letterman was one of two army hospitals that had a Vascular Surgery Section that treated vascular injuries such as frost bite, immersion foot, arteriovenous fisulae, circular deficiencies, varicose veins, etc.

    Other news covered the activities of the Grey Ladies volunteers at the hospital. The newspaper also announced that 1,000 members of the Women's Army Corps (WACs) would be trained as medical technicians.[40]

    Developments at Letterman in 1943 included an increase in the number of military patients from Australia and New Zealand. The hospital added a Maxillo-facial Plastic Center that year and began plastic surgery in June. A fire station for the hospital became an important new feature. It operated from building 1149 in the East Hospital area. Associated with the fire station, four 20,000-gallon emergency water tanks were constructed. As the war in the Pacific and Asia continued, the hospital received 39,349 patients in 1943, of whom only seventy-five died.[41]

    The tempo of allied advances in the Central, South, and Southwest Pacific increased greatly in 1944. So did activities at Letterman. Its primary purpose now was being an evacuation hospital for the reception of overseas patients arriving at the San Francisco Port of Embarkation and the prompt evacuation of those patients to other general hospitals in the interior. Also, the hospital provided definitive care for army units in the Bay Area and for retired personnel. By 1944 Letterman served for the definitive care of cases requiring deep x-ray or radium therapy.

    A year earlier the San Francisco Port of Embarkation had taken over the civilian Dante Hospital, 328 beds, at Broadway and Van Ness in San Francisco. Now, in August, the "Dante Station Hospital" merged with Letterman, thus making a total of 2,338 beds available. In personnel matters, Pvt. Helen Thompson became the first enlisted WAC assigned to Letterman. A new chief nurse, Maj. Josephine Motl, took office on July 1. A month before, army nurses finally received temporary commissions in the Army of the United States. Army brass remained uncommitted to nurses being in the Regular Army. An unfortunate incident occurred in mid-summer when an army officer, Lt. Beaufort Swancutt, under sentence to be hanged for murder, committed suicide in the hospital. At the end of the year plans were ready for the construction of a gymnasium (1152) and a swimming pool (1151) at East Hospital.

    A 1924 advertisement for the Dante Sanitorium which be came the San Francisco Port of Embarkation's Dante Station Hospital and later the Dante Annex of Letterman General Hospital.

    The Fog Horn carried an extensive article on July 1 recording that Fred M. Diernisse served as Letterman's head gardener. The old greenhouse had been moved to a site northwest of the main hospital.

    The former tall privet hedge around the oval in front of the hospital had been replaced with a low boxwood hedge and flowers. The hospital nursery grew snapdragons, hododendrons, azaleas, begonias, pansies, gladiolas, and dahlias. Most of the cut flowers went to the wards. Arrangements were available for executive offices, the officers' club, nurses' mess, the chapel, and the Red Cross. Patients over at the Crissy Annex did their own gardening. Many of the hospital's civilian gardeners were high school boys employed in summer work.

    At the end of 1944, Letterman General Hospital reported that it had admitted 45,168 patients over the past twelve months. The original hospital, East Hospital, and the Dante Annex had a total of fifty wards.

    The Letterman Fire Department closed down after a brief existence, the probable reason being that the Presidio of San Francisco had agreed to take over Letterman's repair and utility operations.[42]

    As early as 1943 Letterman became concerned about procedures for evacuating war-related patients to inland hospitals. The hospital had admitted more than 25,000 patients that year and had evacuated nearly 27,000. An innovation involved aerial transport. Letterman and the Air Transport Command cooperated in the endeavor in May. Ambulances and busses moved 375 patients to nearby Mills Field, the present site of the San Francisco International Airport, where a fleet of twelve C-47 aircraft evacuated them to inland destinations.

    The principal means of evacuation, however, remained the hospital trains from the Crissy yard in the vicinity of Area A, lower Presidio. The Fog Horn described a hospital train in April 1944. The Army had decided on a ten to twelve car train in accordance with the Medical Department's requirements.

    Manufactured by the Pullman-Standard Car Manufacturing Company in Massachusetts, a typical train consisted of the ward cars, utility car, officer personnel car, orderly car, and a kitchen-dining-pharmacy car, each forty-four feet long and mounted on two 4-wheel trucks. A ward car had eight two-tier bunks. The officer car had facilities for four officers at one end, and six nurses at the other.

    A report at the end of 1944 stated that Hospital Train Unit Service Command Unit (SCU) 1960 operated as many as four full trains a day out of the Crissy spur. In September Letterman had evacuated 6,000 patients by train and expected the number to climb to 8,000 in October. The Surgeon General had stationed forty hospital train cars at San Francisco and planned to increase the total to 111.

    By early 1945 the Army had added new hospital unit cars. Each contained a kitchen, small surgery, bunks for thirty-two patients, and sleeping accommodations for Medical Department technicians. Usually a captain of the Medical Corps commanded a train, assisted by five or six army nurses and from fifty to sixty medical detachment enlisted men. When first activated in July 1944 SCU 1960 had had thirty officers, fifty-nine nurses, and 435 enlisted. By June 1945 the numbers had increased to 122 officers, 90 nurses, and 1,700 men.[43]

    The War in the Pacific came to a bitter close on August 14, 1945. The previous seven months had witnessed an explosion of activity at Letterman General Hospital, and there was the promise of even more to come. In February the Fog Horn reported that the hospital would expand to 3,500 beds and that up to two companies of WACs and a WAC band would join the command. Since the 1920s a chapel on the second floor of one of the administrative buildings had served the hospital. Wheelchair patients had no access to it. In August the hospital unveiled plans for a new chapel along with other construction.

    Areas A and B, by now referred to as the Crissy Annex, underwent conversion beginning in the spring to facilities for hospital patients. (The train unit personnel moved to Area B.) Ready in September, Crissy Annex was a self-contained unit having a theater, post exchange, chapel, library, arts and skills center, and accommodations for 900-1,000 patients.

    Letterman now looked forward to caring for former American prisoners of war at the Annex. The first of these men arrived at San Francisco on September 2. By the end of the year the hospital had processed 3,780 of these people.

    Letterman's annual report for 1945 announced a stunning record of accomplishments. The Crissy Annex hospital had become a fully operating facility. Letterman's main function now was that of a debarkation hospital for the Pacific Theater. For patients too ill to travel farther, Letterman offered general hospital care, in addition to definitive care for patients from the local area. Of the 3,500 beds, 1,825 were strictly reserved for severe cases, 775 for ambulatory convalescents, and 900 in the Crissy Annex for debarkees.

    During the year no fewer than 76,313 patients entered Letterman General Hospital and the annexes. Of these, ninety-two had died. At the end of the year less than 2,000 remained.

    In March 1945 so many patients awaited evacuation by rail that Letterman had to set up additional wards at the Presidio of San Francisco and Fort Cronkhite in Marin County. In May thirty-eight trains evacuated 9,000 patients. The largest daily count occurred October 20, when 1,862 patients were admitted. That month the hospital held 10,000 patients, half of them freed prisoners of war. During the year 209 ships had arrived bearing 56,433 sick and wounded, with another 7,659 arriving by air. All told, 304 trains had departed bearing 60,425 patients.

    One account summarized the war years' admissions:

    1940: 9,064
    1941: 10,043
    1942: 19,696
    1943: 37,971
    1944: 32,015
    1945: 73,452
    1946: 20,252

    In November 1945 Letterman created the Neurology and Neurosurgery sections. In December the hospital was designated a center for general surgery, neurosurgery, orthopedic surgery, general medicine, closed ward neuropsychiatry, open ward neuropsychiatry, neurology, x-ray therapy, and radium therapy, in addition to the continued processing of debarking patients. The year 1945 concluded with a visit from the war hero and former prisoner of war Lt. Gen. Jonathan Wainwright.[44]

    A discussion of Letterman's wartime activities would be incomplete without mention of its prisoner of war camp. In 1941 a small annex of mobilization-type buildings had been addedto the east side of Annex A. It consisted of five barracks, two combination administration and storehouse buildings (orderly and supply rooms), a 250-man mess hall, and a recreation building. In 1944 Letterman converted four of these buildings into a stockade to house Italian prisoners of war who remained "uncooperative" when, after the fall of Italy in 1943, the majority of Italian prisoners of war became "co-belligerents" and cooperated with the Allied forces.

    On January 4, 1945, 178 Italian prisoners of war arrived at Letterman to spend the next twelve months in the stockade at Annex A. The four buildings – two 2 story barracks, T272 and T276 the prisoner of war headquarters, supply room, and day room, T274 and the kitchen and mess hall, T275 - were surrounded by a barbed wire fence enclosing a compound 125 feet wide and 250 feet long. The American guard was composed of three officers and twenty-two enlisted men. The Italians had their own organization consisting of the administrative overhead and the laborers. Their function was simply to furnish labor to Letterman General Hospital.

    When the Italians left for their homeland on December 15, a detachment of 150 German prisoners of war replaced them (Germany had surrendered on May 7). Little is known about these men's activities. They departed Letterman on June 21, 1946, bound for the New York Port of Embarkation. The Army promptly inactivated the camp.[45]

    With the return to peace Letterman's patient load declined rapidly, but not down to the pre-war level. In 1946 the hospital admitted 22,150 patients (22 percent were battle casualties) and the number of authorized beds dropped from 3,500 to 2,525. The Army inactivated the hospital's 402d WAC Band. By the end of 1946 all the Hospital Train personnel moved back to Area A and the hospital turned Area B back to the Presidio. Area A, still called the Crissy Annex hospital, also housed convalescents, the Separation Detachment, and any overflow from the main and East hospitals. The Catholic Church regained control of the Dante Annex in June 1946, although army nurses retained their quarters there for the time being.

    Letterman reorganized its activities into "centers" – amputation, hand plastic, orthopedic, neurosurgical, and tumor. In June the hospital transferred from under the Ninth Service Command back to the control of the Army's Surgeon General. Another general, Dwight D. Eisenhower, who led the Allied armies in Europe, visited the hospital that year, meeting some of the wounded veterans. With the coming of peace, discussion renewed concerning constructing a new hospital to replace Letterman now described as "antiquated." [46]

    Army nurses finally received permanent commissions in the Regular Army in 1947 and the chief of the Army Nurse Corps was promoted to the temporary rank of colonel. Adequate quarters for nurses at Letterman, however, continued to be a problem. The hospital had an authorization for 266 nurses at this time of whom 242 were present for duty. Thompson Hall and other spaces had only 201 single rooms for female officers and that included forty-five rooms four miles away that the Army leased in the city.

    The annual report for 1947 shed light on the hospital's Special Services Branch that provided recreation, entertainment, and information for all personnel. It operated the East Hospital Service Club, the library, tackle shop and fishing pier (the old Presidio wharf), and the former army mine layer L-101, now used by fishing parties. It also ran the radio station KLAH. Special Services cooperated with Physical Reconditioning in operating the gymnasium, swimming pool, and bowling alleys. Crissy Annex also had a service club as well as a theater and chapel. The number of patients at Letterman in 1947 further declined, to 14,300. [47]

    Letterman celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of the hospital in 1948. The number of authorized beds dropped slightly this year to 2,185. Patients filled most of them, the number admitted coming to 15,053, of whom 235 died. The annual report gave an interesting breakdown on the patients:

      Enlisted Men and Women 63% Officers 24% Dependents 6% Retired Personnel 3% Army EM and Women 45% Veterans Administration 2% All Others 2%
      Air Corps EM 10.5%
      Army Officers 12%
      Air Corps Officers 2.5%
      Dependents 12%
      VA Beneficiaries 12.4%
      Retired Personnel 4%
      Others 1.6%

    The Korean War, 1950-1953, had a much less impact on Letterman than the tumultuous years of World War II. The hospital remained at 1,500 beds. The first casualty from Korea arrived on July 26, one month after the war had begun. Of the 16,500 admissions that year twenty-eight percent were battle casualties. Between June and December 1,580 debarkees arrived at San Francisco, the bulk of whom arrived in the first half of October. The main hospital took care of the more serious cases, while the Crissy Annex served primarily as a convalescent center. (The former prisoner of war buildings were renovated at this time.) In July 1950 the Department of the Army issued general orders renaming the hospital Letterman Army Hospital. Not until 1960 did the name revert to "General." Sometime shortly before 1950 the Hospital Train unit at Letterman had been inactivated. During the Korean emergency, an Army Reserve organization, the 325th Hospital Train, arrived at Letterman. From September 1950 to December 1951 this organization processed patients, mostly walking wounded, from Korea, issuing uniforms, arranging pay, and sending the soldiers on their way, all in less than twenty-four
    hours. The 325th Hospital Train transferred to Germany at the end of 1951. Sometime during the Korean War, possibly as early as 1950, the Army named the streets in and around the Crissy Annex hospital in honor of soldiers who in World War II had been posthumously decoratedwith the Distinguished Service Cross for extraordinary heroism in battle. [50] Letterman's bed capacity declined slightly in 1951, to 1,400. Professional services by then included a few new fields such as obstetrics and gynecology, and pediatric service. During the year, 725 battle casualties from Korea entered the hospital while the total admissions came to 13,470. Both East Hospital and Crissy Annex contributed to the success of the hospital's mission.
    Other international events involved Letterman to some degree in 1951. On September 8 the Fog Horn reported that Lt. Gen. Joseph M. Swing, Sixth Army, had invited a Letterman patient, M. Sgt. Jack M. Anderson, a veteran of World War II and Korea, to represent his fellow soldiers at the signing of the Tripartite Pact between the United States, New Zealand, and Australia in the Presidio's Service Club (Building 135) for enlisted men. Sergeant Anderson met the U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, the Australian delegate Mr. Spenden, and Sir Carl Berendsen of New Zealand.
    Letterman Army Hospital also became responsible for the health of delegates from fifty-one nations who attended the Japanese Peace Conference at San Francisco's War Memorial Opera House also in 1951.[51]
    Admissions in 1952 amounted to 14,290, of whom only 250 had been wounded in battle. Gen. Matthew Ridgeway, en route from Japan to Washington, visited the Presidio in May. While it seems unusual, he may not have stopped at Letterman. A notable remodeling effort this year involved removing the steps at the main entrance of the 1899 administration building and replacing them with an "ultra-modern" facade with automatic doors. Cost, $30,000.
    Fighting ceased in Korea with the signing of an armistice on July 27, 1953. "Operation Big Switch" resulted in 644 former American prisoners of war, many suffering from maltreatment, arriving at Letterman in September and October. Admissions this year declined once again, amounting to 11,555. [52]
    Letterman's future became a matter of discussion again in 1956. Architect M. T. Pflueger proposed the construction of a new 1,000-bed hospital at Fort Ord near Monterey. The Army rejected that idea saying that an army hospital in the Bay Area had to be close to a medical school. A year later, Letterman announced a reduction in services. Only 900 beds were authorized, of which fifty were reserved for debarkation needs. A breakdown of the 900 showed 250 beds general medicine, 350 beds general surgery, 125 for orthopedic surgery, 100 beds closed ward neuropsychiatry, and 75 for open ward neuropsychiatry. Despite the reductions, Letterman would become a teaching hospital.
    In 1959 the Army's Surgeon General announced that he put a new Letterman hospital high on the priority list. The debate continued. In 1960 the Army began serious planning for an 850-bed hospital on the Presidio reservation. That year the commanding general of Sixth Army authorized the transfer of twenty acres from the Presidio to Letterman south of East Hospital to permit construction of a new hospital to begin while the old plant continued to function. About that time the General Accounting Office recommended no army construction for a hospital, rather a 1,000-bed Navy hospital at Oak Knoll in the Bay Area and a 200-bed addition to the hospital at Travis Air Force Base. The Army argued against those concepts saying that Letterman was one of the Surgeon General's key specialized centers and it trained a quarter of the Regular Army's medical specialists. Further studies followed. The final decision called for a new 550-bed army hospital at Letterman and a 650-bed naval hospital at Oak Knoll.
    A joint venture of architects prepared plans and specifications for both. In the 1965 Military construction program the Congress authorized $14.3 million for Letterman. In 1965 the Lavelle Construction Company won a $165,000 contract for site preparation, which involved the demolition of the World War I East Hospital and the construction of a new entrance road to the Presidio at the Lombard Gate.
    Halvorson McLaughlin of Spokane, Washington, won the bid for construction of the hospital in October 1965.[53] A DeHavilland U-1 used to transport patients from Travis AFB to Letterman General Hospital. Photograph taken at Presidio's Chrissy Army Air Field
    Meanwhile, the mundane affairs of life continued to occupy Letterman's administration. In 1956 the Presidio agreed to letting the hospital occupy the brick cavalry stable (Building 668) as an animal laboratory – dogs, guinea pigs, rats, mice, etc. A 1957 report discussed Letterman's landscaping. Rows of acacias graced the streets east of the main rectangle. Many palms, eucalyptus, and acacias, as well as shrubs, specimen plantings, hedges, flower borders, and vines added to the scene. Nineteen acres of lawn and a greenhouse
    (1053) completed the picture. There were two memorial trees, one to Dr. John D. Foley, 1887-1943, and the other in memory of Brig. Gen. Wallace DeWitt who commanded Letterman in 1927-1931 and again in 1940-1942.
    The greenhouse came up for discussion in 1965 when the Presidio decided to close its own greenhouse. It asked Letterman if it could supply plants for the Presidio's offices, senior officers' quarters, and for official functions. Letterman replied that its greenhouse provided plants and flowers to the wards, messes, and chapel. While it was agreeable to helping the Presidio, safeguards had to be developed to prevent wives of senior officers at the Presidio descending on the greenhouse every time they entertained.
    In 1957 a Letterman arrived at the Presidio – Sp3 John Letterman, the nephew of Maj. Jonathan Letterman four generations removed. A small earthquake that year caused only minor damage to the hospital, such as cracked plaster and windows and loosened tiles. In addition to memorial trees, four of Letterman's streets received names in the 1960s honoring past commanders: Kendall Road for Maj. William P. Kendall, 1901-1904
    Glennan Road for Lt. Col. James D. Glennan, 1910-1913
    Truby Road for Brig. Gen. Albert E. Truby, 1922-1924 and 1926-1927
    DeWitt Road for Brig. Gen. Wallace DeWitt, 1927-1931 and 1940-1942

    Both Glennan and Truby had gone on to become Surgeon General of the Army.[54]
    American involvement in South Vietnam lasted from 1959 to 1975. Letterman Hospital's involvement was even less than that in the Korean War. The most complete annual report for that period is for the year 1970. At that time Letterman's staff stood at 1,090 officers and enlisted personnel and 735 civilian employees. The new hospital cared for an average of 929 in-house patients per month. The number of outpatients reached to more than a half million. During the year the hospital received one of the few two million volt x-ray cancer treatment machines in the United States. An odd statistic gave the average ages of the 26,650,000 veterans of the last four wars as of 1970:
    World War I, 89.9 years
    World War II, 49.3 years
    Korean War, 39.5 years
    Vietnam, 26.1 years
    A new transportation wrinkle in 1965 was the introduction of a H-34 helicopter that the Sixth Army loaned for the transfer of patients from Travis Air Force Base to Letterman. During August and September the helicopter transported 199 casualties from Vietnam to the hospital. Letterman now required a helicopter landing pad nearby. Probably related to Vietnam, Gov. and Mrs. Ronald Reagan visited patients in the hospital in February 1968. [55] A New Hospital Architect's drawing of the new Letterman Army Medical Center
    The joint venture architect-engineering firm of Stone, Marraccini and Patterson and Milton T. Pflueger prepared the plans and specifications for the new Letterman. Halverson and McLaughlin, under the supervision of the U.S. Army District Engineer, Sacramento, completed the construction in the fall of 1968 at a cost of $15.5 million. The 550-bed, fire resistant building contained ten stories and had 445,000 square feet of floor. A wide, three story base housed the clinical facilities. It was surmounted by a seven story tower that contained two nursing units on each level. Poured-in-place concrete piles supported the structure. Reinforced concrete formed the frame. The exterior walls consisted of precast concrete panels.
    Named the Letterman Army Medical Center (LAMC) in 1973, the hospital's facilities included 178 physicians' offices, 100 examination rooms, and a surgical suite consisting of five general operating rooms, an orthopedic operating room, and a neurosurgical operating room. Nine elevators serviced the building. The 550 beds were distributed as follows: medicine 130, surgery 202, intensive care 30, orthopedic surgery 148, thoracic surgery 20, and psychiatry and neurology 20 beds. Jonathan Letterman's grand nephew, Gordon S. Letterman, a doctor of medicine at George Washington University, D.C. attended the dedication in 1969. The hospital staff amounted to 1,800 persons. In 1972 the 200-seat Jack
    W. Schwarz Theater was added to the new hospital. (Schwarz had commanded Letterman from 1960 to 1965.) Two events in 1973 were of passing interest. In the Christmas season the legendary comedian Bob Hope entertained the patients. The San Francisco Examiner suggested that some of his barracks jokes did not go over with the elderly retirees and dependents. Also that year Operation Homecoming at Letterman welcomed nine former American prisoners of war from Vietnam.[56]
    In 1976 the Public Affairs Officer announced that eighty-three years old General of the Army Omar N. Bradley and Mrs. Bradley would be admitted for routine physical examinations. General Bradley hoped to keep his visit to San Francisco on a low-key basis and asked there be no interviews or filming. Public Affairs added that King Hussein of Jordan had been in the hospital recently.

    Demolition of older Letterman buildings continued and in 1976 the Army constructed a medical barracks and an administrative and supply building (1027 and 1028) for Letterman's enlisted women on the site of the 1899 quadrangle. In 1982 Letterman's enlisted men received two three story barracks connected with a one story administration and supply building in the same area.
    The medical center admitted 11,100 patients in 1988 and at the same time the outpatient clinic treated about 1,600 patients a day. Thus had the clientele changed from World War II when most patients were young men. By the late 1980s active duty personnel made up only 11.9% of the patient load, while military retirees and their dependents accounted for 77.1 percent.
    In May 1991 the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers published Base Closure Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Presidio of San Francisco. At that time the Army planned to abandon both the Presidio and Letterman as directed by the U.S. Congress. Earlier legislation allowed for the Presidio reservation then becoming part of the U.S. National Park System. The Statement recounted that the medical center's mission was to provide medical support to military personnel in times of war and to provide peacetime care to active duty personnel and their dependents. The Military Health Services System (MHSS) also provided medical benefits to military retirees, their dependents, and the survivors of deceased military members on a space available basis.
    The transition timetable of Letterman called for the ending of graduate medical education on July 1, 1991. From then through September Letterman was to undergo the transition from a medical center to a 100-bed army community hospital to be called the U.S. Army Medical Department Activity. A year later, on October 1, 1992, this community hospital would begin a general transition to an army health clinic, and on October 1, 1993, the clinic would come under the supervision of the Madigan Army Medical Center. Final closure was scheduled to occur on June 30, 1994. The future would bring many changes to this timetable. [57]
    In 1966 the Surgeon General established the Western Medical Research Laboratory in five small buildings at Letterman. This facility carried out research in several fields including tropical medicine, nutrition, surgery and blood replacement, pathology, and psychiatry. In 1971 the Army began construction of a large permanent facility for the laboratory. Phase 1 of the work began under constructors Rothschild and Raffin, Inc., and architect-engineer Frank L. Hope and Associates and Gwathmey, Sellier, and Crosby in joint venture. This first structure, four stories, erected immediately east of the new medical center, cost $7.4 million. The mission of this renamed Western Medical Institute of Research remained much the same as the former laboratory. When fully completed the institute expected to employ from 500 to 600 scientists and medical technicians.
    Protests against the institute gathered steam in San Francisco, culminating in two protest meetings at the Lombard gate. Organized by the Coalition Opposed to Medical and Biological Attack (COMBAT), the protesters claimed that the new institute would do research on chemical and biological weapons to attack certain races of people. San Franciscans of Asian descent would be the guinea pigs for these ethnic weapons. Only in San Francisco! Also, animal-rights activists protested against the use of animals in medical experiments at the institute over the years.
    The completed institute, named the Letterman Army Institute of Research (LAIR) had three buildings – administrative support, laboratory research, and research support – finished by 1974. The fourth building, chemical storage, was the last to be constructed, in 1982. Varying from one to four floors all four were interconnected and were regarded as one structure, 1110. Having a command structure separate from the medical center, LAIR carried out primary research in medicine, optics, nutrition, and toxicology. The Presidio of San Francisco supported both the medical center and the institute through an Inter-Service Support Agreement. At the time the base closure was announced, LAIRs principal subjects of research
    included artificial blood, laser physics, and the treatment of trauma. Much of its work was conducted in conjunction with Stanford University and the Davis and San Francisco campuses of the University of California.
    Like the medical center, the institute's mission was scheduled to come to an end in 1994 under the Base Closure Act. [58]

    A ceremony marking the inactivation of the Letterman Army Medical Center and its conversion to the Letterman U.S. Army Hospital was held on June 8, 1991. (The official date for closing the medical center was at the end of the fiscal year, September 30, 1991, and the official startup date for the army hospital was October 1.) The Letterman U.S. Army Hospital graduated its last residency program in psychiatry on May 28, 1993, and on June 1 it closed its inpatient service. On the following day a ceremony marked the end of Letterman's service as an army hospital and the beginning of the Letterman U.S. Army Health Clinic. (Again, the official dates were September 30 and October 1, 1993.) The end came in 1995. On June 30 the Health Clinic reduced operations and became the U.S. Army Aid Station. A month later, on August 1, 1995, the aid station closed its doors. Nearly one hundred years had passed since the Letterman General Hospital's genesis had come to pass at the Presidio of San Francisco. Now the grand old hospital passed into history. [59]
    Letterman General Hospital, the oldest named general hospital in the United States Army, was born of necessity because of the military occupation of the Philippine Islands. Expected to be but a temporary medical facility, it soon proved to be an enduring institution in the U.S. Army's medical services. In its first full year of operation the hospital cared for more than 5,000 soldiers. A year later the hospital took care of the sick and wounded from the China Expedition sent to rescue Western legations in Peking during the Boxer Rebellion.
    During the years leading to World War I improvement came slowly while Letterman cared for troops leaving for and returning from the Far Pacific and Hawaii. Epidemics, such as measles, repeatedly demanded the utmost from the doctors, nurses, and the enlisted men of the Hospital Corps. Letterman's responsibilities gradually expanded to include the Western States, Panama Canal Zone, and Alaska.
    In 1906 the hospital threw open its doors to those in need from the devastating earthquake and fire that destroyed a large part of San Francisco. In the days and weeks that followed the hospital staff assumed responsibility for sanitation in the city and in the refugee camps - a critical task accomplished with grace and efficiency.

    Named in honor of a great army doctor in the Civil War, Jonathan Letterman, the hospital lived up to his record for nearly a century of service. The largest general hospital in the U.S. Army down to 1918, Letterman was prepared to accept the increasing responsibilities thrust upon it in World War I. In just two years, 1918-1919, the hospital cared for more than 18,000 soldiers, including the seriously wounded returning from Europe, such as amputation and psychiatric cases. To handle the great influx, Letterman established East Hospital, an annex that more than doubled the patient facilities. After the war Letterman began a program for teaching interns, and added an important feature – an outpatient clinic. In 1923 Letterman dispatched a team of specialists to Japan to aid the victims in Tokyo's devastating earthquake. During the 1930s the young men of the Civilian Conservation Corps
    who needed medical attention found it at Letterman. The 1930s saw considerable improvements in the hospital's physical plant - new nurses' quarters, more substantial wards, and other projects.
    Then came World War II. Letterman's position on the Pacific Coast made it the most critical army hospital for the reception of the sick and wounded from all over the Pacific Theater and eastern Asia. The statistics proved staggering. In 1945 alone Letterman General Hospital received more than 73,000 patients. With the addition of the Crissy Annex hospital and the civilian Dante hospital, Letterman's bed capacity rose to 3,500. Toward the end of the war it established a small stockade for Italian and German prisoners of war who assisted the hospital in laboring tasks. The Women's Army Corps (WAC) became part of the hospital's complement and contributed greatly to the tasks at hand.
    Peacetime proved an illusion. First came the war in Korea, then Vietnam. While Letterman's role in these conflicts was smaller than in World War II, it was important, especially in treating freed American prisoners of war. In 1948 a surprised soldier found himself to be the 300,000th person admitted to the hospital.
    During all these years Letterman's services expanded. Medical care for dependents became apparent by the addition of such fields as Obstetrics and Gynecology. The hospital's staff cared for the health of the delegates from fifty-one nations at the Japanese Peace Conference held at San Francisco in 1951.
    By the 1960s the Surgeon General had placed a high priority on a new ten-story hospital building at Letterman. Named the Letterman Army Medical Center it was dedicated in 1969. Following soon after, the Letterman Army Institute of Research carried out investigations in such spheres as laser physics and artificial blood.
    All this from a humble wood frame hospital hastily constructed nearly a century earlier. Many are the tens of thousands of military and their dependents, active and retired, who have benefited from the existence of Letterman General Hospital. End of an era. Letterman coming down. Footnotes

    1. James A. Wier, " Letterman's Fascinating History " J.V.D. Middleton, in " Letterman General Information " Willard H.S. Mattison, a portion of his account, undated but ca. September 1898, in H.H. Rutherford, History of the U.S. Army General Hospital, Presidio of San Francisco, California (1905). Some documents give Mattison's name as Matthews. It is "Mattison" in the Post Returns, December 1898, Letterman General Hospital, Roll 973, Microcopy M617, NA.

    2. Mattison Isabella E. Cowan served as the first chief nurse. During the Spanish-American War more than 1,700 women nurses were employed on contract in both general and field hospitals. Edgar Erskine Hume, Victories of Army Medicine, Scientific Accomplishments of the Medical Department of the United States Army (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1943), p. 28.

    3. Rutherford, History, quoting a letter by Colonel Middleton, dated May 25, "1898," actually 1905.

    4. Another Girard, Joseph B., had been the Presidio post surgeon, 1894-1896.

    5. Wier, " Letterman " War Department, GO 182, December 1, 1898 Middleton, "Letterman" Anon, " Brief History of Letterman ," p. 5, quoting Girard Anon, " The History of Letterman General Hospital Published in 1919 " and Rutherford, History, p. 7.

    6. Rutherford, History , pp. 70-81.

    7. Anon, " Brief History of Letterman ," p. 5 CO, PSF, March 22, 1900, to Department of California, Letters Sent, PSF, RG 393, NA General Orders 13, April 30, 1900, General Orders 1898-1903, PSF, RG 393, NA Listening Post, History of Letterman, p. 5 Secretary of War, Annual Report 1900, vol. 1, pt. 3, p. 239 Rutherford, History, pp. 86 and 100.

    8. Originally designated building 21, the commander's quarters, now 1000, cost $10,000. In the 1920s it underwent renovations costing $5,000 and by 1931, $9,000 more. In 1930 the front porch was enclosed. Until World War I the exterior was cream in color at that time it became white.

    9. Department of California, May 13, 1901, to CO, PSF, Register of Letters Received April-June 1901, PSF, RG 393, NA Rutherford, History, pp. 126-139.

    10. F.J. Hughes, " Letterman Army Hospital " (1953) " History, Letterman Army Hospital ," 1951 Rutherford, History, pp. 150-175.

    11. Rutherford, History, pp. 179-194. The Presidio post hospital continued to be staffed and morning sick calls continued to be administered there. Soldiers needing hospitalization were sent to the general hospital.

    15. G.H. Torney, Rules and Regulations for U.S. Army General Hospital Presidio of San Francisco, Cal. (n.d., but ca 1905) Rutherford, History, pp. 55-56.

    16. Gordon Thomas and Max Morgan Witts, The San Francisco Earthquake (New York:Stein and Day, 1971), pp. 159-161 W. Stephenson, April 20, 1906, to Surgeon General,
    Letters and Endorsements, Medical Department 1904-1906, PSF, RG 393, NA.

    17. Torney served at San Francisco until 1908. He was reappointed Surgeon General in 1913 but died unexpectedly of broncho-pneumonia. When the new Letterman General
    Hospital was dedicated in 1969, the Army named the general assembly room in his honor. Ashburn, Medical Department, pp. 234 and 293 Lawrence Kinnard, " History of the Golden Gate and its Headlands ," typescript 1962 and 1967, pp. 320-322 Booklet, " Dedication Ceremony, 14 February 1969, Letterman General Hospital , San Francisco ," p. 3.

    18. Fog Horn , April 14, 1956.

    19. Anon, " Brief History of Letterman ," p. 8 W.H. Harts, " Report Upon the Expansion and Development of the Presidio of San Francisco ," General Correspondence 1890-1914, OQMG, RG 92, NA, p. 16.

    20. Earle K. Stewart and Kenneth S. Erwin, An Untitled History of the Presidio of San Francisco (1959), p. 85 Webster's American Military Biographies P.M. Ashburn, A History of the Medical Department of the United States Army (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1929), pp. 78-80 Sanford E. Leeds, " Jonathan Letterman: Soldier, Doctor, and Coroner of the City of San Francisco, " Salvo, California and the American Civil War (Spring 1990), pp. 28-31 Hunt, The Army of the Pacific , pp. 268-269 U.S. War Department, General Orders 152, November 23, 1911. Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, formerly an assistant surgeon at the Presidio of San Francisco, signed these orders.

    21. H.B. McIntyre, August 25, 1910, to QMG Col. F. Von Schrader, March 1, 1911, Inspection of U.S. Army General Hospital, both in General Correspondence 1890-1914,
    OQMG, RG 92, NA

    22. Von Schrader, Inspection , 1911 Ashburn, History , p. 233.

    23. Report of the Surgeon General, 1916, to the Secretary of War, Letterman General Hospital, RG 112, NA-Pacific Sierra Region.

    24. Anon, "A Brief History of Letterman," p. 8 Letterman General Hospital, Annual Report, 1919, General Historical Data, Letterman, RG 112, NA - Pacific Sierra Region.

    25. At the beginning of World War I the Army Nurse Corps had 403 nurses. Eighteen months later the figure stood at 21,000.

    26. F.J. Hughes, "Letterman Army Hospital," August 1, 1953, in Presidio Army Museum " The History of Letterman General Hospital Published in 1919 ." Five other general hospitals received more amputation cases than Letterman: Walter Reed (1,189) General Hospital 3, Colonia, New Jersey (168) General Hospital 6, Fort McPherson, Atlanta, Georgia (91) General Hospital 26, Fort Des Moines, Iowa (161) and General Hospital 29, Fort Snelling, Minnesota (102). Despite the relatively small number of amputees treated, Letterman made significant advances in the development of orthopedic devices at this time, "It was so effective in the rehabilitation of amputees that the "Letterman Leg," developed at the hospital, was used for more than twenty years." Weed, Medical Department, vol. 5 Military Hospitals in the United States , pp. 176-177 Stephen A. Haller, Letterman Hospital, " Work for the Sake of Mankind ," A Summary of Its Significance and Integrity (April 1994), pp. 3 and 7.

    27. Frank W. Weed, The Medical Department of the United States Army in the World War, Military Hospitals in the United States (Washington: Government Printing Office,
    1923), 5:490-491 Civilian employees in the hospital in 1919 numbered 187. Letterman, General Historical Data, RG 112, NA - Pacific Sierra Region.

    28. Listening Post, History of Letterman, p. 8 San Francisco Examiner , October 10, 1919. Listening Post was an in-house newsletter during World War I.

    29. The Medical Department of the United States Army in the World War, vol. 10, Neuropsychiatry (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1927), pp. 128-130.

    30. Weed, Medical Department, 5: 176-177 and 190. General Hospital 21 became Fitzsimmons Army Medical Center.

    31. Weed, The Medical Department, 5 :491 Anon, A Brief History of Letterman , p. 9 " History, Letterman General Hospital, June 27, 1951, " General Historical Data,
    Letterman, RG 112, NA - Pacific Sierra Region.

    32. Anon, " Brief History of Letterman ," pp. 9-10 " History, Letterman Army Hospital, 1951 ," and Letterman, Annual Report 1923 , both in General Historical Data, RG 112, NA - Pacific Sierra Region The Officer's Guide (Harrisburg: Military Service, 1951), p. 31 Joseph D. Harrington, Yankee Samurai (The Secret Role of Nisei in America's Pacific Victory) (Detroit: Pettigrew, 1979), p. 60. Japan had been the most generous of foreign nations when San Francisco experienced the 1906 earthquake

    33. Ashburn, History of the Medical Department , p. 216 DeWitt, February 25, 1929, to the Surgeon General, Master Planning Files 1935, Letterman, RG 112, NA-Pacific Sierra Region. DeWitt served as Letterman's commanding officer twice, 1927-1931 and 1940-1942. It should be noted that construction of the Panama Pacific International Exposition in the lower Presidio in 1914 had eliminated the cavalry stables and all marshes and lagoons that remained.

    34. Office of the Construction Quartermaster, Fort Mason, October 7, 1931, Letterman files, RG 112, NA-Pacific Sierra Region. The third 1931 ward cannot now be identified. The concrete building 1013, containing a 22-bed ward and a receiving office, was constructed in 1933.

    35. San Francisco Chronicle , April 24 and June 25, 1938 Col. J.M. Graham, Annual Inspection of Construction, San Francisco and Vicinity, May 14, 1938 , GCGF 1935-1945,
    OQMG, RG 92, NA. Unfortunately for this report, Graham did not provide a breakdown of the funds. He probably had other matters on his mind.

    36. J.H. Veal, Completion Report on Temporary Housing , October 28, 1941, RG 77, NA.

    37. Anon, " A Brief History of Letterman General Hospital, " pp. 10-11 F.J. Hughes, " Letterman Army Hospital ," 1953.

    38. Annual Report of Letterman General Hospital, 1941, pp. 2-9.

    39. Annual Report of Letterman General Hospital, 1942.

    40. Fog Horn , August 21-December 25, 1943. The first WAC, Lt. Elizabeth A. Rose, arrived at Letterman in February 1944.

    41. Anon, " A Brief History of Letterman General Hospital ," p. 12 J.H. Mackin, October 9, 1965, to Col. Boeckman, Letterman, RG 112, NA-Pacific Sierra Region Annual Report of Letterman General Hospital, 1943 . The fire station is no longer extant. Structure 1149 today is the Gorgas Avenue entrance to the Presidio.

    42. Anon, " Brief History of Letterman ," p. 13 Army and Navy Journal, July 8, 1944 A.H. Schwichtenberg, November 1, 1948, to CO, Letterman, RG 112, NA-Pacific Sierra Region Annual Report of Letterman General Hospital, 1943 and 1944.

    43. Anon, " A Brief History of Letterman General Hospital ," p. 11 "History, Letterman Army Hospital, June 27, 1951," RG 112, NA Fog Horn, April 8 and May 27, 1944, and February 17 and June 16, 1945 Col. H.H. Galliott, December 22, 1944, to District Engineer, San Francisco, Letterman, RG 112, NA-Pacific Sierra Region.

    44. Fog Horn , February 3, April 7 and 14, July 28, August 4 and 11, September 8, and December 1, 1945 Annual Report of Letterman General Hospital, 1945 Anon, " Brief
    History of Letterman General Hospital ," pp. 14-15 Stewart and Erwin, [ AHistory of the Presidio ], p. 73. Wainwright had been assigned to the Presidio of San Francisco in 1912 but had never joined. He went to Yellowstone National Park instead.

    45. Annual Report of Letterman General Hospital, 1945 and 1946 Arnold P. Krammer, " German Prisoners of War in the United States ," Military Affairs, 40: 68-72.

    46. Anon, " Brief History of Letterman ," p. 15 Fog Horn , June 8, 1946 The Star Presidian , July 5, 1963 Annual Report of Letterman General Hospital , 1946.

    47. Anon, " Brief History of Letterman ," p. 15 Extract from the Annual Report of Letterman General Hospital, 1947 The Officer's Guide , p. 32 Maj. E.A. Paxon, Letterman, February 16, 1947, to Surgeon General, RG 112, NA-Pacific Sierra Region. Buildings in the Crissy Annex Hospital, January 1, 1947:

    T-232, commanding officer, adjutant, message center
    T-233, unit surgeon, chief nurse, dispensary, dental clinic
    T-234, evacuation office, transportation office, American Red Cross
    T-253, 256, and 257, patients' recreation
    T-259, theater and chapel
    T-240, patients' clothing room
    Wards: T-235, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 255, 258, and 259.

    The former prisoner of war compound had not yet been added to Crissy Annex hospital. Office of the Chief of Engineers, Washington, Entry 393, Box 197, RG 77, NA.

    48. Annual Report of Letterman General Hospital, 1948 .

    49. F.J. Hughes, " Letterman Army Hospital ," 1953 James H. Mackin, " How Did the New Letterman Come About? ", ca. 1965 Anon, " Brief History of Letterman ," p. 15 Annual
    Report of Letterman General Hospital, 1949.

    51. Fog Horn , September 1, 8, and 15, 1951 Annual Report of Letterman Army Hospital, 1951 . Secretary Acheson paid a short visit to Letterman on September 8.

    52. Annual Report of Letterman Army Hospital, 1952 Fog Horn , June 28, 1952 Anon, " Brief History of Letterman Hospital ," p. 16.


    इस ब्लॉग के पाठकों को कहना है की जहाँ भी इस ब्लॉग में “भगवान” और “ईश्वर” शब्द का प्रयोग किया गया है उसके बदले आप “सृपासं” या गॉड (GOD) शब्द का इस्तेमाल करें और GOD ही समझें और उस सब्द का भविष्य केलिए इस्तेमाल करें क्यों के GOD का सही आर्थिक सब्द इंडिया में पैदा ही नहीं हुआ है । मैंने अपना रिसर्च में ये पाया है की “भगवान” और “ईश्वर” ये दो जो GOD केलिए इस्तेमाल होता है असलियत में बुद्ध का नाम है पुजारी वर्ग बनाम ब्राह्मण बुद्ध का नाम को ही GOD का विकल्प बना दिया है जब की उनकी असली श्रुष्टि उनका काल्पनिक देवादेवियां है जो उनके भक्तों के प्लेसिबो इफेक्ट यानि झूठी संतुष्ट/प्रसन्न और तुष्टिकरण केलिए इस्तेमाल होते आ रहे है। उनके उस झूठी आस्था के बदले उनको एक सबसे बड़ी झूठी सामाजिक शान और पारसाइटीक इनकम, बर्चस्ववादी होनेका मौका पाने के साथ साथ हर चीज में ऑपर्च्युनिटी का पहला हकदार बनते आ रहे हैं । ये असलियत में हमारे देश का देशी संगठित धूर्त्त ठग बर्ग हैं । ये सब इनके कुछ पीढ़ियों का धूर्त पूर्वजों के कारण हुआ है जिसमें इनके अब की पीढ़ियां का कोई दोष नहीं । अगर अब की पीढ़ियां सचाई जानने का वाद अगर “अवर्ण” नहीं बनते तो इंडिया को एक स्वस्थ सभ्यता बनाने केलिए उनको बेनकाब करना जरुरी है । दूसरी तरह बोलें तो ब्राह्मणवादी विचारधारा उनके पीढ़ियों को वैचारिक तौर पर धूर्त्त और ठग असामाजिक वर्ग बनाता आ रहा है इसलिए उनका रेस्क्यू भी जरुरी है क्यों की इंडिया का असवर्ण जैसे ही शिक्षित होते जायेंगे ये उतना ही उनके घृणा का शिकार बनेंगे । ये ध्यान रखें गलती उनकी पूर्वजों ने की थी अब की पीढ़ियां नहीं । अगर किसी का पिता कोई बलत्कारा या हत्या जैसे अपराध करे क्या उसका सजा उसके बेटे या उसके पोते या उनका पीढ़ियों को मिलना चाहिए? अगर नहीं तो उनके पूर्वजों की अपराध की सजा उनके पीढ़ियों को मिलना क्यों चाहिए? हां अगर वही अपराध उनके बच्चे और पीढ़ियां दोहराते हैं, तो ये साजा पानेका जरूर हकदार हैं और इनको सहन करना भी एक तरह की अपराध है । इस आपराधिक सोच और कृत्य का विरोध जरूर करें।

    Recent Posts

    • डिकोडिंग जाति (Caste)
    • ब्राह्मणों का एक ही गोत्र है वह है धूर्तठग गोत्र
    • मिनातन धर्म
    • इंडिया का उत्पीड़क विचारधारा
    • सृपासं
    • Rama is a Character of Buddhist Moral Story “Dasaratha Jataka Katha -461”
    • Fake psychological constructs and Theophilia
    • थीओफिलिआ (Theophilia)
    • क्या वर्णवाद सोसिओपैथ्स की संरक्षण करता है?
    • अगर बुद्ध विष्णु का अवतार हैं कभी ब्राह्मणों को बुद्ध की पूजा करते देखा है?
    • भारत की खोज
    • इंडिया का सबसे बड़ा अंधविश्वास और मानसिक विकृति
    • भारत क्या है?
    • Why should we recognized as Hindus by Brahmins?
    • If Padmini had existed, she would have a Buddhist princess not a Vedic/Hindu follower.
    • Vedic promoters promote Mahabharat to promote Caste System.
    • Brahmins are the God of Hindus.
    • Lord Rama is a God or Ghost?
    • Organized priesthood as Brahmanism & Purusha Shukta.
    • Brahman Nation/ Brahman Akhand Rastra
    • What is “Bharat?”
    • Major fabrications by Brahmins.
    • Hegemony of Brahmanism or crook Game of Vedism
    • Who killed Buddha identity from India? (Brahmins conspiracy to Decline Buddhism and to Buddha)
    • One Nation but Three Names?
    • Brahmins theft Buddhist symbols “ॐ” (OM) & Swastika ” 卐 “
    • Identity theft by Brahmins using word “Avatar”
    • Sacred marks of Brahmins
    • Brahmins are the conspirators those has been started new Brainwash.
    • Brahmins are only the major ideology conspirators in India.
    • Saffron was not representing to Vedism or Brahmanism it was representing to Buddhism or Atheism.
    • Brahmins fabricated Buddhist emblem Jagannath to Avatar of Vishnu.
    • Truth about Rama Janm Bhoomi.
    • Brahmins shaping their new famous identities as Gods for future Hinduism.
    • Major Hindu god and goddess are either Kings, tribal chiefs, mind born powerful fake identity or famous pagan identities from tribal origin.
    • The filthy or dirty hypnotic crook games of Brahmins.
    • Major Hindu Deities and their origin.
    • 13 Most Heinous Crimes by Brahmins.
    • Who is really Lord Vishnu? Is he a Brahmin?
    • Logical true ages of Hindu deities.
    • Hegemony of Brahmins and the Brahminical system in independent India.
    • Bramhanism Theological spiritual Political Parties.
    • What is Hindu and what is RSS?, and what is the conspiracy behind RSS’s “Bharat Mata ki Jay?”
    • When a Hindu get married both of them promise to perform Vedic sacrifices.
    • How God Industry Works.
    • Present famous castesm promoter Sanatani or Brahmanism spiritual agents.
    • RSS persecution with fake sedition case to an innocent in 2016
    • Caste system (Manusmritic Jati Pratha) promoters in the name of Hindu nationalist.
    • Nazism and Narendra Modi
    • Why is BJP backing an outfit inspired by Mussolini and accused of terror?
    • Hindutva’s Foreign Tie-up in the 1930s
    • Hindutva’s fascist heritage
    • Anti National Organization RSS
    • Brahminism persecution in Democratic India.
    • Brahmins Terrorism as RSS
    • Identities theft by Brahmins.
    • Brahmin is above the law
    • Exposing Racial Crimes of Brahmins
    • The reality and unveiling of Hinduism
    • Brahmins are ‘Terrorists’
    • Ambedkar and Phule on Brahmins
    • Brahmins made mania of Rama
    • RSS India’s No.1 terror group: Former Mumbai police officer.
    • Brahmin Dharma’ is a conspiracy to make mulnivasis slaves
    • Brahmins made Sudra Vedic stooge Indian PM (ब्रम्हणोकी चमचा).
    • RSS (Brahmin Terrorists) man of role in 2008 Malegaon blast
    • The True Face of Marathi Brahmins
    • Facebook India runs according to RSS (Brahmin Terrorist Organisation)!
    • Brahmins are ‘Terrorists’
    • Behead Those Who Convert” Says Hindu Leader Pravin Togadia
    • Hindu Polarizer & Radical Terrorist Praveen Togadia.
    • Heinous crook Brahmins Destroyed Buddhism from its own Birth place.
    • Brahmins raped many girls in the name of Dharma.
    • Caste and Racial Discrimination by Brahmins.
    • Origin of Vedas, Their Inspiration, and Authority
    • Textual Corruption of the Vedas by Brahmins.
    • The Status Of Women As Depicted By Manu In The Manusmriti
    • Brahminical usurpation of Buddhist centres.
    • Sati Pratha: The Burning of Widows by Brahmanism
    • ब्रम्होणो की नियोग और नारी नीति
    • Evil Manusmriti, मनुस्मृति : अपराध और दंड
    • Fake protest of cow slaughtering by Brahmins. Brahmins were the Cow eater.
    • Obscenity of Brahmanism.
    • Brahmanism (Hinduism) and Lust.
    • List of true devotees of Brahmanism
    • Crook Brahmins Manu Smriti and Untouchables
    • Crook Brahmin’s leader Mulshankar (Dayanand Saraswati) and Casteism
    • Brahmins promoted women as a commodity.
    • Brahmins Manu and the Shudras
    • Brahmins the root cause of all evils in India.
    • Brahmins Fabricated even Veda and confused and fooled to Hindus.
    • Only Stupid Brahmins taught Cow dung and urine are sacred.
    • How peaceful are Hindus? Hindus meant to Brahmins
    • Extremist Brahmins Don’t recognize Indian constitution as their constitution.
    • Female Foeticide in India is only due to Brahmins.
    • Brahmins are Major reason for Muslims Population.
    • Brahmin Gurus Controls India controlling politics.
    • The Laws of Manu (Constitution of Bramhanism)
    • Were Buddhists persecuted by Brahmins?
    • How Adi Shankara destroyed Buddhism and founded ‘Hinduism’ in the 8th century.
    • Chhatrapati Shivaji & Balaji Baji Rao
    • Brahmins bag most top BJP posts
    • Brahminocracy Media Mafia.
    • Brahmins favoritism in Indian Cricket.
    • Upper castes dominate media: Survey
    • Dishonest and Corrupt Brahmin scholars.
    • Brahmins & Devdasi
    • Women in Brahmanism
    • Brahmins suppressed Shudras not to be educated so that they can cheat & exploit them as they like.
    • Media,entertainment and BRAHMINS
    • Brahmins Cruelties…
    • Corrupt Hindu priest exposed Hinduism is pure fraud
    • Gujarat Riots was a Brahmin’s Conspiracy.
    • Narendra Modi is a puppet to Brahmins (RSS)
    • Brahmanic usurpation
    • BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) is a Brahmins remoted party.
    • Brahmins Fabricated Chankaya’s Biography
    • Brahmins Had created Fake Jagannath Culture replacing Buddha.
    • Devadasis were degraded buddhist nuns
    • Mandal Commission, Rajiv Gandhi and the Manuwadi Conspiracy
    • Kancha Ilaiah – Why I am not a Hindu
    • Brahmins Destroyed the dravidian Indus Valley civilization
    • Aishwarya Rai – A victim of Brahmin Conspiracy
    • The eleven Brahmins and eleven million fools
    • List of Brahmins those are succesfull



    Hindu and Hinduism is a conspiracy to slave Indians by Vedic Caste system which is defined in Rig Veda Purusha Sukta 10.90.

    Watch the video: Κοροϊδία γύρω από το φυσικό αέριο Αύξηση στις τιμές της τάξης του 300% από τις αρχές του έτους (February 2023).

Video, Sitemap-Video, Sitemap-Videos